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ABSTRACT 
I consider who should undertake humanitarian intervention. Should we prefer 
intervention by the UN, NATO, a regional or sub-regional organisation, a state, a group 
of states, or someone else? This thesis answers this question by, first, determining which 
qualities of interveners are morally significant and, second, assessing the relative 
importance of these qualities. The thesis then considers the more empirical question of 
whether (and to what extent) the current agents of humanitarian intervention actually 
possess these qualities, and therefore should intervene. Overall, I develop a particular 
conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. I use this conception of 
legitimacy to assess not only the current interveners, but also the desirability of potential 
reforms to the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The natural order conducive to human peace demands that the power to counsel 
and declare war belongs to those who hold the supreme authority (St. Augustine 
of Hippo in Aquinas 1972,83). 
Since the end of the bipolar, divisive international system of the Cold War, the United 
Nations and its Security Council have been reinvigorated, and this has been reflected in 
the number of its peace operations. Military force sponsored by the UN was used only 22 
times from 1946 to 1990, but 56 times from 1990 to 2000 (Ku and Jacobson 2003,17). 
There has been a similar proliferation in peace operations by non-UN actors, such as 
regional organisations (Bellamy and Williams 2005). 
The events of September 11 th, 2001 and the 2003 War on Iraq, however, risked 
undermining this new-found willingness to undertake humanitarian action. First, in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U. S., a common - and perhaps well-founded - 
fear was that states would turn inwards, focusing their interests on national security and 
the 'War on Terror' rather than on humanitarian intervention to protect the human rights 
of individuals in far-off places. Second, the U. S. and U. K. -led operation in Iraq 
threatened to damage the credibility of humanitarian intervention irrevocably, since one 
of the Justifications offered by George Bush and Tony Blair was essentially humanitarian: 
to end the violation of human rights by the Ba'athist regime and to bring freedom and 
democracy to Iraq. That this war had seemingly questionable motives, used force 
indiscriminately, involved the abuse of civilians, and has led, in effect, to civil war, could 
have created an unrelenting cynicism and rejection in the international community of any 
international action for apparently humanitarian purposes. The risk of world public 
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opinion and elites being against any future international action with a purported 
humanitarian justification was increased further by the degree of worldwide attention on 
- and condemnation of - the war. 
' 
Although these two events have led to a reluctance on the part of western states to 
participate in peacekeeping operations and perhaps to conduct controversial humanitarian 
interventions in the future, there have still been a number of humanitarian interventions 
and peacekeeping missions since (Macfarlane et al 2004). 2 Examples include: 
intervention in the Ivory Coast by France, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and the UN; the ECOWAS and UN action in Liberia in 2003; the 
European Union (EU) and UN intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR 
Congo); the Australian-led peacekeeping mission in the Solomon Islands in 2003; 
African Union (AU) peacekeeping in Darfur and Burundi in 2003 and 2004 respectively; 
and the U. S. intervention in Haiti in 2004. In addition, there continue to be calls for 
humanitarian intervention to be undertaken in a number of other places where the 
violation of basic human rights currently goes unchecked. More generally, despite recent 
opposition to the war in. Iraq, there has been a growing consensus in the international 
community that humanitarian intervention can be morally acceptable on occasion. 
Indeed, it is much harder to find someone who completely supports non-intervention 
nowadays. The lack of action in Rwanda (or, more accurately, lack of effective action) 
and the subsequent genocide had a massive impact on the theory and practice of 
'These two events led a leading commentator to conclude that "the sun of humanitarian intervention has set 
for now" (Weiss 2004,149). 
'Indeed, Gray suggests that there has been a "surge in peacekeeping comparable to that in the early 1990s! ' 
(2005,208). 
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intervention. Even those who are deeply suspicious of humanitarian intervention and 
deeply sceptical about its prospects of success will probably still admit that it might, in 
theory, be justified when a humanitarian crisis is sufficiently serious. 
Underlying this apparently increased acceptance of humanitarian intervention has 
been a gradual change in the concept of sovereignty. As traditionally conceived, the 
principle of sovereignty emphasises a state's freedom from external interference, so that 
it can pursue whatever policies it likes within its own boundaries. Although this notion of 
sovereignty as authority provided a legal and normative barrier that weaker states could 
use to fend off the interference of larger states, it presented the leaders of certain states 
with what was essentially a free hand to violate their citizens' human rights with 
impunity. Humanitarian intervention, from this perspective, is unjustifiable. Indeed, a key 
aspect of the traditional notion of sovereignty is the non-intervention principle. This 
principle is encapsulated by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which states: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
This notion of sovereignty as authority, however, is no longer so sacrosanct (Chopra and 
Weiss 1992). As the notion of universal human rights has grown in standing in the 
international community, the concept of sovereignty has been gradually changing to one 
of sovereignty as responsibility, the responsibility to uphold citizens' basic human rights. 
A key development in this context has been the report by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (ICISS) 2001, Yhe Responsibility to Protect (this 
report is generally referred to as T2P). Commissioned by the Canadian government in 
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response to a request from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and led by former 
Australian foreign affairs minister, Gareth Evans, R2P argues that if a state does not 
protect the human rights of its citizens, sovereignty is temporarily suspended, and there is 
an international responsibility to respond. Accordingly, there is a universal responsibility 
to undertake humanitarian intervention to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. At the UN World Summit in 2005, the 
heads of the member states accepted that the international community has a universal 
responsibility to protect should national authorities be unwilling or unable to protect their 
populations (UN 2005,30). 3 
Yet it remains unclear who in the international community has this responsibility. 
The problem, as Thomas Weiss notes, is that the term international community is vague 
and "without a policy edge. Using it allows analysts to avoid pointing the finger at which 
specific entities are responsible when the so-called international community fails to 
respond or makes a mess of things" (2001,424). We need then to be more specific: who 
exactly in the international community should intervene? Should it be the UN, NATO, a 
regional organisation (such as the African Union), a state or group of states (perhaps with 
the authorisation of the UN Security Council), or someone else? It is vital that we make 
this decision if we are to discharge effectively the responsibility to protect. Otherwise, as 
Alex Bellamy asserts, "there is a real danger that appeals to a responsibility to protect 
will evaporate amid disputes about where that responsibility lies" (2005,33). 
3 See Bellamy (2006a) for a detailed account of how this agreement was reached (and watered down from 
the original R2P concept, away from an obligation to intervene and from action undertaken without UN 
Security Council authorisation). 
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But, as things stand, there is not an obviously legitimate institution - or, as 
Bernard Williams (1995,1) puts it, a salient institution - to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. In (most) domestic societies, the question of who should stop violations of 
basic human rights (such as murder and rape) tends not to arise because an effective and 
4 credible police service exists to tackle these crimes. But there is no direct analogy to the 
domestic police in the international system. To see this, consider the following leading 
candidates for humanitarian intervention, none of which stand out as an obvious choice to 
intervene given their track records. I will offer only a brief sketch of the current 
problematic situation here; the problems highlighted will be considered more extensively 
later in the thesis. 
The UN might appear, at first glance, to be the most appropriate agent. Its 
jurisdiction, as outlined in the UN Charter, is universal and includes matters of peace and 
security. It is also widely accepted as being able to undertake or to authorise humanitarian 
intervention legally. Yet two events have cast significant doubts on its ability and 
credibility as a humanitarian intervener. The first was its failure to act effectively in 
response to the Rwandan genocide, despite there being a UN force (UNAMIR) of 2,500 
peacekeepers in Rwanda to monitor the Arusha peace accords. In February 1994, 
UNAMIR's force commander, Major-General Rom6o Dallaire, obtained death lists of the 
names of Tutsi and moderate Hutu targets. It was clear that genocide was on the cards, 
but Dallaire was denied his request for permission to capture and destroy arms caches. 
Instead, in the middle of the crisis, the size of UNAMIR was decreased, leaving only a 
token force. This sent a clear message that there was little intention to stand in the way of 
4Williams (1995,1) makes a similar point. 
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genocide (ICISS 2001b, 98). The second infamous crisis on the UN watch was only one 
year later. This was in Srebrenica in July 1995, which was at the time a UN 'safe haven'. 
As such, it was supposed to enjoy the protection of UNPROFOR, the UN force in Bosnia. 
UN member states were, however, unwilling to provide the ground troops necessary for 
effective protection. As a result, Bosnian Serbs overran Srebrenica and massacred several 
thousand Bosnian Muslims. Since then, Srebrenica has become synonymous with the gap 
between Security Council rhetoric and effective action (ICISS 2001b, 93). 5 There are, 
then, serious questions about the UN's capacity as an agent of humanitarian intervention. 
As these two cases demonstrate, its member states rarely give it the resources to intervene 
effectively and, as a result, it has not been able to muster the force levels required for 
missions that go much beyond peacekeeping and transitional administration. 
In light of these difficulties when the UN acts itself, one alternative is an 
international mandate by the UN Security Council given to a state, a coalition of the 
willing, or regional organisation to undertake humanitarian intervention. Primafacie, this 
appears to be the ideal solution to the problem of who should intervene. It seems to avoid 
the excesses of unilateralism, overcomes the problems with the UN's lack of capability to 
intervene, and still maintains a sense of internationalism. Indeed, the 1999 UN Security 
Council-authorised, Australian-led intervention in East Timor appeared to bear out the 
optimism about this mandate option. Australia provided the necessary troops for 
successful intervention, suffered little by way of military casualties, received a stamp of 
international authorisation, and achieved a successful resolution to the crisis. 
50verall, as many as 230,000 people died in Bosnia during UNPROFOR's watch (ICISS 2001b, 93). 
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Yet the UN-authorisation option is perhaps not as good a solution as it first 
appears. The Security Council's representativeness and functioning (especially the veto 
powers of the permanent members) are morally problematic, and this means that it is far 
from obvious that interveners authorised by the Security Council are legitimate. 
Furthermore, the Security Council often fails to authorise humanitarian intervention when 
it is desperately needed. The most infamous case of this was its decision not to authorise 
NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo. Both the history of the Milosevic regime during 
the Bosnian war and its behaviour in Kosovo in late 1998 and early 1999 indicated that 
another state-sponsored ethnic cleansing was imn-ýinent. NATO member states sought 
Security Council authorisation to undertake what was essentially preventative action, but 
the mandate was not forthcoming, largely because of Russia's close ties to the Milosevic 
regime. 
Despite the lack of Security Council authorisation, NATO intervention in Kosovo 
was largely successful in preventing a humanitarian crisis on the scale of Bosnia. There 
was, however, significant controversy surrounding this unauthorised action. According to 
some, NATO action significantly risked undermining international law and order, and in 
particular, the general prohibition on the use of force. Moreover, the means used by 
NATO, which included cluster bombs and excluded ground troops, seemed to be highly 
objectionable. Therefore, humanitarian intervention by collective security organisations 
such as NATO and, more generally, unauthorised intervention (action without the 
authorisation of the UN Security Council), is also not an obvious solution to the problem 
of who should intervene. 
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Intervention by regional organisations has its difficulties as well. Take, for 
instance, ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990. Although this Nigerian-led operation 
(ECOMOG) had some success in achieving peace around the capital city and protecting 
civilians within its control, it was not able to establish security elsewhere (ICISS 2001b, 
83; Nowrojee 2004,5). The Nigerian troops committed abuses against civilians and 
supplied arms to some of the factions, thereby contributing to the proliferation of the 
conflict (Nowrojee 2004,5). 6 
It is a similar story for humanitarian intervention by a state or coalition of states. 
The French-led operation (Operation Unicorn) in the Ivory Coast, for instance, has 
struggled to sustain neutrality. The force first incurred the wrath of the rebels for blocking 
their advances on Abidjan, but more recently pro-government militias have attacked 
French interests and expatriates, and President Laurent Gbagbo's supporters have claimed 
that Operation Unicom has been siding with the rebels. The French have been left with 
essentially no option but to muddle through. They cannot pull out, since exiting would 
mean that the Ivory Coast plunges even further into civil war, and they cannot overthrow 
Gbagbo, for fear of an international outcry. 
Therefore, there are a number of potential agents of humanitarian intervention, but 
there is no stand out candidate. Which of these agents should intervene is far from being a 
foregone conclusion. The issue is instead surrounded in controversy, complexity, and 
ambiguity. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, captures the dilemma we face: 
6 In addition, the legal basis of this intervention was dubious: there was no Security Council authorisation 
(although it did receive retrospective authorisation) and the ECOWAS treaty did not permit it to deal with 
internal conflicts (ICISS 2001b, 81). 
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To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the 
use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask - not in 
the context of Kosovo - but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and 
hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act 
in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council 
authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to 
unfold? 
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when States 
and groups of States can take military action outside the established mechanisms 
for enforcing international law, one might ask: Is there not a danger of such 
interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created 
after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future 
interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these 
precedents, and in what circumstances? (1999,1). 
Who then should intervene? This thesis aims to provide a detailed analysis of this 
question. I will consider which agent of intervention should intervene if, and when, there 
is a humanitarian crisis in the future that requires humanitarian intervention. Should we 
prefer intervention by the UN, NATO, a regional or sub-regional organisation, a state, a 
group of states, or someone else? 
To make this choice, we need to know which qualities of interveners are morally 
important. This thesis will therefore determine who should intervene by, firstly, 
evaluating which qualities of interveners are morally significant. I do this by assessing 
the relevant factors when deciding who should intervene. This normative analysis forms 
the bulk of this thesis. Each core chapter examines and evaluates the importance of 
various potential factors. Some of the issues I consider are as follows. Is it important that 
an intervener has a humanitarian motive? How much moral weight should be assigned to 
the importance of an intervener's legal status according to the international law on 
humanitarian intervention? How important is it that an intervener will be effective and 
what does this mean in practice? Can an intervener be legitimate if its intervention harms 
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its own citizens' well-being? How important are the effects of an intervener's action on 
international peace and security9 Is it important that an intervener uses only humanitarian 
means even if these undermine its effectiveness? Should an intervener be welcomed by 
those it is trying to save? Must an intervener have the support of its home population 
before undertaking humanitarian intervention? 
Having determined which qualities are morally relevant, this thesis will, secondly, 
consider the more empirical question of whether (and to what extent) the current agents 
of humanitarian intervention actually possess these qualities, and therefore should 
intervene. How effective can we expect UN action to be in the future? Is NATO likely to 
use humanitarian means? Do regional organisations, such as the AU, have the capacity to 
undertake representative humanitarian intervention? Are Western states likely to have the 
support of those suffering the humanitarian crisis? 
Overall, this thesis aims to develop a particular normative conception of 
legitimacy that answers the question of who should intervene. Note here that I shall use 
the term 'legitimate' to encompass all of the qualities that are morally relevant for 
identifying an actor as the appropriate intervener. Thus, a 'fully legitimate' actor would 
possess all of these qualities and the 'most legitimate' actor would possess them in 
greater measure than any other. With the conception of legitimacy detailed, we will be 
able to assess whether a particular intervener, such as NATO, is legitimate. In addition, 
this conception of legitimacy will help to evaluate potential reforms to the mechanisms 
and agents of humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, this thesis will consider not simply 
who, out of the current agents of intervention, should undertake humanitarian 
intervention, it will go on to delineate what sort of agent should ideally undertake 
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humanitarian intervention - an intervener that is fully legitimate according to the 
conception of legitimacy outlined. Whilst this agent might not be viable in the immediate 
future, it will help to see what we should work towards. 
Throughout the thesis, I do not presuppose that, when a humanitarian crisis arises, 
there will be a large pool of interveners ready and willing to undertake humanitarian 
intervention from which we can select. For varying reasons, there is often an 
unwillingness and a lack of commitment to undertake humanitarian intervention. My aim 
is to indicate whose intervention we should prefer when a humanitarian crisis arises. I 
will also indicate who would be the next best choices, if the first choice decides not to 
intervene. Towards the end of the thesis, I will consider ways of achieving these goals, 
that is, of improving the willingness and commitment of potential interveners, so that in 
the future we will have more willing - and better - interveners to choose from. 
The importance of the topic 
Some question the significance of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. Darrel 
Moellendorf (2002,121), for instance, suggests that legitimate authority is only 
'plausibly good' for intervention. In his words: "The main reason in support of this 
condition is the good of international order. A world in which interventions occurred only 
if authorized would be more orderly than one in which unauthorized, but otherwise just, 
interventions occurred" (Moellendorf 2002,121). It is necessary to refute this claim since 
it challenges the raison detre of this thesis. There are two points to make in response. 
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First, Moellendorf's criticism of what he calls 'legitimate authority' does not 
seem to be targeted at the value of having a legitimate intervener, but instead at the value 
of an intervener receiving UN Security Council (or, more generally, international) 
authorisation. It is important to note here that 'legality' does not necessarily imply 
'legitimacy', as used in this thesis. 7 It follows that, although the UN Security Council 
may have the legal authority to authorise humanitarian intervention, the interveners it 
authorises may not necessarily be legitimate. Moellendorf s rejection of the importance 
of legitimate authority is best understood as a rejection of the importance of the former 
(the importance of legal authority for humanitarian intervention) rather than the latter (the 
importance of moral legitimacy for humanitarian intervention). 
Second, once we accept that legitimate interveners are not necessarily only those 
that have UN Security Council authorisation, it becomes clear that the legitimacy of the 
intervening agent is highly significant. To start with, it has a large impact on the justice of 
an intervention. In this context, consider Allen Buchanan's (2000) assertion of the 
fprimacy of legitimacy'. 8 This does not mean that considerations of legitimacy have 
priority over considerations of justice; rather, "it is simply a denial of the claim that what 
is just can be determined independent of considerations of legitimacy" (Buchanan 2000, 
89 n2). 
More broadly, there are a number of reasons, both political and moral, why the 
topic of this thesis - the legitimacy of the agents of humanitarian intervention - matters. 
As already indicated, there is no obviously legitimate agent for humanitarian intervention, 
yet we need to determine who should intervene in order to be able to discharge 
7 See Chapters 2 and 3 for further discussion and analysis of the link between legality and legitimacy. 
81 discuss Buchanan's account of legitimacy in detail in the next chapter. 
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effectively the responsibility to protect. Moreover, the moral stakes could not be much 
higher. Perhaps most significantly, which particular agent undertakes humanitarian 
intervention has substantial implications for (1) those suffering the humanitarian crisis. 
T'housands of peoples' lives, security, and future depend on which particular agent 
intervenes. Yet it is not just those subject to the intervention who are affected by which 
particular agent intervenes. This may seem quite an obvious point, but who intervenes 
also has significant implications for (2) those individuals who collectively form the 
intervener. These individuals may face increased taxation, decreased spending on public 
services, military casualties, but, at the same time, may enjoy an improved international 
standing. Moreover, there are (3) significant implications for the international system as a 
whole as well. On the one hand, a legitimate intervener might improve the standing of the 
UN and promote the rule of international law. Conversely, an illegitimate intervener 
might undermine the credibility of the UN, including its status as the locus of decision- 
making on the use of force, weaken international law and order, and, in particular, state 
sovereignty and the general prohibition on the use of force. It may also destabilise certain 
regions and areas, such as by creating refugee flows, and perhaps damage the standing 
and credibility of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention so that there will be fewer 
humanitarian interventions in the future. Thus, it is clear that who intervenes is more than 
a side issue; its political and moral implications are substantial and merit the scrutiny that 
this thesis provides. 
Ibis thesis's focus on the agents of humanitarian intervention distinguishes it 
from other discussions of humanitarian intervention, which tend to concentrate on 
whether, when, or why a particular action (humanitarian intervention) is justifiable. For 
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the purposes of this thesis, I largely assume that humanitarian intervention is justified in 
certain circumstances, that is, when a serious humanitarian crisis arises. My concern 
instead is who should intervene in these circumstances. More generally, this thesis has an 
agent-based framework instead of concentrating on the act of intervention. And whilst 
there is some overlap between the two questions on certain issues, 9 my approach 
concentrates much more on the institutional questions - the qualities needed for an 
intervener to be legitimate - than most other accounts, which tend not to address directly 
these questions and which instead devote their energy to the question ofjust cause. 
Indeed, this topic has been overlooked to a certain extent in the literature. 
Although there is an extensive literature on what constitutes legitimacy within the state 
(e. g. Christiano 1996; 2004b; Duming 2003b; Green 1988; Raz 1986; 1994; Regan 1989; 
Simmons 1979), this has not yet been extensively applied to humanitarian intervention. 
Most discussions of humanitarian intervention concentrate mainly on the legality of the 
intervention or, as noted, on when, whether, or why humanitarian intervention is 
justifiable (e. g. Chesterman 2001; Farer 2005a; Heinze 2004; Ramsbotharn and 
Woodhouse 1996; TesOn 1997; Wheeler 2000). And of those who do consider who 
should intervene, most tend to frame this issue in terms of either unilateral or multilateral 
intervention, which can be too simplistic and state centric. Instead, I take a broader 
perspective that looks at the deeper underlying issues of this debate and considers in 
detail the sorts of qualities we should look for in interveners. Of course, there is also 
9For instance, in Chapters 4 and 51 will argue that whoever intervenes must be likely to be effective and 
ICISS, who in R2P presents criteria on when humanitarian intervention is justified, argues that 
humanitarian intervention must be undertaken only when there is a "reasonable chance of success" (2001 a, 
x1l). 
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some literature that does take this sort of broader perspective (e. g. ICISS 2001b; Reisman 
and McDougal 1973; Tan 2006; Walzer 2002b), but there is not a detailed and systematic 
treatment of the agent-based issue of who should intervene and the concomitant issue of 
legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. 
In addition, in the course of this thesis I present my own answers to a number of 
issues and develop a particular normative (and complete) conception of legitimacy for 
humanitarian intervention which has not yet been outlined in the relevant literature. 
Moreover, a number of the works on humanitarian intervention have a strong 
focus on the case studies. Their focus is largely on providing descriptive accounts of the 
previous incidents of humanitarian intervention, offering normative and conceptual 
arguments only intermittently (primarily at the start and at the end). I will not replicate 
that model here; the literature on the case studies is already extensive. 10 Instead, I will 
focus on various approaches to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and the 
related conceptual and normative arguments, making use of examples of previous 
instances of humanitarian intervention to support my arguments and to repudiate others 
where necessary. 
That said, it might help focus the concerns of this thesis if I list here some of the 
previous incidents of humanitarian intervention from the past 35 years. These cases are 
uncontroversially instances of humanitarian intervention: they are both commonly 
'OThe most informative accounts of the previous instances of humanitarian intervention are Chesterman 
(200 1), Franck (2002), ICISS (200 1 b), Murphy (1996), Weiss (2005b), and Wheeler (2000). ICISS (200 1 b) 
has a particularly detailed list of sources for each case of humanitarian intervention. 
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regarded in the literature as instances of humanitarian intervention and they fall under the 
definition of humanitarian intervention provided in Chapter 2.11 
" India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 in response to severe Pakistani 
oppression of Bengalis. 
" Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1979 to tackle the murderous regime of Idi 
Amin. 
" France's 1979 intervention in the Central African Republic that engineered a 
bloodless coup against the self-proclaimed and brutal Emperor Bokassa. 
" ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990 to restore law and order. 
" French, British, and American intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 to create safe 
havens and to implement no-fly zones to protect thousands of endangered Kurds. 
" The U. S. -led intervention in Somalia in 1992 to open up humanitarian corridors. 
" French intervention in Rwanda in mid-1994 in the aftermath of genocide. 
" U. S. -led intervention in Haiti in 1994 to restore the democratically-elected Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide. 
" NATO's bombing of Bosnian-Serb positions in 1995 to end the civil war in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
"The understanding of these previous incidents of humanitarian intervention varies from author to author. 
Most, however, would agree that these interventions are cases of humanitarian intervention. Other possible 
cases are more controversial. ThTee that do not make it on this list are Vietnamese intervention in 
Cambodia in 1978, U. S. -led action in Afghanistan in 2001, and U. S. and U. K. -led action in Iraq in 2003. 
These actions did not have a humanitarian intention and so are not cases of 'humanitarian intervention. See 
Chapter 2 for further analysis. 
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" ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 to restore peace and stability after 
much fighting. 
" NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to protect the Kosovan Albanians from 
ethnic cleansing. 
" Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999 after Indonesian brutality. 
" UN action (including an EU force) in eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo since 1999. 
" U. K. intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 to strengthen the UN's faltering 
mission, UNAMIL. 
" ECOWAS, the UN, and the U. S. intervention in Liberia in 2003 after the renewal 
of fighting. 
" French intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003. 
The road ahead 
Having listed some previous cases of humanitarian intervention, let me now outline how 
this thesis will proceed. The next chapter defines the terms 'legitimacy' and 
'humanitarian intervention'. 12 Since both terms can be employed in a number of different 
ways, it is essential for the meaning and clarity of what follows to indicate how I use 
12 Note that, despite having listed some cases of humanitarian intervention above, it is still necessary in the 
pext chapter to consider in detail how we should define 'humanitarian intervention'. Also note that, given 
that these cases are commonly regarded as instances of humanitarian intervention in the literature, they will 
have some impact on the definition of the term presented in the next chapter. 
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these terms. In addition, the definition of humanitarian intervention presented identifies 
four defining qualities that an agent must have in order to be engaged in 'humanitarian 
intervention'. These conditions do not prejudge an intervener's legitimacy, but they do 
set the boundaries in which the normative debate about who should intervene must take 
place. To that extent, Chapter 2 starts to answer the question of who should intervene. 
But it is in Chapters 3 to 6 that the real normative analysis occurs, i. e., the 
discussion of which factors are morally relevant when deciding who should intervene. 
Chapter 3 analyses various readings of the international law on humanitarian intervention 
and then assesses the moral significance of an intervener's legal status. Here I consider - 
and largely reject -a number of possible arguments for the importance of an intervener's 
legal status, including the claim that illegal humanitarian intervention is abusive and 
undermines international order. This chapter also examines - and questions - the intrinsic 
and instrumental importance of an intervener's motives. 
Chapters 4 and 5 consider the importance of what I argue is a much more 
significant factor - an intervener's effectiveness. Chapter 4 outlines and defends what I 
call the 'Moderate Consequentialist Approach'. This holds that an intervener's 
effectiveness is the primary determinant of its legitimacy. More specifically, I distinguish 
between three types of effectiveness - internal effectiveness, global external 
effectiveness, and local external effectiveness - and go on to argue that effectiveness is a 
necessary condition of an intervener's legitimacy. To give this argument for an 
intervener's effectiveness a more solid philosophical foundation, I apply Joseph Raz's 
account of legitimate authority to humanitarian intervention, which, like the Moderate 
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Consequentialist Approach, takes consequences to be the primary determinant of 
leizitimacy. 
Having defended the Moderate Consequentialist Approach in Chapter 4, Chapter 
5 considers two possible alternatives to this approach. The first, the 'Non- 
Consequentialist Approach', holds that an intervener's effectiveness is of little or no 
moral concern. The second approach considered is one that gives exclusive weight to an 
intervener's effectiveness - which I call the 'Extreme Consequentialist Approach'. To 
show that this approach is unpersuasive, I outline the importance of an intervener's 
following principles of jus in bello (principles of just conduct in war). Although the 
importance of fidelity to these principles can occasionally be outweighed, they still need 
to be taken into account in a complete conception of legitimacy for humanitarian 
intervention. This, I argue, is one of the key attractions of the Moderate Consequentialist 
Approach. 
Chapter 6 argues that, in addition to fidelity to the principles ofjus in bello, there 
are two further non-consequentialist factors that should affect who intervenes - what I 
call an intervener's 'internal representativeness' and its 'local external 
representativeness'. The importance of these factors, I claim, further demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the Extreme Consequentialist Approach and, as a corollary, further 
establishes the persuasiveness of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
Chapter 7 begins by bringing together the findings of the previous five chapters to 
provide a complete conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. This 
conception of legitimacy, with its emphasis on effectiveness, provides the framework for 
answering the question of who should intervene. Chapter 7 then goes on to use this 
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conception of legitimacy to consider, who, out of the currently existing agents of 
humanitarian intervention (such as NATO, the UN, states, and regional organisations), is 
the most legitimate and should therefore actually undertake humanitarian intervention. I 
conclude that, although some agents of intervention possess an adequate degree of 
legitimacy, no current agent isfully legitimate according to the conception of legitimacy 
identified. 
For this reason, Chapter 8 considers some proposals for improving the 
mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention so that we can legitimately tackle 
egregious violations of human rights on a much more frequent basis. More specifically, I 
evaluate four sets of proposals, before presenting two suggestions for reform, one long- 
term, one short-term. The thesis concludes by considering how we can realise these 
reforms. 
26 
CHAPTER 2: LEGITIMACY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
DEFINED 
This chapter clarifies the key terms used in the course of this thesis. It is divided into two 
sections. The first outlines how I will use the term 'legitimacy' throughout the thesis; the 
second examines what is meant by 'humanitarian intervention'. 
The need for such analysis is clear. To start with, the concept of 'legitimacy' can 
be used in a number of different ways, from implying mere legality, to identifying an 
institution that has the support of its subjects, to denoting morally justified power. It is 
therefore necessary to outline how this concept will be used. In addition, clarifying how I 
will use the term 'legitimacy' is essential for the understanding of the normative 
arguments that are made in the later chapters. In particular, the analysis of the concept of 
legitimacy in this chapter will (1) make clear what exactly it is that we are concerned 
with when we consider who should intervene, (2) clarify how the various factors in the 
legitimacy of an intervener hang together, (3) make explicit the relevance of ex ante and 
e-x post questions of legitimacy in this context, and (4) identify the various types of 
legitimacy that will be encountered in this thesis. 
The term 'humanitarian intervention' can also be employed in a number of 
different ways. For instance, it may be defined broadly to include humanitarian assistance 
and peacekeeping, or more narrowly to exclude interveners without humanitarian 
motives, or, alternatively, to include a number of normative criteria so that the rectitude 
of humanitarian intervention is presumed in the definition. With each subtle and not-so- 
subtle variation in definition, the scope for the ensuing normative arguments alters. If, for 
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instance, one includes humanitarian motives in the definition of humanitarian 
intervention, then one cannot criticise humanitarian interveners that lack a humanitarian 
motive, since such interveners would not be engaged in 'humanitarian intervention'. It is 
important, then, also to present a precise definition of what I mean by 'humanitarian 
intervention'. This definition, first, will set the normative boundaries for what follows. 
Some issues and arguments, such as those concerned with peacekeeping and non- 
humanitarian intervention, will be placed outside the remit of this thesis. Second, the 
definition will identify the defining qualities that an agent must have to be a humanitarian 
intervener. Therefore, some potential interveners will be ruled out, i. e., (i) those agents 
not engaged in military or forcible action, (ii) those not responding to a situation where 
there is grievous suffering or loss of life, (iii) domestic agents, and (iv) those without a 
humanitarian intention. 
I. LEGITIMACY FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION INTRODUCED 
In this first section, I will outline how I will use the term 'legitimacy' in this thesis. I 
should make clear here that my discussion in this section will relate to legitimacy as a 
concept rather than a conception. The difference is that the former (a concept) is 
normatively neutral, more general, and includes many conceptions, whereas the latter (a 
conception) is a more specific, normative notion, incorporated with other conceptions 
within the broader concept. 13 For instance, John Rawls (1999a, 9) defines the concept of 
justice as the proper balance between competing claims and a conception of justice as a 
13 The distinction between a concept and a conception is most famously made by Rawls (I 999a, 8-9). 
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set of related principles for identifying relevant considerations which deten-nine this 
balance. In this chapter, I will be concerned with giving an account of how I use the 
concept of 'legitimacy' in general rather than with offering any specific normative 
argument that defends my particular conception of legitimacy. For most of the remainder 
of this thesis, I will be concerned with analysing different normative arguments and 
presenting my own particular conception of legitimacy. 
My use of the concept of legitimacy draws on Allen Buchanan's account of 
political legitimacy. This account is normative in that it is concerned with the morality of 
political power, and, as such, differs from sociological legitimacy. To possess 
sociological legitimacy (or 'perceived legitimacy'), an agent needs those who are under 
its jurisdiction to believe that it is legitimate, that is, to believe that its use of power is 
morally justifiable. As such, sociological legitimacy is explanatory: those utilising this 
concept (most typically political scientists) examine whether a particular relationship is 
legitimate according to the beliefs of those subject to it and, if so, why. Normative 
legitimacy, on the other hand, is prescriptive (and falls within the province of moral 
philosophy); it does not depend on the beliefs of those subject to power, but is instead 
determined by whether an agent actually is legitimate. This depends on moral 
considerations, such as consent, procedure, legality, consequences, etc. 14 As Daniel 
Bodansky notes, there is "a conceptual difference between saying, 'the Security Council 
is legitimate', and 'the Security Council is accepted as (or perceived as) legitimate"' 
(1999,602). 
14 The distinction between normative and sociological legitimacy blurs if one holds that individuals' beliefs 
in legitimacy are morally relevant. 
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It is also important to distinguish between legitimacy and legality. Sometimes 
'legitimate humanitarian intervention' is used as a synonym for legal humanitarian 
intervention. This is especially prevalent amongst international lawyers. There is nothing 
mistaken in this use of legitimacy when it is used purely terminologically. It is simply 
one use of the term legitimacy, my use of the term legitimacy to mean morally justified 
power is another. However, those that use legitimacy in a purely legal sense on occasion 
drift between using it to imply legality and using it to imply morally justified power. The 
implicit assumption made then is that which is legal is morally justifiable and that which 
is illegal is not. By contrast, my use of the term legitimacy does not imply legality (I use 
'authority' to denote legality). Whether the law is in fact legitimate - meaning morally 
justifiable - needs to be subject to argument. 
15 
The implicit assumption made about the moral justifiability of that which is legal 
relates to another assumption often made about legitimacy. Legitimacy is sometimes 
treated as equivalent to procedural justice. That is, it is thought to depend, for example, 
on whether an institution follows procedures that are democratic, have been consented to, 
and are legal. Legitimacy is then contrasted with substantive justice, which depends, for 
example, on whether an institution has good laws and is effective (e. g. McDougall 2004; 
The Stanley Foundation 2004; Kurth 2006). But this purely procedural account of 
legitimacy rules out a consequentialist understanding of legitimacy, such as that 
presented by Raz (1986), which, I shall argue in Chapters 4 and 5, is largely persuasive. It 
is better then to treat legitimacy as involving issues to do with both procedural and 
substantive justice. The consequentialist conception of legitimacy can then be 
"I consider this issue in detail in the next chapter. 
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incorporated into our general understanding of legitimacy. 
For my account of the concept of legitimacy, I largely rely on the clear, simple, 
and judicious framework presented by Buchanan (2002; 2004). 1 should say here that, 
although I use largely the same concept of legitimacy as Buchanan, the conception of 
legitimacy I present later in the thesis differs from his in at least two ways: first, it 
addresses many issues on which he is silent; and second, it directly conflicts with his own 
particular normative conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. In other 
words, I invoke Buchanan here for conceptual, rather than normative, purposes. 
Buchanan (2002,693-694) argues that, in general, any theory of the morality of 
political power must answer two questions: (1) 'the agent-justiflability question' - under 
what conditions is it morally justifiable for some agent or agents to wield political power 
and (2) 'the reasons-for-compliance question' - under what conditions do those over 
whom political power is exercised have sufficient reasons to comply with its demands. 
Question (1) focuses on the morality of the agents wielding power, asking for an account 
of the qualities they need to be justified in exercising power (Buchanan 2004,290). 
Question (2) focuses on the objects of political power, asking what sorts of conditions, if 
any, provide sufficient reason for their compliance with this political power (Buchanan 
2004,290-29 1). 16 
Question (1) concerns legitimacy. For Buchanan, legitimacy is "about the 
conditions that must be satisfied if it is to be morally justifiable to use force to secure 
compliance with principles of justice" (2000,73). It follows that "[w]hether an entity is 
16 Although they ask different things, the two questions are obviously linked. The conditions that satisfy the 
agent-j usti fi ability question are also likely to satisfy the reasons-for-compliance question. 
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politically legitimate depends on only whether the agents attempting to wield political 
power in it are morally justified" (Buchanan 2004,239). So, legitimacy pertains to agents 
- it is an 'agent-justifiability question'. Rather than the focus being on whether a 
particular action is justified, the concern is with the justifiability of the agent undertaking 
the act. Hence, to answer question (1), we need to know the qualities of an agent that 
would mean it could justifiably wield political power. 17 When we apply this 
understanding of legitimacy to humanitarian intervention, the focus is on the agent 
undertaking the humanitarian intervention - the intervener. The intervener requires 
certain qualities to be legitimate. These features make it an appropriate agent to wield 
political power (i. e. to undertake humanitarian intervention). A central aim of this thesis 
is to determine what these features are. That is, I will answer the question of who should 
intervene by assessing the qualities needed for an intervener to be legitimate and then 
examining which interveners, if any, have these qualities. 
Question (1) is where our main interest lies, but to gain a better understanding of 
the morality of political power in the case of humanitarian intervention, it is worth also 
addressing question (2). In response to question (2), 1 suggest that each and every 
individual has a natural duty to do what he or she can to prevent, halt, and decrease 
substantial human suffering, such as in cases of genocide and large-scale violations of 
human rights. The existence of such a duty is highly intuitive. To see this, consider the 
alternative where there is no such duty and inaction in the face of extreme human 
17 This treatment of legitimacy as morally justified power is quite prevalent. However, some, such as 
Simmons (1999), take legitimacy to be much stronger than this, for instance by implying moral obligation 
owed to the institution. Buchanan's (and my) use of the term 'legitimacy' is much closer to Simmons' 
account of 'justification'. 
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suffering is morally acceptable, even if we can prevent it at little or no cost to ourselves. 
This duty to prevent human suffering is not dependent on high levels of interdependence; 
instead, it is universal, generated from a fundamental moral premise that human suffering 
ought to be tackled. 18 To be sure, however, this duty to tackle human suffering is not 
always an overriding duty-, sometimes there are countervailing moral reasons against 
fulfilling it (for example that its fulfilment would cause more suffering and would 
undermine valuable personal relationships, such as family relationships). ' 9 
What does this general duty to tackle human suffering mean in practice? First, for 
those agents that can do so legitimately, the more general duty to tackle human suffering 
translates into a more specific duty (and a right) to undertake humanitarian intervention. 
Second, for those agents that cannot intervene legitimately (perhaps because they would 
not be effective, or lack the resources to intervene, or would not be able to intervene 
without excessive cost to themselves), there is no duty to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. (Otherwise, such agents would have a duty to undertake what would be, in 
effect, illegitimate humanitarian intervention, which seems odd. ) Instead, the more 
general duty to prevent human suffering translates into other, more specific, duties. These 
might include duties: (a) to work towards becoming legitimate interveners (perhaps by 
"As such, I largely endorse interactionalism over institutionalism (see Pogge 1992). An institutional 
approach "maintains that principles of justice apply to 'insfitutions"' whereas an interactional approach 
"maintains that principles of justice apply even in the absence of a common institutional background" 
(Caney 2005,105-106). For a more detailed defence of how the duty to intervene (which is a corollary of 
the duty to prevent suffering) can be generated from fundamental moral premises, see Bagnoli (2006). 
191n Chapter 5,1 suggest a subtle amendment to the duty to prevent human suffering to make it less 
demanding for those agents that have already done their fair share. 
33 
Chapter 2: Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention Defined 
improving capability); (b) to prevent human suffering in ways that can be done 
legitimately (such as by using diplomatic pressure and giving aid); and (c) to assist (and 
not to resist) those that are attempting to tackle human suffering. This last duty means 
that those in the political community that is subject to the intervener's political power 
have sufficient reason to comply with its demands. It therefore provides an answer to 
question (2), 'the rcasons-for-compliance question'. To give an example, a bystander in a 
target state which is in the midst of genocide has sufficient reason to comply with (and 
not to resist) an intervener that is attempting to stop the genocide. This is because 
complying with the intervener would most likely assist in reducing suffering. By 
complying, the bystander acts on her duty to do what she can to prevent, halt, and 
decrease substantial human suffering. 
Scalar and fonvard looking 
I need to make two additional clarifications about my use of legitimacy. First, I take 
legitimacy to be scalar, that is, a matter of degree. We can distinguish between an 
intervener possessingfull legitimacy and an intervener possessing an adequate degree of 
legitimacy. An intervener possessing an adequate degree of legitimacy is morally 
acceptable. However, it is desirable to have an intervener with a more than adequate 
degree of legitimacy and, in particular, an intervener that isfully legitimate, for the simple 
reason that such an intervener's use of power would be more morally justified. 
A number of different qualities contribute to the legitimacy of an intervener. To 
befully legitimate, an intervener needs to have all the relevant legitimating qualities. But 
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an intervener does not have to have all of these qualities in order to have an adequate 
degree of legitimacy. It may, for instance, be effective, representative, and legal, but not 
use humanitarian means, and yet still be legitimate overall. An intervener can also have 
varying degrees of the qualities, possessing high levels of one quality but less of another. 
For example, it may be extremely likely to be globally externally effective, closely follow 
principles ofjus in bello, and be highly internally representative, but make only a small 
effort to be locally externally representative. Any combination of qualities is acceptable, 
as long as they each contribute enough legitimacy so that, when added together, the 
intervener possesses an adequate degree of legitimacy. 
Some characteristics will make a large contribution to an intervener's legitimacy, 
others will be less significant. But each of the qualities is limited in how much it can 
contribute and therefore an intervener needs to possess a number of the qualities in order 
to reach an adequate degree of legitimacy. In other words, most of these legitimating 
qualities, taken singularly, are not necessary or sufficient conditions for an adequate 
degree of legitimacy. (That said, I argue in Chapters 4 and 5 that effectiveness, given its 
importance, is a necessary condition for an intervener to be legitimate - and can be a 
suffi'dent condition in certain circumstances. ) Hence, this approach is cumulative: the 
legitimacy of an intervener depends on the combined contribution of the various qualities 
it possesses. 
This approach differs from a categorical approach, such as that sometimes found 
in Just War Theory. According to some accounts of Just War Theory, war can be justly 
waged only when eight criteria of jus ad bellum Oust cause, reasonable prospect of 
success, right authority, right intention, formal declaration of war, last resort, absolute 
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justice, and proportional response) are met. If one of these criteria is not met, war should 
not be waged. In recent years, many theorists have used the same categorical approach 
for humanitarian intervention. The most significant example is the Canadian government- 
commissioned R2P (ICISS 2001 a), which requires an intervener to meet five criteria Oust 
cause, proportionate means, last resort, reasonable prospects, and right intention) . 
20 So, 
on a categorical approach, an intervener would need to possess all of the relevant 
qualities in order to be legitimate. If it were to lack even one quality, it could not be 
legitimate. For example, if intervention is not the last resort, then it should not occur, 
even though it may be a proportionate response to a just cause undertaken for the right 
reasons and with a good chance of success. The main difference between the scalar 
approach I use in this thesis and the categorical approach favoured by some accounts of 
Just War Theory (beyond the difference in focus - jus ad bellum considers when 
intervention is justified; I consider who should do it) is that, on my position, fulfilment of 
all the criteria is not always necessary. On occasion, an intervener that lacks one quality 
could still possess an adequate degree of legitimacy (depending on the other qualities it 
possesses). Notwithstanding, to be fully legitimate, an intervener will need to possess all 
of the relevant qualities. 
The second clarification is temporal. Two types of question might be raised when 
considering the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. One is backward looking (ex 
post) and is concerned with whether an intervener was legitimate in a particular case. The 
20 Other notable examples include Farer (2005a), the report of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004,57-58), A More Secure World., Our Shared Responsibility, and 
Kofi Annan (2005), who, in the report, In Larger Freedom, calls for the use of force to meet certain criteria. 
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other is forward-looking (ex ante) and is concerned with whether an intervener will be 
legitimate. My concern is with the forward-looking (ex ante) question. The concern of 
this thesis is who should intervene if there is a humanitarian crisis that requires 
intervention in the future. As such, this thesis aims to provide practical guidance for the 
future, that is, it aims to provide an action-guiding moral theory. Ex post questions of 
legitimacy - questions of whether an intervener was legitimate - are not directly relevant, 
although they can help to provide historical evidence on which to base future decisions, 
such as an agent's track record of undertaking successful humanitarian intervention. 
Chris Brown (2005,228), however, objects to the ex ante approach (and, in 
particular, to Tom Farer's (2005a) five-part test for humanitarian intervention). He claims 
that "they are not actually the kind of questions states ask before the event in order to 
decide whether or not to act" (Brown 2005,228). The role for such questions is not to 
guide behaviour, but to help us judge a humanitarian intervention after the event (Brown 
2005,228). This objection is mistaken. Some states, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and 
the U. K. (primarily during Robin Cook's tenure as Foreign Secretary) have been directly 
concerned with these sorts of forward-looking issues and have produced their own 
forward-looking tests on when war should be waged. 21 Other states that are less directly 
concerned with these issues are still influenced by international moral norrns on such 
matters. For instance, before deciding whether to intervene, these states may act upon the 
forward-looking questions, not because they believe that this is the right thing to do 
(although this may influence their decision-making too), but because their international 
2 'The Canadian government was responsible for R2P. Also see Tony Blair (1999) and the Dutch Advisory 
Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (2000). 
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reputation would be damaged otherwise. And even if no states were influenced by the 
forward-looking questions I am concerned with, it is still conceivable that they could be 
concerned with these questions. Indeed, we should work towards persuading our leaders 
to be more concerned with these issues. Moreover, Brown's acceptance that these kinds 
of questions can help us judge intervention after the event (ex post) sits ill at ease with his 
belief that these kinds of questions do not influence our judgment beforehand (e-x ante). 
As Farer responds: "If a test, developed in light of past experience and thought 
experiments, influences their assessment of acts or omissions that have already occurred, 
why should we assume that it will not be around to influence decision-making when the 
next similar case comes down the road? " (2005b, 243). 
Internal and external legitimacy 
For a fuller understanding of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, we need to note 
the two types of legitimacy that an intervener can have. This distinction will recur in 
various forms throughout this thesis. 
The first concerns the intervener's use of political power over those who make up 
its citizens. This is what Buchanan (1999) calls an intervener's 'internal legitimacy'. It 
depends on whether an intervener is morally justified with respect to the population under 
its normal jurisdiction, such as a state's citizens if a state is the intervener. This does not 
(necessarily) mean that these individuals need to believe that the intervener is legitimate. 
Instead, an intervener needs to act in a certain way or to have a particular structure that 
means it is legitimate for these individuals. The second type of legitimacy is what 
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Buchanan calls 'external legitimacy'. External legitimacy depends on "whether 
intervention by one state or by a collection of states can be justified to the state that is the 
object of intervention, or to the community of states as a whole" (Buchanan 1999,72). 
Again, this does not mean that these individuals must believe the intervener to be 
legitimate; rather, it means that the intervener is structured or acts such that its power 
over them (its intervention) is morally justified. 
It helps to distinguish between two sorts of external legitimacy. The first sort of 
external legitimacy - what I shall call 'local external legitimacy' - depends on whether 
an intervener is morally justifiable for those in the political community that is subject to 
its intervention, whereas the second sort of external legitimacy - what I shall call 'global 
external legitimacy' - depends on whether it is morally justifiable for those in the wider 
international community (apart from those who have been taken into account under the 
other two notions of legitimacy). On the one hand, an intervener may successfully halt a 
massive violation of human rights in a particular community - and therefore possess local 
external legitimacy - whilst on the other hand its intervention may destabilise the 
surrounding region, cause widespread loss of life elsewhere, and set a precedent which 
undermines international law - and therefore lack global external legitimacy. 
To illustrate fully the different types of legitimacy an intervener can possess, 
consider Operation Turquoise, the French intervention in Rwanda in 1994. The internal 
legitimacy of France in this case depended on whether it was morally justifiable in 
domestic terms, i. e., with regard to French citizens. For instance, two factors that might 
have influenced the internal legitimacy of Operation Turquoise was whether it took into 
account the opinions of French citizens on whether they wanted to intervene in Rwanda 
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and how many French soldiers arrived home in bodybags. France's local external 
legitimacy depended on whether it was morally justifiable for Rwandan citizens. This 
could be influenced, for instance, by whether Operation Turquoise helped to end the 
genocide and whether the Rwandans wanted intervention. Lastly, the global external 
legitimacy of France's intervention depended on whether it was morally justifiable for the 
wider international community. Factors that might influence this include its effects on 
international law and whether the exodus of the interahamwe (the Hutu militia largely 
responsible for the Rwandan genocide) into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
that region's subsequent destabilisation, was caused by Operation Turquoise. 
11: DEFINING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Having seen how the term 'legitimacy' will be used, I will now define 'humanitarian 
intervention'. This will clarify one of the key terms of this thesis and one that is 
employed in a number of different ways in the literature. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the definition needs to accord in reasonable measure with the term as it is used in the 
relevant literature, in policy-making circles, and in the wider international community. 
I develop my definition by analysing the four main aspects of a humanitarian 
intervention. First, I consider what R. J. Vincent calls 'the activity of intervention' (1974, 
7). Secondly, I examine the circumstances of humanitarian intervention, and, after 
dismissing two leading conceptions, propose that humanitarian intervention occurs in 
situations of 'actual or impending grievous suffering or loss of life'. Thirdly, I consider 
who undertakes humanitarian intervention and argue that this must be an outside party. 
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Finally, I consider at length the crucial question of whether humanitarian intentions, 
motives, and/or outcomes should be included in the definition of humanitarian 
intervention. 
It is important to distinguish the definitional issue of the qualities that an agent 
needs to be engaged in humanitarian intervention from the normative issue concerning 
the qualities it needs to be engaged legitimately in humanitarian intervention. By defining 
humanitarian intervention, the ensuing discussion will provide an account of certain 
qualities that an intervener must have if it is to be engaged in 'humanitarian intervention'. 
Let me explain. Some qualities are implicit in the meaning of humanitarian intervention. 
These qualities are its defining conditions rather than its legitimating conditions. In other 
words, they help to define a humanitarian intervener, rather than what counts as a 
legitimate humanitarian intervener. So, by defining humanitarian intervention, I will, at 
the same time, outline some of the qualities that an intervener must have. Specifically, I 
will argue that it needs (i) to be engaged in military and forcible action; (ii) to be 
responding to a situation where there is impending or ongoing grievous suffering or loss 
of life; (iii) to be an external agent; and (iv) to have a humanitarian intention, that is, a 
predominant purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the ongoing or impending 
grievous suffering or loss of life. Unless it has all four qualities, an agent cannot be said 
to be undertaking 'humanitarian intervention'. This section will therefore begin analysing 
who should intervene since certain interveners will be ruled out (i. e. those without these 
four qualities). 
This is not to prejudge the legitimacy of an intervener: an intervener that is 
engaged in 'humanitarian intervention' according to the definition I outline might still be 
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illegitimate. To be legitimate, it needs to have a number of other, moral, qualities. Thus, 
the definition I present is intended to be non-natively neutral. This contrasts with a 
definition of justijiable humanitarian intervention, which, by including a number of 
normative criteria, builds the rectitude of humanitarian intervention into its definition. 
International lawyer, and former Argentine diplomat, Fernando Tes6n (1997,121-127) 
provides the best example of a definition of justifiable humanitarian intervention. He 
argues that, for an intervener to be said to be engaged in 'humanitarian intervention', it 
must, amongst other things, be welcomed by victims of the oppression, use right-inspired 
means, and be governed by the interplay of principles of proportionality and restoration 
of human rightsý All humanitarian interventions that meet this definition will be 
justifiable as well. The difficulty with this sort of definition is that it risks twisting the 
definition of humanitarian intervention so as to exclude morally problematic cases of 
humanitarian intervention, which, despite their difficulties, are still generally regarded as 
instances of 'humanitarian intervention'. As Charles Beitz argues with regard to non- 
intervention, "if it turns out that there are cases in which some forms of intervention are 
morally pen-nissible, one should acknowledge that fact rather than conceal it behind a 
cumbersome and mystifying definition" (1979,74). Consequently, a normatively-neutral 
approach to the definition of humanitarian intervention is superior because it is "better to 
separate questions of definition from questions of political ethics" (Beitz 1979,74). 
(i) The activity of humanitarian intervention 
Let us begin by considering what sort of action an intervener must be engaged in. One 
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option is that its intervention must be forcible (Bull 1984,1; Chesterman 2001,3; 
Holzgefe 2003,18; Stowell in Chesterman 2001,1 n3; Windsor 1984,50). To be 
forcible, humanitarian intervention does not have to involve the actual use of force, but it 
must involve at least the threat of force. From this perspective, then, non-forcible means 
are excluded. According to Simon Chesterman (2001,3), these non-forcible means are 
not part of the notion of humanitarian intervention but should be included instead in the 
concept of 'humanitarian assistance'. 
This position seems commonsensical, but the question arises: against whom must 
humanitarian intervention be forcible? Many of the narrower definitions of humanitarian 
intervention argue that it must be contrary to the wishes of the government of the political 
community that is subject to the intervention. In other words, humanitarian intervention 
must lack the consent of the government of the target state. The reasoning is that action 
that has been consented to is not intervention because it does not violate state sovereignty 
(Chesterman 2001,3; Coady 2002,10; Holzgrefe 2003,18; Roberts 1993,429). Yet this 
is unduly restrictive. International action that has the support of the target state's 
government can still be humanitarian intervention. For instance, the Australian-led 1999 
intervention in East Timor, which was consented to by the Indonesian government, is 
widely (and rightly) regarded as an instance of humanitarian intervention. " It is 
important though that the action is against someone's wishes, such as militias, warlords, 
or criminal gangs - particularly those who are responsible for the humanitarian crisis - 
even if it is not necessarily contrary to the wishes of the government of the political 
community that is subject to the intervention. 
22 That said, the consent of the Indonesian government was largely obtained by duress. 
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It follows that there is a distinction between humanitarian intervention and certain 
forms of peacekeeping. The essential problem with the latter is that they are not forcible. 
The mandate and rules of engagement of these types of peacekeeping missions (i. e. first 
generation or traditional peacekeeping) are not strong enough for them to be deemed 
humanitarian intervention. 
In addition, humanitarian intervention must be military (Roberts 1993,445). 
Otherwise, it would include a vast number of actions that we do not commonly regard as 
humanitarian intervention. Firstly, economic interventions, such as sanctions, trade 
embargoes, and boycotts, and, secondly, diplomatic interventions, such as denunciation, 
the restricting of certain individuals' ability to travel, and the cutting of diplomatic ties 
would all be included under the definition of humanitarian intervention, and this would 
sit ill at ease with how the term is employed in the literature. 23 
Hence, the activity of humanitarian intervention must involve both a military and 
a forcible element . 
24 This excludes forcible but non-military actions, such as economic 
sanctions, and military but non-forcible actions, such as certain types of peacekeeping. 
23 Indeed, humanitarian intervention is sometimes referred to as 'humanitarian military intervention' in the 
literature. 
24 A mission need not be wholly forcible and military, however. It is still possible for NGOs to be agents of 
humanitarian intervention on this understanding, even though they lack a military (and often a forcible) 
element. They can be part of a broader humanitarian intervention that involves the use of force by other 
agents, such as the opening up of humanitarian corridors. 
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(ii) The circumstances of intervention 
When does humanitarian intervention occur? One option is that humanitarian intervention 
5 
is a response to acts which 'shock the moral conscience of mankind' (Walzer 2000a) .2 
Yet the vagueness of this criterion is its downfall. As Peter Singer argues, the problem 
with the "appeal to the 'conscience of mankind' criterion is that this conscience has, at 
various times and places, been shocked by such things as interracial sex, atheism, and 
mixed bathine' (2002,122-123). Another option is to say that humanitarian intervention 
is a response to 'crimes against humanity'. The benefit of this approach is that it allows 
for more specificity. Singer (2002,124-125), for instance, goes on to list the definition of 
'crimes against humanity' given by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. However, this approach is unduly restrictive, since it limits humanitarian 
intervention to political acts of killing and inflicting harm. 26 It seems that humanitarian 
intervention can also occur where the political community concerned has attempted, but 
is unable, to remedy the situation. 27 
25Note that some of the accounts of the circumstances of intervention surveyed in this section are part of a 
definition of justifiable humanitarian intervention rather than a definition of humanitarian intervention. 
Nevertheless, it is insightful to consider these arguments in relation to a neutral definition of humanitarian 
intervention. 
26 Heinze (2003) also argues that the rights violations must be politically caused, that is, purposely violated 
with disrespect by a militia or government (such as ethnic cleansing and genocide), rather than being 
indirectly denied (for instance, by famine, social injustice, and starvation). 
2'For further criticisms of limiting the circumstances in humanitarian intervention to politically caused acts, 
see Mehta (2006,267). 
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The literature's favoured line on this is fairly restrictive: it declares that 
humanitarian intervention must be a response to the violation of basic human rights (e. g. 
Abiew 1999,31; Holzgefe 2003,18). And this is not the 'everyday' violation of basic 
human rights; rather, it is reserved for gross or massive violations (Vincent 1986,127). 
But this account is problematic since it assumes that humanitarian intervention cannot 
occur in small-scale cases. The exclusion of small-scale cases assumes that a 
proportionality requirement should be included in the definition of humanitarian 
intervention. This is premature. Although there is a good case for insisting that the 
number of human rights violations must be large for humanitarian intervention to be 
justifiable (I argue this point in Chapter 4), it is nevertheless possible for an intervener to 
be engaged in humanitarian intervention even in small-scale cases. For instance, an 
intervener that responds to a humanitarian crisis in a n-iicrostate would still be engaged in 
'humanitarian intervention', even though the number of violations of basic human rights 
would be small. Thus, the case for making large numbers of human rights violations part 
of the definition of humanitarian intervention is unconvincing. 
Rather than defining the circumstances of humanitarian intervention as those in 
which the moral conscience of mankind is shocked, there are crimes against humanity, or 
there is a gross violation of human rights, I will take them to be circumstances in which 
there is 'actual or impending grievous suffering or loss of life'. The benefits of this view 
are that it is neither so indeterminate as to depend on the subjective conscience of 
humanity, nor so determinate as to include only political acts of killing and inflicting 
harm. Furthermore, Mark Stein argues that "a suffering-based definition of humanitarian 
intervention seems more consistent than a right-based definition with the dictionary 
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definition of the word 'humanitarian"' (2004,30). And, although it might not be 
sufficiently specific for justifiable humanitarian intervention, it is adequate for the 
purposes here of presenting a neutral definition of humanitarian intervention. 28 
It is important to re-emphasise that an intervener that is responding to such 
circumstances is not necessarily legitimate and that humanitarian intervention may be 
unjustifiable. For instance, one may hold that to violate justifiably another state's 
sovereignty or communal autonomy, the situation must be more serious than that required 
by the definition of humanitarian intervention. The discussion in this section has 
concentrated on the circumstances in the target state that enable us to say that an 
intervener is engaged in 'humanitarian intervention' rather those that relate to its being 
justifiably engaged in humanitarian intervention, which is commonly referred to as 'just 
cause i, . 
29 
(iii) Who undertakes humanitarian intervention? 
An important, but quite uncontroversial, condition for intervention is that it is conducted 
by an external agent or "an outside party" (Bull 1984,1). This means that a state 
resolving its own humanitarian crises and an insurrection by an ethnic group within a 
state to end a crisis are not examples of a 'humanitarian intervention', whereas a state 
intervening to resolve another state's humanitarian crisis is. In short, humanitarian 
2'That said, this definition can be used, for the most part, interchangeably with 'the violation of basic 
human rights' (as long as it is not insisted that the violation is on a large scale). 
29 In Chapter 4,1 suggest that an intervener must have a just cause in order to be legitimate and outline what 
this is. 
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intervention must be transboundary. Yet 'outside parties' can range from global 
institutions to multinational companies and private individuals. To narrow this wide 
array, many theorists contend that only certain forms of agents can undertake 
humanitarian intervention. Let us now briefly examine and repudiate the two foremost of 
these arguments. 
Stanley Hoffmann (and many others) claim that it is only states, state-based, or 
state-backed institutions that can intervene (1984,10). But against this argument, non- 
state actors, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private military 
companies (PMCs) can intervene, have intervened, and do intervene (see Gaer 2000; 
Singer 2003b). Thus, we would misrepresent the practice of current humanitarian 
intervention if we restricted the agents of intervention to states or state-based institutions. 
Alternatively, some claim that the agent of intervention cannot be an international 
organisation like the UN because "there can be no such thing as 'intervention' by an 
international organization to which its members have accorded a certain degree of 
authority" (Luard 1984,159). From this perspective, the ceding of jurisdiction by states 
to an international organisation means that the international organisation in question is no 
longer 'an outside party'. The trouble with this argument, however, is that, although a 
state may transfer some of its jurisdiction to supra-national institutions, like the EU or the 
UN, it retains the vast majority of its powers. These remaining powers mean that 
intervention by an international organisation should still be regarded as intervention by 
'an outside party'. If a state were to transfer more of its powers of jurisdiction, including 
its monopoly over the use of force, to an international organisation, then that international 
organisation might not be conceived as an external agent. But since no state has yet done 
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this, international organisations still constitute 'outside parties' and remain as potential 
agents of humanitarian intervention. 
It is apparent then that there is no need to place any restriction on the sort of agent 
that can undertake intervention in the definition of humanitarian intervention, apart from 
the requirement that it is an external agent. All outside parties are potential agents of 
intervention if they meet the criteria delineated in this section. The fact that many outside 
parties, such as private individuals, struggle to meet these criteria means that they are not 
engaged in humanitarian intervention. But if they were to meet these criteria, there seems 
to be no conceptual reason why they should not be regarded as agents of humanitarian 
intervention. 
(iv) Humanitarian intents, motives, and outcomes 
Although the three elements of humanitarian intervention considered thus far - the 
activity, circumstances, and agent of humanitarian intervention - take up a good part of 
the debate about defining intervention, they do not exhaust it. The task now is to decide 
whether, in addition to these three aspects, humanitarian intervention requires a 
humanitarian intention, a humanitarian motive, and a humanitarian outcome. It is worth 
noting first that, in practice, interveners tend not to have purely humanitarian intentions, 
or motives, or to achieve purely humanitarian outcomes; they have - to varying degrees - 
a combination of humanitarian, security, economic, and political intentions, a mix of 
altruistic and self-interested motives, and both increase and decrease human suffering. 
Consequently, our concern should not be with purely humanitarian intentions, motives, 
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and outcomes, but with predominantly humanitarian motives, intentions, and outcomes. 30 
Given the complexity and importance of this issue, it will help if I begin by 
clarifying the meaning of each of the three concepts that are central to it. The first is 
humanitarian intention, which means that the intervener has the purpose of preventing, 
reducing, or halting the humanitarian crisis. Such an intervener acts with the aim of 
bringing about humanitarian consequences. However, the underlying reason for the 
intervener's having this humanitarian intention does not have also to be humanitarian. It 
could be, for instance, a self-interested reason. In this context, Terry Nardin argues that 
"[o]ne should distinguish a person's goals - what he or she aims at - from that person's 
dispositions and desires - why he or she is aiming at it. There are good reasons for 
keeping these two aspects of choice separate" (2006,10; emphasis added). For example, 
State A might intervene to stop a humanitarian crisis in State B, but its reason for doing 
so is because it desires to reduce the number of refugees entering its borders. To be sure, 
to have a humanitarian intention, humanitarian objectives must not be incidental to the 
main objective. A war that has a predominantly non-humanitarian purpose, but which has 
expected humanitarian side-effects, would not be considered to have a humanitarian 
intention. If State X intervenes in State Y with the purpose of establishing a puppet 
government in State Y, it would not have a humanitarian intention, even if the 
establishing of a puppet government increases the stability of State Y and therefore has 
humanitarian side-effects. 
Second, if the intervener is to have a humanitarian motive, not only must its 
intention be humanitarian, but also its reason for having that intention. Hence, its motive 
30Mason and Wheeler (1996,95) make a similar point. 
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is the underlying reason for undertaking humanitarian intervention. In the example 
above, if State A is to have a humanitarian motive, the reason for its wanting to intervene 
in State B must be humanitarian. In other words, its humanitarian intention must not be 
due to some underlying self-interest, such as glory, power, or enrichment; on the 
contrary, it must be caused by an underlying humanitarian reason, that is, it must be 
motivated by the desire to save lives and to end human suffering. 
Many of the objections against humanitarian intervention overlook this distinction 
between intention and motive, but it is vital. 31 In fact, it is one that is commonly made in 
criminal law. Consider, for instance, a criminal who steals - which is his intention - but 
receives a lighter sentence because he has the motive of feeding his starving family. 
Tes6n surnmarises the distinction: 
Intention covers the contemplated act, what the agent wills to do. I see a person in 
distress, decide to rescue her, and do it. The action was an act of rescue. I 
intended to rescue the person, I committed to doing it, and did it... By contrast, a 
motive is afurther goal that one wishes to accomplish with the intended act. I 
rescue the person in danger, I intended to do it, so mine was an act of rescue. But 
suppose I did it because I wanted to appear as a hero in the local newspaper. I had 
an ulterior motive (2005a, 5; emphasis in original). 
Third, if a humanitarian intervention succeeds in ending human suffering then it has a 
humanitarian outcome. The intervener need not have a humanitarian motive or intention 
- for instance, it may intervene only to remove a hostile regime, and do so successfully, 
but its act may have significant humanitarian consequences. 
3 'John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham also make this distinction between intention and motive (Ridge 
2002). Also see Nardin (2006,9-11). 
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Humanitarian intentions 
Humanitarian intervention must have a humanitarian intention. That is to say, to be 
'humanitarian', an intervention must have the predominant purpose of preventing, 
reducing, or halting actual or impending loss of life and human suffering, whatever the 
underlying reasons - its motives - for wishing to do so. This assertion is well supported 
by the literature. Ellery Stowell says that humanitarian intervention is the "'reliance upon 
force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state"'; Ian 
Brownlie states that humanitarian intervention has "'the object of protecting human 
rights"'; Adam Roberts says that humanitarian intervention has "'the purpose of 
preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants"' (Chesterman 2001,1-3; 
emphases added); and Bhikhu Parekh defines humanitarian intervention as having "a 
view to ending or at least reducing the suffering" (I 997b, 5; emphasis added). 32 
Those who deny the need for humanitarian intervention to have a humanitarian 
intention could make the following argument: a humanitarian intention is not required if 
there is a humanitarian outcome. This argument is unsatisfactory, as demonstrated by the 
following example. Suppose, in the middle of the night, the electrics in house No. 13 
short-circuit, causing a small fire. The battery in their fire alarm has run out and so it does 
not sound. Soon after, a burglar breaks into the neighbouring house, No. 14, setting off 
their intruder alarm. It is so loud that it awakens the residents of house No. 13 before the 
fire in their house has time to spread and put their lives at risk. Indirectly then, the burglar 
has saved the lives of inhabitants of No. 13. But we would not call his action 
32 Also see Murphy (1996). 
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'humanitarian' because, despite it yielding a humanitarian outcome, his intention was not 
to save the lives of the inhabitants of No. 13. 
Now, if we apply this same reasoning to international intervention, it is clear that 
an intervention that does not aim to have a humanitarian outcome cannot be called a 
humanitarian intervention even if it actually results in a humanitarian outcome. In this 
context, Tes6n (2005a, 8) gives the example of the Falklands war. This resulted in a 
humanitarian outcome - the establishment of democracy in Argentina - but lacked a 
humanitarian purpose (Thatcher's intention was not to free the Argentines) and, for this 
reason, is not widely regarded as an instance of humanitarian intervention. It is clear, 
then, that a humanitarian intervention by definition must have a humanitarian intention. 
Indeed, this is how we tend to classify actions. As Tes6n. asserts, the concept of 
intention "allows us to characterize the act, to say that the act belongs to a certain class of 
acts, such as acts of rescue" (2005a, 5; emphasis in original). That is to say, a chief way 
to determine what a particular agent is doing - its action - is to look at its intentions. 
Hence, Donald Davidson asserts that "an action, in some basic sense, is something that an 
agent does that was 'intentional under some description"' (in Wilson 2002,1). Thus, the 
intention of an intervener is key to determining its action. If an intervener has a 
humanitarian intention, then, providing that it meets the other defining conditions, it is 
engaged in humanitarian intervention. 
Some who make the distinction between an intervener's motive and its intention 
go on to suggest that an intervener's intention has moral significance. Teson, for instance, 
suggests that "[flntention, unlike motive, is... relevant... in evaluating the action morally" 
(2005a, 7; emphasis in original). Similarly, Bellamy argues that "the legitimacy of a 
53 
Chapter 2: Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention Defined 
humanitarian intervention ought to be evaluated according to whether the intervener 
intended to prevent or halt an injustice and promote peace" (2004,227; emphasis in 
original). It follows then that a humanitarian intention contributes to the legitimacy of an 
intervener. 
I do not endorse this position. A humanitarian intention is only a defining 
condition of humanitarian intervention: an intervener needs to have a humanitarian 
intention in order to be engaged in humanitarian intervention. But a humanitarian 
intention is not a legitimating condition of an intervener. It does not do moral work. 
Generally speaking, an intention, by itself, is not sufficient for the moral evaluation of an 
action or agent. We need to look to other moral facts about the action or agent, such as 
whether it was done out of the right motive (although I will question the moral 
significance of this in Chapter 3 in the context of humanitarian intervention) or whether it 
was done with a reasonable expectation of success. To give an example, suppose that 
Jason intends to rescue Lucy from a prison, where she is being arbitrarily detained and 
will be executed very shortly. Without any further information, we cannot properly assess 
the moral credentials of this action. We do not know how Jason intends to rescue Lucy, 
why he intends to do it, or whether he would be successful. Now, suppose that Jason's 
action would be unsuccessful - he is ill-equipped to mount such a rescue - and, 
moreover, his action would result in the torture of Lucy for the few hours that she is alive. 
Jason is well aware of these facts, but attempts the rescue anyway. In this case, we can 
say that, given the extra information, his action was morally wrong. Or, suppose instead 
that Jason's action would almost certainly be successful - he is an ex-SAS officer and has 
in his possession a large array of firearms, which can easily overpower the prison's 
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defence systems. In this case, we can say that, given the extra information, his action was 
morally right. Moreover, if we learn further that Jason's successful action was motivated 
by financial gain, rather than out of justice, love for Lucy, etc., then we might question 
his motives. There would therefore be a more complex moral picture of the justifiability 
of his action. My point, then, is that the agent's intention is not a factor for its moral 
justifiability. Knowing that Jason has a humanitarian intention of rescuing Lucy is not 
enough to characterise his action as justifiable. For this, we need to look to other factors. 
Indeed, in Chapters 4 and 5,1 will claim that the main factor contributing to an 
intervener's legitimacy is its expectation of success. It follows that an intervener that has 
a humanitarian intention may or may not be legitimate; but an intervener that is likely to 
be successful in fulfilling its humanitarian intention will go a long way towards being 
legitimate. Thus, a humanitarian intention is a defining condition, rather than a 
legitimating condition of humanitarian intervention. 33 
Humanitarian motives 
Having claimed that humanitarian intervention must have a humanitarian intention, the 
question now is whether this intention must be motivated by underlying humanitarian 
33 To see this further, consider an intervener that has a non-humanitarian intention, but whose action would 
nevertheless result in humanitarian side-effects. It may, for instance, decide to wage war against an 
imperialistic neighbour in order to stop itself being conquered, and the expected result of this action is the 
pacification and subsequent democratisation of its neighbour. In this case, although the war would not be 
humanitarian intervention - it would not have a humanitarian intention - it still would be morally justifiable 
because of its humanitarian effects. 
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reasons. The chief argument for including humanitarian motives is that an intervention by 
definition cannot be humanitarian unless those intervening are motivated by humanitarian 
concerns. As Parekh has it, humanitarian intervention is "an act for showing concern for 
and helping our fellow human beings... born out of compassion and solidarity, not 
contempt and pity, and is motivated by a desire to help" (1997a, 64-65). It follows that 
intervention which lacks a humanitarian motive would not be regarded as humanitarian 
intervention. However, there are two difficulties with including motives in a definition of 
humanitarian intervention. 
The first problem with the claim that motives are a defining quality of a 
humanitarian intervener is ontological: whose motives should count? It is misleading to 
anthropornorphise the intervener, claiming that it has a particular motivation, for 
interveners are simply a collection of individuals. And the motivations of the individuals 
who collectively constitute the intervener cannot be easily collated so as to say that the 
intervener has a certain motive. As Shashi Tharoor and Sam Daws (2001,24) suggest, 
every intervention arises from a complex and changing context of political aims, views, 
and positions in which motives are hard to isolate and interrogate. 34 Therefore, we need 
to specify exactly whose motives matter: should we take the motives of the intervener to 
be determined by (1) the motives of the intervener's ruling elite (i. e. the governing 
authority and leading decision-makers) or (2) the motives of all those individuals who 
collectively constitute the intervener? It is questionable, if we are to take motivation as a 
34 Also see Buchanan, who argues that "[gliven the multiplicity of forces that contribute to state preferences, 
it would be remarkable if they possess the unity that psychological egoists attribute to the preferences of 
individuals" (2004,34). 
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guide, whether we should limit this to (1) the ruling elite's motivation. The risk is that 
intervention that is otherwise humanitarian would be rejected as an instance of 
humanitarian intervention if the ruling elite were motivated by non-humanitarian motives, 
such as personal glory or electoral pressures. A better indicator then would seem to be (2) 
the motivation of all those who collectively constitute the intervener, such as Americans 
if the intervener is the U. S. However, on this position, an intervener's motive would be 
impossibly complex, given the number of individuals with different motives involved. 
Thus, making motives a defining condition of humanitarian intervention risks either (1) 
disregarding obvious cases of humanitarian intervention or (2) having an unmanageably 
complex notion of an intervener's motive. 
The second problem is epistemological: there are serious difficulties in 
ascertaining an intervener's motives. Assume, for example, that we take an intervener's 
motives to be deten-nined by its ruler's motives. Establishing what motivated a ruler to 
decide to intervene is notoriously difficult. Even if we overlook the banal point that we 
can never know what someone else is thinking, attempting to discover a ruler's motives 
for intervening is decidedly tricky. For instance, did Bill Clinton want to intervene in 
Kosovo because he really cared about saving the lives of the Kosovan Albanians? Or was 
he more concerned with reducing the domestic political heat after the Monica Lewinsky 
affair? It is extremely difficult to know and, as a result, making the definition of an 
intervention hang on such matters is problematic. The same applies, but on a much larger 
scale, if we were to take an intervener's motives as the motives of all those who 
collectively form the intervener; we would face the challenge of determining all these 
individuals' motives. 
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Note here that a humanitarian intention is not subject to these two problems. First, 
an intervener's intention can be taken to be the intentions of the ruling elite, without the 
risk of these jeopardising the humanitarian credentials of an obvious humanitarian 
intervention. It seems clear that if the ruling elite of the intervener do not have a 
humanitarian intention, then nor does the intervener. Second, ascertaining the intention of 
an intervener is far easier than ascertaining its motives. Assuming that we take an 
intervener's intentions to be its ruling elite's intentions, the task is to determine what 
these are. As Bellamy argues, "a number of tests can be applied to ascertain a state's 
intentions with a reasonable accuracy" (2004,227). 1 suggest that there are three ways we 
can do this, which, when combined, can help us to build a general picture of what the 
intervener's intention is. 
The first way is to examine the rhetoric of the ruling elite (Bellamy 2004,227). 
We should look to the justifications offered and the rationales given for the intervention. 
But, in this context, Tes6n claims that "governments, like individuals, may lie about why 
they are doing what they are doing, or they may be n-dstaken about why they are doing 
what they are doing... Words lack magical power, so whether the intervention is 
humanitarian cannot depend on the government saying so" (2005a, 4). Nevertheless, the 
rhetoric of the ruling elite can provide some indication of the intention of the intervener. 
First, in many cases, a government may not be lying or be mistaken about what it is 
doing. Second, once a government has offered a humanitarian justification for an 
intervention, it often becomes tied into that justification and has to follow a subsequent 
course of action that conforms to this justification. Hence, Nicholas Wheeler argues, pace 
Tes6n, "[t]he legitimating reasons employed by governments are crucial because they 
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enable and constrain actions" (2000,27). For instance, the (first) Bush and Clinton 
Administrations' invocation of humanitarian justifications for their interventions in 
northern Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans constrained their subsequent actions by the need 
to defend these actions as being in conformity with their humanitarian claims (Wheeler 
35 2000,288). 
The second way to determine an intervener's intention is to consider the decisions 
taken by the intervener's ruling elite. Do they result, or are they likely to result, in 
humanitarian action? In other words, we need to consider the intervener's behaviour. 
Thus, Tes6n suggests that "what the intervener does is the best evidence of its intention" 
(2005a, 8; emphasis in original). Similarly, Bellamy asserts that "intentions can be 
inferred from acts themselves" and "[w]hen a state embarks on humanitarian 
intervention, the strategies it adopts allow us to infer its intentions" (2004,227). 
Third, we should look to the intervener's previous behaviour (that is, the past 
decisions of the intervener's ruling elite). How does its current intervention fit in with the 
intervener's general pattern of behaviour? 
So to judge NATO's intention in Kosovo, for instance, we can look to (1) the 
statements of the NATO heads of states and governments, (2) consider the decisions they 
"Wheeler relies on the philosophy of Quentin Skinner here. Skinner asserts that whether an actor is sincere 
or not is beside the point. What matters is that, once an agent has accepted the need to justify behaviour, he 
is committed to showing that his actions "were in fact motivated by some accepted set of social and 
political principles. And this in turn implies that, even if the agent is not in fact motivated by any of the 
principles he professes, he will nevertheless be obliged to behave in such a way that his actions remain 
compatible with the claim that these principles genuinely motivated him" (in Wheeler 2000,9; emphasis in 
original). 
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made and NATO's subsequent behaviour (e. g. was it more concerned with opening up 
humanitarian corridors or establishing access to any natural resources? ), and (3) see how 
these fit with the previous decisions taken by NATO leaders. Given that NATO leaders 
(1) repeatedly reaffirmed their desire to halt the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, (2) took 
actions that evidenced a strong desire to end the humanitarian crisis, and (3) undertook 
similar action in Bosnia, it seems clear that NATO's intention in Kosovo was 
humanitarian. 
So, to return to the main point, humanitarian motives do not have to be included 
in the definition of humanitarian intervention. 36 If an intervention does not have a 
humanitarian motive, an intervener can still be humanitarian as long as its intervention 
has a humanitarian intention (as well as meeting the other defining conditions). 
Humanitarian outcomes 
Let us now focus on the question of humanitarian outcomes. One approach holds that 
intervention must result in an improvement in the humanitarian crisis in order to be 
defined as 'humanitarian intervention'. It follows that an intervention that does not 
reduce, halt, or prevent grievous loss of life and human suffering would not be deemed 
'humanitarian', regardless of its motives or intentions. 
There is good reason, however, not to insist that humanitarian intervention must 
have a humanitarian outcome. First, the U. S. -led UN intervention in Somalia in 1992 
36 There are also difficulties with holding motives are an important moral factor in an intervener's 
legitimacy. I consider these problems in Chapter 3. 
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(arguably) did not have a humanitarian outcome, but it did have a humanitarian intention. 
If an intervention, such as in Somalia, which is generally regarded as an instance of 
humanitarian intervention, has humanitarian purposes but ultimately fails, why is it not 
humanitarian? Excluding this sort of case from humanitarian intervention would seem to 
fly in the face of common understandings of what constitutes humanitarian intervention. 
Furthen-nore, if we were to make humanitarian outcomes a defining condition of 
humanitarian intervention, we would have to wait until after intervention to see whether it 
was in fact humanitarian. As Tes6n argues, if we were to include humanitarian outcomes 
in the definition of humanitarian intervention, "actions could not be judged when they are 
contemplated, since we would have to wait for all the consequences of the action to 
unfold" (2005a, 8). 
While there is no need to include humanitarian outcomes, it is necessary to 
exclude one form of non-humanitarian outcome from the definition of humanitarian 
intervention: imperialism. After the action, the intervener may justifiably argue that it 
must stay in the political community that is subject to the intervention for a long period of 
time, perhaps to avoid a recurrence of the humanitarian crisis. But this must not extend 
into benevolent imperialism, like the American military occupation in Cuba from 1898 to 
1902, which often has humane effects but nonetheless erodes the independence of the 
object of intervention (Walzer 1992,103-104). The agent's action is no longer a discrete 
event with a beginning and an end and, therefore, as Vincent asserts, it should not be 
included in the definition since it does not possess 'a distinguishable feature of 
intervention in international politics', namely, "'stepping-out' after the objective of 
intervention has been achieved or it has failed" (1974,8). 
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Consequently, a qualification that excludes imperialism is required. This 
qualification insists that the agent of intervention must not annex any territory, set up any 
forms of indirect (neo-) colonialism, or alter the object of intervention in any other 
imperialistic manner. This, of course, cannot be determined until after intervention has 
occurred. We have no choice but to presume, in the meantime, that an intervention that 
meets the other defining conditions is humanitarian. If intervention ultimately results in 
these sorts of non-humanitarian outcomes, then, in hindsight, it should not be deemed 
humanitarian intervention. 37 For, as Parekh rightly argues, humanitarian intervention is 
"not designed to annex the state or permanently redraw its territorial boundaries. Rather it 
scrupulously respects the territorial integrity of the state and interferes with it only 
temporarily and to the minimum extent necessary to end the suffering occurring within it" 
(1997b, 5). 
The definition in full 
Having considered the main issues in defining humanitarian intervention, it is now time 
to conclude this section with the definition in full. I define humanitarian intervention, for 
the purposes of this thesis, as: 
Forcible military action by an external agent in the relevant political community 
with the predominant purpose ofpreventing, reducing, or halting an ongoing or 
37 Although this perhaps conflicts with my second argument for rejecting humanitarian outcomes as a 
defining condition of humanitarian intervention, it seems commonsensical that humanitarian intervention 
cannot result in colonial occupation, whereas it seems less commonsensical that humanitarian intervention 
must result in a humanitarian outcome. 
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inipcnding gricvous suffering or loss of life. 
Thus, to be engaged in 'humanitarian intervention', an intervener needs to meet four 
defining conditions: it needs (i) to be engaged in military and forcible action; (ii) to be 
responding to a situation where there is impending or ongoing grievous suffering or loss 
of life; (iii) to be an external agent; and (iv) to have a humanitarian intention, that is, a 
predominant purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the ongoing or impending 
grievous suffering or loss of life. 
The War in Iraq 
It is worth noting here that, according to this definition, the 2003 war in Iraq was not a 
humanitarian intervention. This is because its predominant intention was not the tackling 
of an imminent or ongoing grievous suffering or loss of life. It therefore fails to meet 
defining condition (iv). This is not to claim that the war was not justifiable (although the 
coalition would not be legitimate according to the conception of legitimacy outlined in 
this thesis), but to indicate that it cannot be included under the class of actions regarded 
as 'humanitarian intervention'. The same can be said of the U. S. -led action in 
Afghanistan. Despite having humanitarian effects, this war had the (non-humanitarian) 
intention of ensuring national security, and, as such, is also not an instance of 
humanitarian intervention (Weiss 2005b, 156). 
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Tes6n (2005a), however, disagrees with this understanding of the war in Iraq. 38 
His argument is careful and considered, and makes perhaps the strongest case that can be 
made in favour of the war being a humanitarian intervention. Tes6n also distinguishes 
between an intervener's intention and motive, arguing that only the former is relevant in 
defining humanitarian intervention. He goes on to argue that, whilst the British and 
Americans may have had dubious motives for intervening (personal enrichment, a place 
in history, etc. ), their intention was humanitarian. This intention was regime change, to 
bring to an end Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule (Tes6n 2005a). 
Tes6n is right to focus on the coalition's intention in Iraq; it is key to 
understanding whether this war is a case of humanitarian intervention, since it clearly 
meets the other defining conditions (it was military and forcible, it occurred in 
circumstances of grievous suffering, and it was by an external party). 39 But, pace Tes6n, 
it is very doubtful whether the coalition's intention was humanitarian. Rather, as Weiss 
rightly asserts, "the primary purpose of the war in Iraq was not to halt human suffering 
but rather to pursue geopolitical interests" (2005b, 179). 
Tes6n's argument relies on the humanitarian credentials of regime change, of 
ending Saddarn Hussein's tyrannical rule. But, although it may have humanitarian side- 
effects, removing a tyrannical dictator is not, in itself, humanitarian. It can be consistent 
with having a non-humanitarian intention, such as protecting national security. There 
needs to be something extra to establish the humanitarian credentials of a particular 
38AIso see Heinze (2006), who argues that the assertion that the invasion of Iraq was not justifiable is 
actually more nuanced than some may think. 
39That said, some have questioned whether the humanitarian crisis in Iraq in early 2003 was serious enough 
for the war to be humanitarian intervention. See Winston (2005) and Roth (2006). 
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regime change. 
40 
Tes6n (2005a, 13) concurs that regime change, by itself, may not be enough to 
ensure an intervention's humanitarian intention. But he argues that the coalition had a 
humanitarian intention because not only did they remove a vicious dictator, they also 
attempted to establish democracy, set up a liberal constitution, and did not leave Iraq to 
anarchy. There is little evidence, however, that the predominant intention of the regime 
change was humanitarian. We can see this by using the three tests of an intervener's 
intention outlined earlier. 
First, the rhetoric of the British and American governments claimed that the 
predominant purpose of the war - of regime change - was the national interest, primarily 
national and regional security - to remove weapons of mass destruction. In this context, 
Ken Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, asserts that the "principal 
justifications offered in the prelude to the invasion was the Iraqi government's alleged 
possession of weapons of mass destruction, its alleged failure to account for them as 
prescribed by numerous U. N. Security Council resolutions, and its connection with 
terrorist networks" (2004,6). 
Second, the behaviour of the British and American governments cohered with the 
rhetoric - the decisions taken have not been directed at benefiting Iraqi civilians. Roth 
argues that "if invading forces had been determined to maximise the humanitarian impact 
40To be sure, this is not an argument about motives. I agree with Tes6n that we should leave the underlying 
motives of leaders aside when assessing the humanitarian credentials of intervention. An agent may 
undertake intervention to remove two tyrannical dictators, one with the intention of securing national 
security, the other with the intention of halt genocide, and the leader's decisions in both cases may be 
motivated by electoral pressures. 
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of an intervention, they would have been better prepared to fill the security vacuum that 
predictably was created by the toppling of the Iraqi government. It was entirely 
foreseeable that Saddam Hussein's downfall would lead to civil disorder" (2004,6). In 
addition, the coalition employed measures, such as cluster bombs, that it was clear would 
result - and did result - in a large number of civilian casualties (Roth 2006,89-90). 
Therefore, the behaviour of the coalition also showed that it did not possess a 
humanitarian purpose. 
Third, the previous behaviour of the British and American governments in 
imposing sanctions against Iraq fits in with this pattern of behaviour. These sanctions 
exacted a terrible humanitarian toll on Iraq. As many as 500,000 Iraqi children died of 
thirst, malnutrition, and preventable diseases as a result (Winston 2005,49). Yet the U. S. 
and the U. K. continued to support sanctions against Iraq, despite opposition to sanctions 
from many other governments. 41 
Thus, the coalition lacked a humanitarian intention. For this reason, the 2003 war 
on Iraq was not a case of humanitarian intervention. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the analytical framework for the rest of the thesis. I began by 
defining what I mean by 'legitimacy'. I relied to a certain extent on Buchanan's concept 
of legitimacy. This treats legitimacy as the morally justifiable use of political power. A 
legitimate agent will have certain qualities that mean it can justifiably wield political 
'For a detailed critique of the British government's case for sanctions against Iraq, see Herring (2002). 
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power. Elaborating further, I suggested that, for the purpose of this thesis, legitimacy is a 
normative rather than a sociological concept, is not necessarily the same as legality or 
procedural justice, is forward-looking rather than backward looking, and should be 
viewed as scalar. I also distinguished between an intervener's internal legitimacy, its 
local external legitimacy, and its global external legitimacy. 
The second part of the chapter defined 'humanitarian intervention'. The meaning 
of humanitarian intervention requires that interveners have some basic qualities. To be 
engaged in humanitarian intervention, an intervener needs to meet four defining 
conditions: it needs (i) to be engaged in military and forcible action; (ii) to be responding 
to a situation where there is impending or ongoing grievous suffering or loss of life; (iii) 
to be an external agent; and (iv) to have a humanitarian intention, that is, a predominant 
purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the ongoing or impending grievous suffering 
or loss of life. 
So, we already have an idea of some of the qualities that a humanitarian 
intervener requires. In what follows, the rest of the thesis will not be concerned with 
agents that fail to meet these conditions. This chapter therefore has outlined the 
boundaries for the analysis that follows. It is important to reiterate, however, that these 
four defining conditions are normatively neutral in that they do not prejudge the 
legitimacy of an intervener. An intervener could possess these qualities, and therefore be 
engaged in 'humanitarian intervention', yet still be illegitimate. 
Over the next four chapters, I will consider the normative qualities that are 
required for an intervener to be legitimate. The next chapter - Chapter 3- begins this 
analysis by evaluating the moral relevance of an intervener's legal status and, in doing so, 
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an intervener's motives as well. I will also consider what the international law on 
humanitarian intervention is, which is vital to understanding the international picture in 
which the normative debates about humanitarian intervention take place. 
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LAAV 
Much of the controversy surrounding NATO's 1999 air campaign against Serbia arose 
from its questionable legality. Although the Security Council passed Resolution 1199, 
which affirmed "that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo... constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region" and "all parties, groups and individuals immediately 
cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire", and also passed Resolution 1203, which 
emphasised "the need to ensure the safety and security of members of the Verification 
Mission in Kosovo and the Air Verification Mission over Kosovo", neither resolution 
expressly authorised the use of force (Chesterman 2001,207-208). According to most 
international lawyers and commentators, this meant that NATO's intervention was illegal 
because it violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (stated in Chapter 1) . 
42 
There are arguably only two legal exceptions to this article: acting in self-defence 
and when the Security Council authorises the use of force under its Chapter VII powers in 
response to a threat to international peace and security. 43 However, NATO's intervention 
did not fall within either of these two legal exceptions: firstly, it was patently not self- 
42 The list of scholars who regarded the Kosovo intervention as illegal is too long to document here, but a 
sample of them are as follows: Buchanan (2003), Byers and Chesten-nan (2003), Chandler (2002), 
Chesterman (2001), Franck (2003), the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Krisch 
(2002), Lepard (2002), Mayall (2000), and Nardin (2003). 
43 As we will see, many reject the existence of a customary international law which would permit 
unauthorised humanitarian intervention and therefore provide an additional exception. 
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defence and, secondly, Russia and China made it clear that they would veto any 
resolution that expressly authorised the use of force under Chapter VII in this case. 
The controversy that surrounded the illegality of this intervention seemed to 
derive from the view that humanitarian intervention needs to have UN Security Council 
authorisation in order to be justifiable, and that illegal humanitarian intervention - 
intervention undertaken without express UN Security Council authorisation - is morally 
problematic. In other words, a humanitarian intervener needs to be legal in order to be 
legitimate 
. 
44 The primary aim of this chapter is to assess this commonly-held view. More 
specifically, I answer the following question: when deciding who should intervene, how 
morally important is it that those undertaking humanitarian intervention have the legal 
authority from international law to do so? 
The chapter will proceed as follows. I begin with an analysis of the current law on 
humanitarian intervention and consider whether a positivist or a naturalist understanding 
of international law is preferable. Having determined the current status of international 
law on humanitarian intervention, I then critically examine five reasons for treating an 
intervener's legal status as morally significant. In particular, I consider the arguments that 
an intervener's legal status is morally significant because: (i) legal interveners derive 
their authority from state consent; (ii) legal interveners derive their authority from the 
functioning of the Security Council; (iii) illegal humanitarian intervention is itself 
"Although some lawyers automatically equate legality and legitimacy, as discussed in Chapter 2, this is not 
the position taken in this thesis. Nor is this usage consistent with an apparently growing trend in 
international law to distinguish between the two. The most famous example of this is the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo's assertion that "the intervention was legitimate, but not legal, given 
existing international law" (2000,289). 
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abusive; (iv) illegal humanitarian intervention leads to abusive intervention; and (v) 
illegal humanitarian intervention unden-nines international order. 
I. THE LEGAL PICTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW ON HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
Let us start by looking at the current status of the international law on humanitarian 
intervention. Tliere are a number of different readings of the current law, but I shall focus 
on two of the most informative: international legal positivism and TesOn's natural law 
theory. The debate between these two approaches should be helpful for our purpose of 
determining what the law on humanitarian intervention iS. 45 Why is this relevant? First, 
and most obviously, if we are to assess the moral importance of an intervener's legal 
status according to current international law, we need to know what this law is. Second, 
understanding the international law on humanitarian intervention is central to grasping 
the international framework in which the normative debates about humanitarian 
intervention must work. It is important then to grasp the international legal picture before 
deciding who should intervene. 
45That is not to say that these are the only two accounts of the legality of humanitarian intervention. The 
debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention is also framed in terms of 'restrictionists' against 
6counter-restrictionists', 'legal realism' against 'classicism' (see Farer 1991; 2003), and 'pluralism' against 
'solidarism'. These alternative ways of framing the legality of intervention cut across the 
positivisn-dnaturalism divide on some issues. However, the naturalist/positivist distinction is perhaps the 
most illuminating and revealing, and is the basis on which a clear understanding of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention can be formed. 
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A legal positivist reading of international law 
International legal positivism is a subspecies of legal positivism. It holds the 'separability 
thesis', asserting that there is a conceptual distinction between what international law is 
and what morality demands. As such, le-x lata - the law as it is - is not the same as le-x 
ferenda - the law as it ought to be. Its account of legal validity, and therefore of what 
international law is, is highly voluntaristic. International law is said to emanate 
exclusively "from the free will of sovereign independent states. There is no law except 
what is 'posited' by sovereign powers" (Wight 1991,36). There are two ways in which 
sovereign states 'posit their will', i. e., consent to international law: the first is by agreeing 
to a treaty; the second is by engaging in a practice which becomes a customary rule of 
international law over time as it is repeated (and which meets the requirements of Opinio 
juris). 46 In other words, for international legal positivism the two sources of international 
law are treaty and custom and, as such, moral considerations are not necessary for legal 
validity. 
International legal positivists generally take the following position on the legality 
of humanitarian intervention. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides a general 
prohibition on the use of force. There are only two legal exceptions: unilateral47 or 
46 See below for a statement of the requirements of opiniojuris. 
47 'Unilateral' is sometimes used by international lawyers to refer to action by any number of states that lack 
UN Security Council authorisation. This usage is confusing. I will use 'unilateral' to refer to an intervention 
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collective self-defence and Security Council enforcement action under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. Most international legal positivists reject the existence of a third possible 
exception to Article 2(4), which would hold that unauthorised humanitarian intervention 
is legal because there is a customary international law for this practice. Their argument, 
in brief, is that there is insufficient state practice to establish such a customary 
international law (e. g. Byers and Chesterman 2003; Chesterman 2001; DUPI 1999). It 
follows that humanitarian intervention - which violates Article 2(4) - can be legal only 
when undertaken for self-defence or when the Security Council authorises it. 48 We can 
dismiss the former because humanitarian intervention will be very rarely, if ever, legal on 
the basis of self-defence, so defined in international law. 49 Interveners therefore need to 
have Security Council authorisation in order to be legal. 
This reading of the law on humanitarian intervention, however, is disputed by 
some who regard it as being too broad (e. g. Joffe 1994). They can cite Article 2 (7), 
which states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
carried out by one state on its own and 'unauthorised' to refer to an intervention that lacks Security Council 
authorisafion. 
48 In fact, there are two additional (but less significant) exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. The 
first is when the target state expressly agrees to the intervention. The second is intervention undertaken by 
the African Union. Article 4 (h) of the Charter of the African Union permits it to intervene in grave 
circumstances (war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity) in countries which have signed up to 
the treaty. 
OThe International Court of Justice has ruled that claims of self-defence can be made only in response to 
'an armed attack' (ICISS 2001b, 160). 
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intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
Since Chapter VII measures refer only to 'international threats to peace and security', and 
since humanitarian intervention rarely constitutes an international threat to peace and 
security, it may seem that the Security Council cannot legally authorise humanitarian 
intervention. What this overlooks, however, is that Article 39 of the UN Charter states: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
As such, the Council is able to act in response to almost any situation it chooses to 
interpret as a threat to international peace and security. Although the Security Council is 
officially constrained by the purposes of the Charter, there are no effective judicial 
mechanisms to enforce this (DUPI 1999,72-73; Welsh 2004,182). Accordingly, "there 
appear to be no theoretical limits to the ever-widening interpretation of international 
peace and security" (ICISS 2001b, 159). 50 Indeed, since the early 1990s, the Council, on 
occasion, has broadened its determination of a threat to international peace and security 
to include intra-state war and internal oppression, and has been willing to authorise 
humanitarian intervention in these cases. Hence, broadly speaking, on an international 
legal positivist reading of international law, a humanitarian intervener is acting legally if 
501n addition, Holzgrefe argues that study of the records of the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco 
conferences (the travaux priparatoires) indicates that "the drafters of the UN Charter wanted the Security 
Council to have wide discretion in detennining the existence of any threat to the peace" (2003,41). 
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its intervention is authorised by the UN Security Council and illegally if its intervention 
lacks such authorisation. 
A naturalist reading of international law 
Others deem this understanding of the law on humanitarian intervention to be too 
restrictive. A prominent example is TesOn (1997), who, from the perspective of natural 
law, argues that those undertaking humanitarian intervention do not need to have express 
UN Security Council authorisation to be legal. 
Like all naturalist accounts, Tes6n. rejects the separation of legal validity and 
morality. His account, which is based on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive natural law 
theory, asserts that what the current status of the law is on a certain issue, such as 
humanitarian intervention, also depends, in part, on what the law ought to be. In other 
words, le-xferenda affects lex lata. TesOn's naturalism includes a large role for positive 
law, but in contrast to legal positivists, he argues that neutral analysis of the two 
traditional positive sources of international law - custom and treaty - is impossible, and 
we should therefore interpret these sources according to the best moral theory of the 
purposes of international law. This theory, according to Tes6n (1997), is a human rights- 
based approach that sees individuals as the subjects of international law and the role of 
international law as the protection of human rights. 
On the basis of this human rights-based approach, Tes6n. argues that those 
undertaking humanitarian intervention do in fact act legally, even if they lack express 
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Security Council authorisation, providing that they meet certain normative criteria. 
51 He 
reaches this conclusion principally by claiming that the selection and reading of possible 
precedents, which could establish or deny the existence of a customary law permitting 
humanitarian intervention, is inevitably affected by the interpreter's views on the role of 
international law. Given that international practice tends to be chaotic and contradictory, 
and that any attempt to find normative patterns of behaviour is result-orientated (TesOn et 
al 2003,941), he claims that we need to appeal to moral-political values to interpret 
potential precedents (Tes6n 1997,166). 
Using a human rights-based interpretation of state practice, TesOn (1997) argues 
that there are nine precedents of humanitarian intervention: India's 1971 intervention in 
East Pakistan; Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda; France's 1979 intervention in the 
Central African Republic; the U. S. 's 1983 intervention in Grenada; the U. S., the U. K., 
and France's 1991 intervention in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds; the U. S. -led 1992 
UN intervention in Somalia; the U. S. -led 1994 action in Haiti; the French-led 1994 
intervention in Rwanda; and NATO's 1994 intervention in Bosnia. To this list we can add 
NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, and the U. S. -led interventions in Afghanistan 
(2001) and Iraq (2003), which Tes6n has recently claimed were legal (2003,109 n38; 
2005c, 232 n54,393). On the basis of these precedents, Teson asserts that there is a legal 
right to intervene in customary international law for both authorised and unauthorised 
interveners. 
"These require the intervener: (1) to have a humanitarian intention and to adopt humanitarian means, (2) to 
use force effectively and only when necessary, (3) to be welcomed by the victims of the oppression, and (4) 
to be internally legitimate (Tes6n 1997,121-128; 1998,59). 
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It is hard to see how he can sustain this conclusion, however. The central problem 
is this: whilst intervention authorised by the UN Security Council is legal, too few of the 
unauthorised humanitarian interventions cited by Tes6n have met the requirements of 
opiniojuris for it to be plausibly claimed that unauthorised humanitarian intervention is 
legal according to customary international law. According to the International Court of 
Justice, the ophdojuris condition of customary international law requires: 
Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must 
have behaved so that their conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it' (in Chesterman 
2003,58 n26). 
Most of the unauthorised interveners that Tes6n cites did not behave in a way that 
evidences a belief that humanitarian intervention is legally obligatory. In particular, they 
did not claim that their intervention was legal according to the international law on 
humanitarian intervention (they instead cited other legal justifications, such as self- 
defence), nor was world opinion inclined to regard these interveners' actions as legal 
(Chesten-nan 2003,49-50). For instance, neither Tanzania in Uganda, India in East 
Pakistan (at least primarily), nor France in Central Africa invoked a humanitarian 
justification for their intervention, nor was there support for the legality of humanitarian 
intervention in the international community at the time (Byers and Chesterman 2003; 
DUPI 1999,89; Holzgrefe 2003; ICISS 2001b; Wheeler 2000). 
That said, it could be reasonably claimed that some unauthorised humanitarian 
interventions have met the requirements of opinio juris. For example: the 1992 
intervention in northern Iraq by the U. K., the U. S., and France was claimed to be in 
conformity with Security Council resolution 688, but also asserted a right of humanitarian 
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intervention (albeit a limited one which required a supporting Security Council 
resolution) (Stromseth 2003,251; Wheeler 2000,169); ECOWAS declared a right of 
humanitarian intervention in its interventions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) 
(ICISS 2001b, 166); and NATO's legal justification for intervening in Kosovo rested on 
some assertion of a right of humanitarian intervention or humanitarian 'necessity' (ICISS 
2001b, 167; Stromseth 2003,251). 
It is doubtful, however, whether any customary right of unauthorised 
humanitarian intervention can be reasonably interpreted to exist solely on the basis of 
these few interventions. Customary international law is formed by states engaging in a 
repetitive and ongoing practice; as the practice is repeated over time, it becomes law. The 
problem is that there have been too few instances of unauthorised humanitarian 
intervention that meet the requirements of opinio juris for unauthorised humanitarian 
intervention to be said to be a repetitive and ongoing practice. 
Hence, legal positivists are right in their understanding of current international 
law. Legal interveners are those with express UN Security Council authorisation and 
illegal interveners are those without it. 
11. THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AN INTERVENER'S LEGAL STATUS 
Having seen what the current international law on humanitarian intervention is, how 
important is it that those undertaking humanitarian intervention do so legally? Or, to put 
it another way, is it morally significant that interveners have UN Security Council 
authorisation? 
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It should be noted here that, although I have defended a legal positivist 
understanding of international law, this is not to reject the importance of the moral 
evaluation of the current international law on humanitarian intervention. Positivists deny 
that moral considerations are part of legal validity, but this does not mean that they deny 
moral considerations in general. On the contrary, a positivist can coherently assert that an 
intervener needs to have UN Security Council authorisation in order to possess the legal 
authority to undertake humanitarian intervention, but, at the same time, hold that whether 
an intervener has UN Security Council authorisation - and therefore has the legal 
authority to undertake humanitarian intervention - is of little moral significance. My 
point, then, is that, in this second section of the chapter, the positivism/naturalism debate 
is, in the main, left behind; we have what we want from it -a sound understanding of the 
international law on humanitarian intervention - and so can now consider the question of 
the moral significance of an intervener's legal status according to this understanding of 
international law. 
I will begin by assessing two potential procedural reasons for asserting the 
importance of an intervener's legal status. These procedural reasons defend the 
significance of an intervener's legal status by highlighting the moral value of the 
processes by which this law is formed, that is, by (I) state consent and (II) UN Security 
Council authorisation. Also note that, if these two reasons are persuasive, a legal 
intervener will be legitimate because it will be globally externally legitimate - that is, 
legitimated by global factors. 
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(i) State consent 
As already discussed, state consent is the process by which international law is created 
(by treaty and custom) and therefore the way in which interveners authorised by the UN 
Security Council ultimately gain their legal authority. Some argue that state consent is 
also inorally valuable, and consequently that international law has moral significance 
because it is formed by state consent (e. g. Doyle 2001). On this line of reasoning, then, 
the legality of interveners is important because legal interveners ultimately derive their 
authority from state consent. Why might one subscribe to this argument and how 
persuasive is it? 
A traditional, organicist approach to international law holds that the state has an 
international personality from which certain rights and duties arise and, analogously, state 
consent has moral value because individual consent has moral value. This view is most 
popular amongst classical theorists. Christian Wolff, for instance, asserts that "nations are 
regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature" and, as a result, the rights 
and obligations of men and nations are the same (in Beitz 1979,75). However, this 
argument suffers from a number of difficulties. Most notably, the comparison between 
individual consent and state consent cannot be plausibly maintained because the analogy 
between the state and the individual (commonly referred to as the 'domestic analogy') is 
false (Beitz 1979; Caney 2005; Teson 1997; Vincent 1986). In short, this is because states 
"lack the moral properties we attribute to human beings" (Caney 2005,236). This 
organicist approach to international law is also problematic because it treats state consent 
as unconditionally morally valuable, that is, valuable regardless of what goes on within 
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the state's bordcrs. For instance, the state consent of a dictatorship is deemed to have 
moral value, even if this dictator slaughters thousands of his subjects. 
A related, but more sophisticated, defence of the moral significance of state 
consent does not claim that state consent is unconditionally valuable. Rather, the claim is 
that most states represent their citizens, even if, on the face of it, they are undemocratic 
and do not have a formal system of representation. In Michael Walzer's (1980,214) 
terms, we should presume that there is a 'fit' between a people and its government. As a 
corollary, international law, which is fon-ned by state consent, is also morally valuable 
because states represent their citizens. But this argument is largely unpersuasive because 
many states are undemocratic and even some apparently democratic states are often 
unrepresentative of their citizens on specific issues, including foreign policy issues. In 
these cases, Buchanan argues, "leaders cannot reasonably be regarded as agents of their 
people" and "it cannot be said that state consent is binding because it expresses the 
people's will" (2003,152). One might reply that states represent their citizens even 
though their citizens have not expressly consented. Yet this claim has limited credibility. 
It is plausible only when there is some formal system of representation in place (this does 
not have to be liberal democracy) and when states do not seriously violate their citizens' 
52 human rights. So, although this argument is not fully convincing, neither is it wholly 
unsuccessful: state consent can be said to have some, albeit minor, moral value because, 
in some states, it expresses the wishes of that state's citizens. 
A seemingly more promising defence of the moral worth of state consent, and 
therefore of an intervener's legality, is presented by David Chandler (2002). He argues 
52 An example of such a society might be Rawls' (I 999b, 63-67) account of a 'decent hierarchical society'. 
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that state consent is necessary for the formal equality of states, which he assumes is 
morally valuable. More specifically, he argues that state consent is a crucial part of the 
'equality of derivation', which along with the 'equality of application', is required for 
international law to be based on the formal equality of states. In his words: "international 
law derives its legitimacy from the voluntary assent of nation-states... Without a notion of 
consent, the distinction between law... and repression... disappears" (Chandler 2002, 
137). 
The trouble with this argument is that it shifts the problem from justifying state 
consent to justifying the formal equality of states, and it is unclear why the formal 
equality of states has moral value. The formal equality of states cannot be plausibly 
defended on democratic or egalitarian grounds. It does not reflect an equal consideration 
for individuals (which is perhaps one of the most convincing arguments for the 
democratic ideal) since, firstly, many states are unrepresentative of their citizens on a 
number of issues, and, secondly, states of massively varying population size would be 
treated equally if we were to follow this principle (Buchanan 2004,318). And even if we 
overlook these difficulties and assume that the equality of states is valuable, there is not a 
strong link between the formal equality of states and the actual equality of states. 
Powerful states have a much greater ability to consent to international law (they are more 
likely to be the authors of customary international law and have greater bargaining power 
in treaty negotiations) and are less likely to have international law applied against them. 
This leads us to a larger problem with arguments that use state consent to make 
the case for the moral value of an intervener's legal status: in practice, international law is 
not founded on the free consent of sovereign states. The first element of this problem is 
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that, when states consent to international law, their consent is often not freely given. It is 
widely held that consent needs to be free from duress and that there need to be reasonable 
options available if it is to be morally valid, but such requirements are frequently not met 
in the process of international law. Hence, Buchanan argues: "What counts as consent in 
the system is not qualified by any requirement of voluntariness that would give what is 
called consent normative punclf ' (2004,303). The second element of this problem is that 
states have not consented to many aspects of international law. Although treaty-based law 
may appear less susceptible in this regard, it still suffers from a lack of free consent. 
Perhaps the best example of this, as H. L. A. Hart (1994,226) notes, is the automatic 
assumption that newly formed states are bound by international treaties, even though they 
have not consented to them. Given the number of states achieving independence in the 
past 100 years, this is a serious consideration. What is more, even if states subsequently 
withdraw their consent to a particular aspect of (some realm of) international law, they 
are still held to be bound by it (Hall 2001,203). Hence, the traditional view of 
international law, in which sovereign states are free to posit their will as they like and are 
bound by the law only when they choose, is in conflict with the experience and 
complexity of international law. In short, international law is not, in large part, based on 
the free consent of states. 
Thus, these three defences of the moral value of state consent are largely 
unpersuasive and, even if they were persuasive, the extent to which states have freely 
consented to international law is questionable. It follows that state consent to 
international law provides little reason for holding that the legality of an intervener 
matters. Let us now consider a second possible procedural reason for the moral 
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significance of an intervener's legal status. 
(ii) The functioning of the Security Council 
UN Security Council authorisation is the process by which the international law in a 
particular case of humanitarian intervention is deten-nined and is therefore, like state 
consent, a central way in which interveners gain their legal authority. And again, as with 
state consent, some argue that the functioning of the Security Council is morally valuable 
and, as a corollary, that legal interveners gain in legitimacy because their authority 
derives from this process. 
To be sure, most of those who make this argument adn-dt that the Security Council 
is far from meeting the requirements of an ideally functioning institution (e. g. Caron 
1993,566; Krisch 2002,333). But, like E. H. Carr (2001), they claim that the current 
international system is conflictual and dominated by powerful states, and because of this, 
it is highly unlikely that we would be able to develop an international system that 
completely matches the ideal in the foreseeable future. If we overlook these realities of 
the international system, we would be guilty of a form of naive idealism, which is 
morally problematic for two reasons. First, if we construct an international system based 
on an ideally functioning international institution, powerful states would not agree to join 
it or to be constrained by it. This would reduce the capability of the institution to govern. 
More seriously, it would have terrible consequences for the international system: 
powerful states would not be constrained by the law, and so would be free to dominate, to 
violate others' sovereignty, and to do generally what they want, or even worse, to engage 
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in wars with each other. This danger, Carr (2001,29-3 1) argues, can be observed in the 
failure of the League of Nations, which was largely because it was too idealistic and 
therefore failed to constrain powerful states, and was therefore unable to prevent World 
War 11. Hence, there is (what I shall call) a 'moral-political' demand to include powerful 
states within our international institutions, even if this means sacrificing some of (what I 
shall call) the 'ideal-moral' demands for the functioning of the institution. 
Second, constructing an international system based on an ideally functioning 
international institution would be counter-productive with respect to the 'ideal-moral' 
demands. Since powerful states would refuse to be constrained by such an institution, any 
institutional arrangements based on ideal functioning would not locate these ideal 
principles where they are needed most - to constrain the decision-making of the 
powerful. If we wish to realise the 'ideal-moral' demands it would be more productive to 
reduce these demands so that powerful states are included in the institution and therefore 
the ideal principles, although weakened, govern the decision-making of the powerful. The 
best solution is therefore an international institution that recognises the realities of the 
international system and which balances the ideal-moral demands for an institution that 
has a representative make-up and a fair and democratic decision-making procedure with 
the moral-political demands for including powerful states. 
The UN Security Council is claimed to strike such a balance (e. g. DUPI 1999, 
123). By giving China, France, Russia, the U. K., and the U. S. permanent membership 
and veto power, it provides some of the most powerful states in the international system 
with a reason to engage with the UN. In addition, the functioning of the Council attempts 
to respond to ideal-moral demands by including ten non-permanent members which 
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provide it with a sense of universal representation (Doyle 2001), and also by giving each 
of these members a vote. 
In short, the Council's functioning includes powerful states in the international 
legal system and subjects them to a formalised decision-making procedure, while still 
being based on a sense of universal representation and the rule of law. Interveners that are 
authorised by the UN Security Council are desirable because they gain their authority to 
intervene from this carefully-balanced and morally-valuable process. 
The theoretical premises of this argument are persuasive, but its empirical claims 
are not. That is to say, although it is true that we need to balance ideal-moral demands 
carefully with moral-political ones for including powerful states, the functioning of the 
Security Council does not reflect such a balance. It is too much of a compromise with 
power and has too little concern for ideal-moral demands for its functioning to legitin-dse 
the interveners that it authorises. To start with, the representativeness of the Security 
Council is unduly limited. There are only ten non-permanent members and these states 
have limited power within the Council. More representative bodies, such as certain NGOs 
and the UN General Assembly, have little input into the procedures of the Council. In 
short, the Security Council is highly unrepresentative, not only of states, but also, much 
more significantly, of individuals. Furthermore, the Council's decision-making lacks 
almost any consideration for ideal-moral demands. As Allen Buchanan and Robert 
Keohane (2004,9) assert, there is no justification for the veto given that it creates a 
radically unequal distribution of decision-making authority; it seriously impugns the 
legitimacy of the legal status quo. The veto is contrary to a system based on fair and 
democratic decision-making and the Council operates a 'closed-door' approach, which 
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means that non-pcnnancnt members are often not consulted (Lepard 2002,313). It also 
has an uneasy relationship with other UN organs and lacks both coherence and 
consistency in its decisions, which often reflect the particular sclf-interests of the 
permanent five (Lepard 2002,324-325). 
The Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) (1999,123-124) reply by 
arguing that the current arrangements of the Security Council are the only way to include 
the great powers and also the best way to achieve an effectively governing institution. In 
other words, the current workings of the Council are the only way to respond realistically 
to the moral-political demands; any other system would be less successful in this regard. 
But this argument is flawed. First, it is wrong to assume that the current arrangements of 
the Council are the only viable option and that reform to redress the balance towards 
ideal-moral considerations would undermine the Council's ability to govern and to 
constrain powerful states. Pace David Caron (1993), refonning the veto and changing 
membership are unlikely to weaken the Council. Second, reform of the Council may in 
fact strengthen it, given the higher levels of perceived legitimacy that would come with 
such reforms. Indeed, a good case can be made for the necessity of such reform if the 
Security Council system is to maintain itself and its capacity to govern. 53 
This leads us to the second point, which is that the current balance of the Security 
Council is not only morally problematic because it disfavours ideal-moral considerations, 
it also jeopardises the moral-political considerations. This is because it is doubtful 
whether the Security Council does in fact constrain powerful states. The permanent 
"Paul and Nahory (2005) have a particularly thoughtful discussion of proposals for refonning the Security 
Council. 
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members mostly act as they please, whether it be engaging in unauthorised and unjust 
wars, massively violating their citizens and non-citizens' rights, refusing to sign up to 
climate change protocols, or conducting nuclear tests. Moreover, it could be claimed that 
giving these five states permanent status reinforces their power. By being permanent 
members, they are always involved in UN decisions on the use of force, and by having 
the veto, they are essentially free from the governance of the Council (Lepard 2002). 
Similarly, and contra Nico Krisch (2002), it is doubtful whether the Council is effective 
in its governance. For years it was stymied by the Cold War. Yet even in the less divisive 
international system of the past two decades, the Council has failed in a number of areas. 
Most notably, it did not adequately respond within any acceptable timeframe to a number 
of humanitarian crises, such as those in Rwanda, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Indonesia. It has 
also failed to enforce its resolutions or to fulfil its supposed purpose of achieving 
international peace and security. What is more, part of the ineffectiveness of the Council 
may be due to the demands to include powerful states; the requirement for consensus 
amongst powerful states within the Council has led to either a lack of a decision or a 
watered-down resolution that represents the lowest common denominator of agreement 
between member states (Lepard 2002,314). Hence, the Security Council compromises 
the idcal-moral requirements for a democratic, fair, and representative system without 
securing sufficiently the compensating moral-political benefits of constraining the great 
powers and promoting effective governance. 
So, we have seen that the importance of an intervener's legality cannot be 
persuasively established by the two main arguments for the moral value of the procedures 
by which interveners achieve their legal authority. I will turn next to consider whether the 
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moral importance of an intervener's legality can be successfully demonstrated by 
arguments that claim that there are links between abusiveness and illegal humanitarian 
intervention. Unlike the procedural arguments, which are concerned with whether the 
intervener's legality derives from a morally-valuable international legal process, these 
arguments are concerned with the moral value of the content of international law, and in 
particular, with its effects when obeyed and disobeyed, that is, with the consequences of 
interveners being legal or illegal. The first of these, the Trojan Horse Objection, is 
concerned with the effects of an intervener's legal status on its local external legitimacy. 
The second objection, the Bad Precedent Objection, is concerned with effects of an 
intervener's legal status on its global external legitimacy. 
(iii) Abusive humanitarian intervention - the Trojan Horse Objection 
One of the most common arguments given in favour of the importance of an intervener's 
legal status is that illegal humanitarian intervention involves abuse. This argument is best 
seen as involving two quite distinct objections to illegal humanitarian intervention. The 
first objection is that illegal humanitarian intervention is itseIr abusive. This is what I 
shall call the 'Trojan Horse Objection': states use humanitarian intervention as a cover to 
engage in abusive humanitarian intervention. Consequently, we should use an 
intervener's legal status to decide who should intervene because this avoids abusive 
humanitarian intervention. 
This Trojan Horse Objection, although frequently made, is either (1) incoherent or 
(2) unconvincing. To see this, it is important first to recall the distinction made in the 
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previous chapter between an intervener's intention and its motive. If an intervener has a 
humanitarian intention, it has the purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the 
humanitarian crisis. The intervener's underlying reason - its motive - for having this 
humanitarian intention, however, does not also have to be humanitarian. It could, for 
instance, be a self-interested reason. 
Now, the Trojan Horse Objection's accusation of 'abusive humanitarian 
intervention' is ambiguous. It is sometimes meant to imply (1) imperialistic or neo- 
colonial intervention, where the intervener's primary intention is to gain territorial, 
economic, or strategic advantage (e. g. Chandler 2002; Kirsch 2002). But the previous 
chapter argued that those undertaking 'humanitarian intervention' could not be 
imperialistic in either the intention (which must be humanitarian) or the outcome of 
intervention. It follows that this first version of the Trojan Horse Objection misses its 
target: this sort of illegal intervention is clearly not humanitarian - its intention is not to 
halt violations of human rights - and, as such, should not be regarded as an instance of 
'humanitarian intervention'. Accordingly, it is incoherent to claim that illegal 
humanitarian intervention is 'abusive' because it is imperialistic. Although illegal non- 
humanitarian intervention can be abusive in this sense, illegal humanitarian intervention 
cannot. 
Another version of the Trojan Horse Objection uses 'abusive' to mean (2) 
motivated by self-interest: illegal humanitarian intervention is abusive because those 
undertaking such interventions do so with self-interested motivations. Ian Brownlie, for 
instance, asserts that when humanitarian justifications have been made by interveners, 
"circumstances frequently indicated the presence of selfish motives" (1963,339). This 
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contrasts with legal humanitarian intervention, which, the argument runs, is much less 
likely to be self-intcrested given the processes of the UN Security Council. So, this 
second version of the Trojan Horse Objection claims that an illegal intervener's motives 
undermine its legitimacy-, self-interested reasons constitute inappropriate motives for 
conducting war in defence of human rights. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the notion of an intervener's having a 
humanitarian motive suffers from serious ontological and epistemological problems. 
These difficulties also apply to this argument about abusive intervention. Moreover, even 
if we were to overlook these conceptual problems and assume that we can easily establish 
an intervener's motives, it is doubtful whether an intervener's having a humanitarian 
motive is of moral significance. In other words, the normative claim of the Trojan Horse 
Objection - that an intervener motivated by self-interest is morally objectionable - is 
unpersuasive. 
First, it is doubtful whether an intervener's having a humanitarian motive has 
intrinsic value. The argument for humanitarian motives having intrinsic value revolves 
around the Kantian notion that people should do the right things for the right reasons. If, 
for instance, Jack rescues Jill from drowning, it should be because he wanted to save her 
life, not because Jack thought that Jill would give him a big financial reward. To be sure, 
there does seem to be something intuitively attractive about this Kantian notion. As Terry 
Nardin argues: "Motives are a necessary element in judgments of responsibility, of praise 
and blame, culpability and excuse" and "are relevant in making moral judgments because 
we have moral duties to act from the proper motives" (2006,10). 
But in the context of humanitarian intervention, the intrinsic importance of a 
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humanitarian motive seems small. It is certainly not a necessary condition of legitimate 
humanitarian intervention. As Tes6n argues: 
It puts too much stock in the agent's subjective state and, in doing so, disallows 
many actions that are objectively justified under any plausible moral theory. Take 
this obvious case: a political leader decides to stop genocide in a neighboring 
country (or, even less controversially, to defend that country against aggression) 
because he thinks that is the best way to win reelection. If we require right motive 
and not merely right intent, that war would be unjust (2005a, 9; emphasis in 
original). 
Could an intervener's having a humanitarian motive nevertheless be a significant, if not 
necessary, condition of an intervener's legitimacy? Humanitarian intervention is a 
response to grievous suffering or loss of life, typically on a massive scale. In this context, 
the intrinsic importance of an intervener's having a humanitarian motive pales into 
insignificance, especially when contrasted with other values that are important to an 
intervener's legitimacy. In short, the mindset of those intervening is far less important 
than these other qualities. (I establish the moral significance of these values over the next 
few chapters. ) Consider the following hypothetical example, which demonstrates the 
difference in importance between an intervener's effectiveness and its motivation. There 
is a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. Zambia, for humanitarian reasons, wants to intervene, 
and has a reasonable expectation of saving 10,000 lives. Tanzania wants to intervene in 
Burundi as well, but this time for self-interested reasons (to stop border incursions) and 
has a reasonable expectation of saving 10,001 lives. Who should intervene, Zambia or 
Tanzania? Assuming, for the sake of example, that there are no further differences 
between the potential interveners, and that the different motivations for intervening have 
no impact on how the intervention is carried out, it is clear that we ought to prefer 
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Tanzania's intervention because, despite its lacking a humanitarian motivation, one 
further life would be saved. Similar arguments can be made to demonstrate the 
importance of other factors affecting the legitimacy of an intervener, such as its 
representativeness and the means it uses. If we have a choice between a representative yet 
self-interested intervener, and a less representative but well-motivated intervener, we 
should prefer the former. Likewise, if we face a choice between an intervener that uses 
humanitarian means yet undertakes intervention for self-interested reasons, and an 
intervener that drops bombs indiscriminately but whose leader has a humanitarian 
motive, we should, again, prefer the former. My point, then, is that the value of an 
intervener's having a humanitarian motive is likely to be overshadowed by other, more 
morally important, factors affecting the legitimacy of an intervener. By comparison, then, 
having a humanitarian motive is of little intrinsic moral value. 
In response, one could claim that, in practice, an intervener's motivation is 
instrumentally important since it affects these other normative qualities: an intervener 
with a humanitarian motivation is much more likely to be effective, representative, and to 
adopt humanitarian means. But on the basis of past evidence (e. g. India's probably 
selfishly-motivated but generally successful intervention in Bangladesh and, 
antithetically, the U. S. 's perhaps altruistic yet largely ineffective intervention in 
Somalia), the motivation of the intervener (to the extent that we can ever determine what 
this is) seems to have less of an effect than one might think. 
Some even suggest that it is morally desirable that an intervener is not purely 
motivated by humanitarian concerns (e. g. Seybolt 2000,6; Stein 2004,3 1; Walzer 2002a, 
4). This argument, which I consider further in Chapter 5, has some plausibility. An 
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intervener with a humanitarian motive alone is unlikely to commit the resources required 
to prevent egregious human suffering beyond its borders. As ICISS asserts, the "reality of 
the 1990s has been that humanitarian motives alone rarely suffice to sustain an 
intervention" (2001b, 211). An intervener needs a political motivation to undertake 
humanitarian intervention as well, which means that it can justify its commitment in 
terms of the interests of its citizens. Therefore, a strong element of self-interest makes it 
more likely that an intervener will provide the commitment necessary for effective 
humanitarian intervention, such as to provide substantial military resources over a 
54 sustained period of time (Stein 2004,35). Thus, a humanitarian motivation does not 
have significant intrinsic or instrumental value. 
So, if 'abusive humanitarian intervention' is meant to denote humanitarian 
intervention with a self-interested motivation (assuming that we can establish this 
motivation), that sort of humanitarian intervention is not necessarily objectionable. There 
is little stock then in the argument that an intervener's legal status is morally significant 
because illegal interveners are motivated by self-interest. Thus, the Trojan Horse 
Objection, which claims that illegal humanitarian intervention is abusive, is unconvincing 
because (1) intervention that is 'abusive', meaning imperialistic, is not humanitarian 
intervention, and (2) intervention that is 'abusive', meaning self-interested, is not that 
54 A further argument in this context is that mixed motives are desirable, since, as Walzer (2002b, 26) 
argues, the leaders of states have an obligation to consider the interests of their own people when they 
commit to undertake humanitarian intervention. It follows that, if an intervener were to have a pure 
humanitarian motive, it would disregard its fiduciary obligation to consider the interests of its own citizens. 
Buchanan (1999), however, presents a powerful critique of this 'discretionary association view of the state'. 
Also see Chapter 6. 
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morally problematic. " 
(iv) Future abusive intervention - the Bad Precedent Objection 
Let us now consider the second claim often made about illegal humanitarian intervention 
and abuse, which is instrumentalist in form. The allegation is that illegal humanitarian 
intervention leads to abusive intervention. 'Abusive' intervention here is meant to imply 
non-humanitarian intervention (such as imperialistic or neo-colonial intervention), as in 
the first version of the Trojan Horse Objection. This argument - which I shall call the 
'Bad Precedent Objection' - has become more popular recently, with some theorists 
suggesting that the illegal intervention in Kosovo led to the 2003 war in Iraq (e. g. 
Wheeler 2005). 
The Bad Precedent Objection has two parts: (1) illegal humanitarian intervention 
leads to humanitarian reasons being regarded as more acceptable reasons for breaking the 
prohibition on the use of force (perhaps, but not necessarily, in the form of a legal right to 
undertake humanitarian intervention in international law); (2) if humanitarian reasons are 
regarded as more acceptable reasons for breaking the prohibition on the use of force, 
states will be more inclined to engage in abusive (non-humanitarian) interventions. 
Therefore, we should prefer legal to illegal interveners because they do not have the 
negative effect of creating additional abusive interventions. It should be noted that the 
argument is not that it is impossible to distinguish between genuine humanitarian 
intervention and abusive intervention that is falsely claimed to be humanitarian; we can 
55Tes6n (1997,111-113) presents a similar argument about humanitarian intervention in general. 
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distinguish between the two by looking at the intervener's rhetoric, conduct during the 
intervention, and track record of waging war for humanitarian reasons. Rather, it is that, 
by establishing humanitarian reasons as permissible reasons to breach Article 2(4), 
unauthorised humanitarian intervention increases the opportunities for abusive 
intervention because, in the future, other states will cite humanitarian reasons to justify 
their abusive actions. 
However, the two parts of the causal relationship between illegal humanitarian 
interveners and abusive intervention that underlie this argument are not strong. To start 
with, although it is probably true that (1) illegal humanitarian intervention leads to greater 
acceptance of humanitarian reasons as reasons that justify the breach of the prohibition on 
the use of force, this is also true of legal humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the Security 
Council-authorised interventions of the 1990s have already gone a long way towards 
establishing the acceptability of humanitarian reasons for the use of force in the 
international community. 
The second part of the causal link (2) is also questionable. This objection to illegal 
humanitarian intervention is similar to the argument given by some of those who reject a 
new legal right to intervene: formally establishing humanitarian justifications as 
permissible justifications for using force (in the form of a legal right) will lead to abusive 
(non-humanitarian) interventions (Brownlie 1973,147-148; Chesterman 2001,6; Linter 
2005,288; Vincent 1986,144). 56 The difficulty with this argument is that establishing 
humanitarian reasons as acceptable reasons for using force is unlikely to provide many 
additional occasions for states to engage in abusive interventions with the purpose of 
56 For a detailed discussion of whether we should we establish such a legal right to intervene, see Chapter 8. 
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gaining territorial, material, or strategic advantage. This is not to deny that states have 
used humanitarian justifications mendaciously in the past. As Farer (1973,150) asserts, 
humanitarian justifications were frequently invoked to justify armed interventions by 
Western states in the rest of the world during the 19th and early 20 th centuries (when there 
was a better case for the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention in international 
law), yet the majority of these interventions were in defence of property interests rather 
than human rights. Nor is it to deny that, if humanitarian reasons became more acceptable 
reasons for breaking the prohibition on the use of force, sometimes states would invoke 
maliciously and mendaciously a humanitarian justification for their actions. Rather, my 
point is that, since states already invoke self-defence as the justification for so many 
actions, increasing the acceptability of humanitarian reasons for using force is unlikely to 
provide many new opportunities for abuse. During the period in which humanitarian 
justifications for using force were more accepted (in the 19th-century and early 20th- 
century), did states engage in abusive (non-humanitarian) interventions that they would 
not have otherwise engaged in? In most cases, I doubt it. And while it might seem that 
there would be at least a few more cases of abusive (non-humanitarian) intervention as a 
consequence of further establishing the permissibility of humanitarian reasons for using 
force, this has not been bome out by recent state practice. Humanitarian reasons have 
become increasingly acceptable (at least political and perhaps legal) reasons to violate the 
prohibition on the use of force (Newman 2002), but there has not been a corresponding 
increase in the number of abusive interventions that mendaciously allege a humanitarian 
justification. Wars and interventions in recent decades have instead relied on self-defence 
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as the justification for their action. 
57 As Mark Stein rightly asserts, the "idea that 
humanitarian interventions will lead to nonhurnanitarian wars has been somewhat 
58 
overtaken by events" (2004,37). Furthermore, and again as Stein asserts, in the future, 
the U. S. 's recent interpretation of 'anticipatory self-defence' is far more likely to 
undermine the prohibition on the use of force and lead to abusive intervention than "the 
possibility, feared by opponents of unauthorized humanitarian intervention, that like 
cases will lead to unlike cases" (2004,37). 
What is more, even if the two claims (1) and (2) were true, the good achieved by 
the original illegal humanitarian intervener could outweigh the harm done by subsequent 
abusive intervention. Although abusive intervention may lead to oppression, domination, 
and the violation of human rights, these negative, long-term effects could be balanced by 
illegal humanitarian intervention's positive, immediate effects of ending serious 
violations of human rights, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, if it is true that 
(1) illegal interveners establish the acceptability of humanitarian reasons as reasons for 
breaching Article 2(4), then in addition to abusive interventions where humanitarian 
justifications are claimed mendaciously, there may also be additional genuine 
humanitarian interventions. These genuine humanitarian interventions could further offset 
"Self-defence was the main reason given for the following uses of force: the U. S. in Nicaragua; Portugal's 
conflicts with Guinea, Senegal, and Zambia; South Africa in Namibia, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
and Zambia; Israel in Lebanon; Thailand in Burma; Senegal in Guinea-Bissau, TaJikistan in Afghanistan; 
and Iran in Iraq (Gray 2000). Self-defence was also the main reason given by the U. S. and the U. K. for the 
2003 war on Iraq (their attempts to justify the war for humanitarian reasons were always secondary to the 
main argument of self-defence) and for the action in Afghanistan (see Chapter 2). 
58SimilaTly, Farer (2005b) argues strongly that the Kosovo intervention did not set a precedent for Iraq. 
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any harm done by abusive interventions. The worry then that illegal humanitarian 
intervention will lead to abusive non-humanitarian intervention is largely misplaced. 
(v) International order 
Some, however, question the ability of humanitarian intervention to do more good than 
hann (e. g. Brownlie 1973,146). Their argument, which is instrumentalist, is that illegal 
humanitarian intervention undennines international order. Kofi Annan, for instance, 
argues that "actions without Security Council authorization threaten the very core of the 
international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations" (in Wheeler 
2000,294). 
We have just encountered and rejected one version of this argument, that illegal 
humanitarian intervention leads to additional abusive interventions, and therefore 
undermines international order. Chandler (2002,157-191) offers a more general 
argument. He argues that by circumventing the international legal system, an illegal 
humanitarian intervener reintroduces chaos into international affairs and fundamentally 
challenges the pre-existing structures of international order, thereby pushing us towards a 
Hobbesian international system. This is because illegal intervention leaves the judgment 
to the individual state, rather than deferring to the UN, and therefore removes consensus 
and certainty from international law. 
This massively over-exaggerates the potential destabilising effects of illegal 
humanitarian intervention on international order. As Buchanan (2003,147-148) argues, 
international law is not a seamless web: cutting one thread - violating one norm such as 
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the law on humanitarian intervention - would not destroy the whole fabric and send us 
towards chaos. Indeed, the experience of illegal humanitarian intervention does not 
suggest that it destabilises the international legal system. On the contrary, illegal 
humanitarian intervention is often condoned by the international community, as in the 
cases of Tanzania's intervention in Uganda and (to a certain extent) NATO's intervention 
in Kosovo (Wheeler 2000). 
There is, however, another way in which the legality of an intervener's status 
might be said to have significance for the legal order. This argument appeals to the 
positive effects of legal interveners (instead of the negative effects of illegal interveners) 
for international order, and runs as follows. Since legal interveners require UN Security 
Council authorisation in order to be legal according to current international law, when 
legal interveners act, they help to demonstrate that the Security Council is an effective 
system of international governance - the Council is fulfilling its purposes of governing 
and authorising the use of force. And, although the functioning of the Security Council is 
procedurally problematic (for reasons outlined above), in terms of the substantive 
question of international order, an effectively functioning Security Council is likely to be 
beneficial because it will strengthen the rule of law and the stability of the international 
system by centralising decision-making on the use of force. As such, legal interveners are 
preferable to illegal ones, not because illegal interveners have disastrous effects on 
international order, but because legal interveners have a greater positive effect on 
international order. 
It is important, however, not to overstate the force of this argument. It is highly 
speculative and cannot be easily verified. Even if it were accurate, it does not provide a 
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strong reason for disfavouring illegal humanitarian intervention, but only a reason for 
favouring legal humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, the positive effects of a UN 
Security Council-authorised intervention on the international system and on international 
order would probably be insignificant, at least in a grand scale of things. Consequently, 
the UN Security Council's authorisation of a particular humanitarian intervention is 
unlikely to have an immediate, significant, and positive effect on overall international law 
and order. 
111. CONCLUSION 
My suggestion, then, is that a humanitarian intervener's legal status according to current 
international law is of small moral importance, and significantly less important than 
commonly assumed. All we can say is that an intervener with UN Security Council 
authorisation is mildly preferable to an intervener without such authorisation. This is, 
firstly, because states have sometimes consented in the process of the formulation of the 
international law on humanitarian intervention and this has partial moral value because 
some states are representative of their citizens' wishes, and, secondly, because legal 
interveners could perhaps have some positive effects on international order. But these two 
reasons do no more than establish the minor contribution of an intervener's legality to its 
legitimacy. 
This is not to say that the Security Council, in general, has no moral value. On the 
contrary, for uses of force apartfrom humanitarian intervention (such as the 2003 war in 
Iraq (which lacked Council approval), the 2001 action in Afghanistan, and other security- 
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related uses of force), it is probably morally desirable, for instrumental reasons at least, 
that only agents with Security Council authorisation act. However, in cases of 
humanitarian intervention, if an intervener responds to a grave humanitarian crisis but is 
unable to achieve UN Security Council approval, perhaps because of the self-interested 
actions of its permanent five members, it will not be illegitimate merely because it is 
illegal. Similarly, if we face a choice between an ineffective but legal UN intervention, 
and a justifiable yet illegal humanitarian intervention by another agent, we should regard 
the latter as legitimate, other things being equal. 
So, when deciding who should intervene, an intervener's legal status according to 
the current international law on humanitarian intervention should play a small role in our 
thinking. This is also true of an intervener's motives, which have neither intrinsic nor 
instrumental moral significance. We will need instead to look to other factors, such as 
those considered over the course of the next three chapters. 
It follows then that there is too great a gap between the international law on 
humanitarian intervention and the demands of morality: le-x lata bears little relation to lex 
ferenda. If we want an intervener's legal status to matter more, we need to reform 
international law. But this reform is perhaps not best achieved by changes in customary 
international law; the problem with this approach is that it leaves too much to fortune. 
Nor should reforrn simply be a matter 'of legalising all unauthorised humanitarian 
interveners or legalising all unauthorised humanitarian interveners that meet certain 
criteria. A more realistic, and desirable, solution (which I expand upon in Chapter 8) is an 
approach that would develop additional formal bases for authorising humanitarian 
intervention in certain regional organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and 
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the EU, which would supplement the powers of the Security Council. Additional treaty- 
based law would be created to give these organisations not only the legal authority to 
authorise and to undertake humanitarian intervention within their regions, but also the 
legal responsibility and duty to do so. This more integrated response would start to tackle 
the problems of the lack of states' willingness to intervene, as well as some of the legal 
issues raised in this chapter. And, although this solution would not be ideal, it would be a 
lot better than the morally deficient international law on humanitarian intervention we 
have at the moment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the importance of an intervener's legal status is 
significantly less than is commonly assumed. So, when deciding who should intervene, 
whether an intervener has UN Security Council authorisation should not be the primary 
concern. I focus now on what is a much more important factor for an intervener's 
legitimacy - its effectiveness. Indeed, I argue that an intervener's effectiveness is the 
most important factor for the legitimacy of an intervener. It follows that, when 
considering who should intervene, we should primarily look to the intervener that would 
be most effective. 
Given its importance, I devote two chapters to the issues surrounding 
effectiveness. In this chapter, I outline and defend my own account of the role of 
effectiveness in the legitimacy of an intervener - what I call the 'Moderate 
Consequentialist Approach'. My aim is to formulate the Moderate Consequentialist 
Approach so that it is the most persuasive approach to the value of consequences in an 
overall account of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. I argue that the Moderate 
Consequentialist Approach provides a compelling answer to how much weight we should 
give an intervener's effectiveness. In the next chapter, I consider and reject two 
alternative approaches to the value of consequences: the 'Non-Consequentialist 
Approach' and the 'Extreme Consequentialist Approach'. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by giving a brief introduction to 
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consequential ism and outline the basics of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. I 
then make the case for the persuasiveness of this approach. I first highlight the intuitive 
appeal of consequentialist thinking on humanitarian intervention. I then distinguish 
between three types of effectiveness and suggest that an intervener's effectiveness is a 
necessary condition of its legitimacy. To give this argument for an intervener's 
effectiveness a more solid philosophical foundation, I apply Raz's account of legitimate 
authority to humanitarian intervention. Like the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, 
Raz takes consequences to be the primary determinant of legitimacy. Having defended 
the basic premise of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach - that an intervener's 
legitimacy is primarily dependent on its effectiveness - the third part of this chapter 
fleshes out this approach in more detail. In particular, I consider what timescale we 
should use to measure an agent's effectiveness and outline what sort of comparison we 
should make to judge effectiveness. The final part of the chapter argues that, according to 
the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, a legitimate humanitarian intervener must have 
a sufficiently just cause, yet need not be unselective. 
11. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The key assertion of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach is that an intervener's 
effectiveness is the primary (and a necessary) determinant of its legitimacy. When 
deciding who should intervene, the Moderate Consequentialist Approach focuses on the 
intervener that will be the most effective. Unlike the Non-Consequentialist Approach, 
considered in the next chapter, it gives significant weight to the importance of an 
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intervener's effectiveness. And unlike the Extreme Consequentialist Approach (also 
considered in the next chapter), it does not hold that this is the only determinant of an 
intervener's legitimacy. Other non-consequentialist factors, such as an intervener's 
representativeness and fidelity to the principles ofjus in bello, matter to a certain degree, 
although they are less important than effectiveness. Their value can be included under the 
Moderate Consequcntialist Approach. 59 
Before going any further, it is worthwhile spending some time considering what 
consequentialism is in general and then relating this to the effectiveness of an intervener. 
Putting it in its most simple form, consequentialism judges things by their consequences. 
If something - such as an action, rule, institution, or practice - promotes (or is expected 
to promote) a good outcome, then that makes it morally right. What consequentialism is 
concerned with therefore is the intrinsic value of certain 'states of affairs'. Actions, rules, 
and institutions are instrumentally valuable to the extent that they have (or are expected 
to have) the consequence of achieving the intrinsically valuable state of affairs. As 
Philippa Foot puts it: "A consequentialist theory of ethics is one which identifies certain 
states of affairs as good states of affairs and says that the rightness or goodness of actions 
(or of other subjects of moral judgment) consists in their positive productive relationship 
to the decent state of affairs" (1988,224-225). Utilitarianism, which for a long time has 
been the most prominent form of consequentialism, identifies the 'good' as utility 
'91t might be alleged that the Moderate Consequentialist Approach is not really a consequentialist approach 
since it accepts that an intervener's legitimacy can be determined, in part, by other, non-consequentialist 
values (such as representativeness). In reply, although it does not take consequences to be the sole 
determinant of legitimacy, it does take them to be the primary determinant, and this is sufficient for it to be 
deemed consequentialist, at least for our purposes here. 
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(roughly meaning welfare) and claims that the rightness of something depends on 
whether it promotes utility. However, the structure of consequentialism does not require 
that the good is always utility, since other values, such as human rights, can be specified 
as the intrinsically good states of affairs. 
A consequentialist approach to humanitarian intervention could take the good 
that is to be increased by an intervener as utility, the enjoyment of basic human rights, the 
prevention of human suffering, or well-being. Not much turns on this choice. Given the 
seriousness of a humanitarian crisis, these terms can be used interchangeably to a certain 
extent, without a loss of meaning. For instance, an intervener that is expected to promote 
utility in the political community suffering the humanitarian crisis would most likely do 
so by preventing human suffering, and the prevention of human suffering would involve 
the protection of basic human rights. The Moderate Consequentialist Approach (and, for 
the most part, this thesis) takes the good that is to be increased as the enjoyment of basic 
human rights, which will more often than not involve the prevention of human rights 
abuses. I sometimes refer to the prevention of human suffering and the promotion of 
well-being, but this does not affect the overall argument. So, an intervener that increases 
enjoyment of basic human rights is effective. In other words, the effectiveness of an 
intervener is determined by whether it achieves good consequences, that is, by whether it 
increases the good, which in this case is the enjoyment of basic human rights. This 
position is therefore similar to what Robert Nozick (1974) calls the 'utilitarianism of 
rights'. 
Note here some basic human rights - the enjoyment of which is the 'good state 
of affairs' to be increased - may be themselves justified consequentially, but many may 
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not be, and all may be justified non-consequentially. Indeed, it is in the nature of 
consequential ism that it must make its case by reference to a goal which is morally 
ultimate - the good state of affairs - and which cannot therefore be justified 
consequentially. These features of consequentialism. in general, and of human rights in 
particular, are consistent with the claim of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach that 
the primary determinant of an intervener's legitimacy is consequentialist. Also note that a 
strong commitment to consequentialism as the primary determinant of an intervener's 
legitimacy need not entail a more comprehensive commitment to consequentialism in 
general. My focus is on legitimacy for humanitarian intervention and it is in this context 
in which I argue that consequentialist thought is largely compelling. I do not consider the 
persuasiveness of consequentialist thinking on other issues. 
Why should we take the consequences of an intervener's action seriously? The 
notion that an intervener should be effective is intuitively appealing. Indeed, in the 
normative debates surrounding humanitarian intervention, one subject that continually 
arises is the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention. The discussions on how, when, 
and most notably, whether, humanitarian intervention should be undertaken all revolve 
around this issue. Those who are sceptical of intervention can cite the failure of the 1991 
UN and U. S. interventions in Somalia and UN action in Bosnia as examples of the 
ineffectiveness of intervening to save lives. John Stuart Mill (1984), for example, defends 
the principle of non-intervention because humanitarian intervention is unlikely to be 
successful, given the importance of self-determination. 60 Those more favourable to 
intervention, on the other hand, can highlight the successes of NATO's 1999 action in 
60That said, he limits the principal of non-intervention to 'civilised' societies. 
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Kosovo, UN-authorised Australian-led action in East Timor, and Indian action in 
Bangladesh. 61 
Despite their differing empirical judgments, what both sides agree on is the 
importance of intervention being successful. If humanitarian intervention is not 
successful, then it should not occur; but if it is, perhaps it should. The basis of this highly 
plausible notion is a certain consequentialist logic: if intervention in another political 
community is to be undertaken in order to achieve a humanitarian outcome, it matters that 
it should achieve that humanitarian outcome. 
From this intuitive notion follows another: those that undertake humanitarian 
intervention should be successful. If the UN, for instance, is to intervene in Burundi, it 
should do so effectively. This is a frequent requirement made of interveners both in the 
academic literature and by those involved with the practice of humanitarian intervention. 
For instance, in his address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, Annan 
(1999) called upon member states to unite in the quest for more effective policies to stop 
egregious violations of human rightS. 62 Furthermore, the Just War tradition typically 
requires war to have a reasonable prospect of success and to be proportionate. These two 
criteria can be interpreted as requiring that those undertaking war should be expected to 
be effective and, when applied to humanitarian intervention, that interveners should have 
a good prospect of success. 63 
"'Mason and Wheeler (1996), for instance, present persuasive arguments against 'consequentialist realism'- 
the view that humanitarian intervention cannot be justified because it would lead to bad consequences. 
62 Others who argue for the importance of an intervener being effective include Beach and Isbister (2000), 
deLisle (2001), Singer (2002), Stromseth (2003), Walzer (2002a; 2004a), and Wheeler (2000). 
63 See Fixdal and Smith (1998). 
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At the very least, then, a degree of consequentialist thought on humanitarian 
intervention is appealing. This helps to provide some initial backing for the Moderate 
Consequentialist Approach, which claims that an intervener's effectiveness is the primary 
determinant of its legitimacy. 
Three types of effectiveness 
To see more clearly why an intervener's effectiveness is such an important consideration 
for its legitimacy, it helps to distinguish between three types of effectiveness. First, 'local 
external effectiveness' depends on whether an intervener promotes or hanns the 
enjoyment of basic human rights of those in the political community that is subject to its 
intervention. Second, 'global external effectiveness' depends on whether an intervener 
promotes or harms the enjoyment of basic human rights in the world as a whole. Third, 
'internal cffectiveness' depends on whether an intervener promotes or harms its own 
citizens' enjoyment of basic human rights. 
To illustrate these categories by way of example, the local external effectiveness 
of Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda depended on whether Tanzania promoted the 
enjoyment of the basic human rights of Ugandans. Its global external effectiveness 
depended on whether it promoted the enjoyment of the basic human rights in the world at 
large (i. e. the international community). Third, its internal effectiveness depended on 
whether it protected the basic human rights of Tanzanians. According to the Moderate 
Consequentialist Approach, all three types of effectiveness are important for an 
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intervener's legitimacy. Together, they explain why an intervener's effectiveness is the 
primary determinant of its legitimacy. I will make the case for each in turn. 
The first type of effectiveness most clearly demonstrates the significance of an 
intervener's effectiveness and why effectiveness is the primary determinant of an 
intervener's legitimacy. This is an intervener's local external effectiveness, which 
depends on whether an intervener is likely to promote or harm the enjoyment of basic 
human rights of those in the political community that is subject to its intervention. In 
other words, to be locally externally effective, an intervener needs to be successful at 
tackling the humanitarian crisis. For instance, if the UN is to intervene in Darfur with the 
purpose of helping the Darfurians, it is vital that its intervention should benefit the 
Darfurians. If it were likely to make the situation even worse, then it would be locally 
externally ineffective and (in all probability) would not be legitimate. 
Why is this a highly significant factor for an intervener's legitimacy? My 
reasoning is as follows. The violation of basic human rights is morally wrong. Indeed, the 
degree of human suffering typically involved in the violation of basic human rights is 
perhaps the greatest moral wrong, more morally urgent than other moral concerns. We 
tend to think, generally speaking, that rape, torture, and murder are more morally 
significant than repression, inequality, etc. A humanitarian crisis usually involves a high 
degree of human suffering and the mass violation of basic human rights. As such, it 
involves (1) the worst moral wrong (2) on a massive scale. Accordingly, it is of the 
utmost moral importance that the humanitarian crisis is effectively tackled, given it 
involves such a high degree of severe human suffering. It follows that, when a serious 
humanitarian crisis arises, it is vital that it is effectively tackled. It is important, then, that 
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a humanitarian intervener is effective, since it is vital that the degree of human suffering 
involved in the humanitarian crisis in which it intervenes is halted. 
Moreover, humanitarian intervention involves military force and there is a risk 
that the use of force will increase the amount of human suffering in the target state. For 
this reason, Farer argues that "there must be a high probability that the use offorce will 
achieve a positive humanitarian outcome" because the "one sure thing about force is that 
it destroys things... to propose to invade a society, to thrash around breaking things, and 
then to leave without significantly ameliorating and possibly even aggravating the 
situation is unacceptable" (2005a, 219; emphasis in original). 
The second type of effectiveness is 'global external effectiveness'. This depends 
on whether an intervener is likely to promote or hann the enjoyment of basic human 
rights in the world at large. But in order to avoid double-counting an individual's 
enjoyment of basic human rights, global external effectiveness excludes those already 
included under internal effectiveness and local external effectiveness. Thus, global 
external effectiveness depends on whether an intervener promotes or harms the 
enjoyment of basic human rights in the world at large, apart from the intervener's citizens 
and those subject to its intervention. 
It is perhaps a little more difficult to see the significance of this factor for an 
intervener's legitimacy. In the vast majority of cases, the most important thing seems to 
be whether the intervener promotes the enjoyment of human rights of those suffering the 
humanitarian crisis, not whether the intervener promotes the overall enjoyment of human 
rights worldwide. Yet global external effectiveness is a key consideration. Perhaps the 
best way of seeing this is to consider not the importance of an intervener's promoting the 
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worldwide enjoyment of human rights, but the importance of its not harming significantly 
the worldwide enjoyment of human rights. In other words, the significance of an 
intervener's global external effectiveness is best seen in its negative aspect: an intervener 
that undertakes humanitarian intervention that severely harms the enjoyment of basic 
human rights in the world at large (minus those included under local external 
effectiveness and internal effectiveness) loses legitimacy. 64 The following are some 
examples where global external effectiveness is important. An intervener could 
destabilise the neighbouring states of the target political community (perhaps by creating 
a large refugee flow) and therefore severely harm the enjoyment of basic human rights of 
those in neighbouring states. Alternatively, an intervener's action may undermine 
international order by setting a dangerous legal precedent that challenges the prohibition 
on the use of force. The international instability that results may undermine the 
enjoyment of basic human rights of a large number of individuals in the international 
community. Or, an intervener's action may cause great power antagonism, and, 
ultimately, nuclear war. 
The third type of effectiveness is an intervener's internal effectiveness, which 
depends on the consequences for the intervener's own citizens. This requirement tends to 
receive less attention than global and local external effectiveness, yet it is still significant. 
My claim is this: an intervener's legitimacy depends, at least in part, on its looking after 
its citizens' basic interests. To that extent, I agree with Walzer's claim (although not 
"This is not to endorse what Smart (1973) calls 'negative utilitarianism', which attempts to minimise the 
bad rather than maximise the good. Although I argue that the importance of global external effectiveness is 
best seen in its negative aspect, it is also possible for global external effectiveness to be important because 
an intervener has a positive impact on the enjoyment of basic human rights in the world. 
113 
Chapter 4: The Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
necessarily his whole communitarian philosophy) that "[flhe leaders of states have a 
right, even indeed, they have an obligation, to consider the interests of their own people, 
even when they are acting to help other people" (2002a, 4). 65 
Like global external effectiveness, the importance of internal effectiveness is less 
obviously important for an intervener's legitimacy than local external effectiveness. It is 
also typically best seen in its negative aspect. In most cases, we would not expect an 
intervener to make an improvement in its own citizens' enjoyment of basic human rights, 
given the costs of humanitarian intervention in terms of lives and resources. Instead, 
humanitarian intervention is likely perhaps to decrease some of its citizens' enjoyment of 
basic human rights, e. g. its soldiers who are wounded and killed in action. But this 
decrease must not be excessive: an intervener that undertakes reckless humanitarian 
intervention, which will severely decrease its own citizens' enjoyment of basic human 
rights (perhaps by incurring heavy casualties among its own forces or by bankrupting the 
state), loses legitimacy (i. e. it is ineffective overall). 
If one doubts this assertion, consider the following scenario. The Mozambican 
government decides to intervene in Russia with the purpose of resolving the humanitarian 
crisis in Chechnya. This requires a massive military and financial effort. Mozambique's 
minimal financial resources are all tied up in the intervention and, as a result, it is unable 
to provide vital services, such as clean water provision, for its home population. Because 
of this, tens of thousands of Mozambicans lose their lives through cholera and water- 
65 See, further, Mason (2000,199-200), who argues that a state can legitimately engage in humanitarian 
intervention, but when doing so it should give proper weight to the special obligations it owes to its 
citizens. 
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bome diseases. Although Mozambique does achieve an improvement in the enjoyment of 
basic human rights of the Chechnyans through its intervention, that improvement is tiny 
compared to the loss of well-being for the Mozarnbicans because of the intervention. Is 
Mozambique a legitimate intervener in Chechnya? It seems that it is not. Thus, according 
to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, an intervener's legitimacy depends also on 
its internal effectiveness and typically how internally ineffective it is. Although an 
intervener could be legitimate even though it does not promote its own citizens' 
enjoyment of basic human rights, its legitimacy will be reduced if its intervention causes 
excessive harm to its home population (so that it is ineffective overall). 
Given the importance of an intervener's being effective in these three senses, it 
follows that an intervener's overall effectiveness is a necessary condition of its 
legitimacy. If, when combining its local external effectiveness, global external 
effectiveness, and internal effectiveness, an intervener is ineffective overall, it cannot be 
legitimate. If an intervener's effectiveness were not a necessary condition of its 
legitimacy, an intervener could be legitimate even though it (1) failed to make an 
improvement in the humanitarian crisis - and so lacked local external effectiveness, (2) 
undertook intervention that was excessively costly to human rights worldwide - and so 
was extremely globally externally ineffective, and/or (3) undertook intervention that was 
excessively costly to its citizens - and so was extremely internally ineffective. 
Accordingly, an intervener must be likely to make an overall improvement in the 
enjoyment of basic human rights to be legitimate. As Jane Stromseth notes, 
"humanitarian intervention should have a reasonable prospect of success in stopping the 
atrocities that triggered intervention in the first place. Otherwise, the interveners will 
115 
Chapter 4: The Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
simply be exposing their soldiers and the target population to life-endangering situations 
without the hope of success that justifies the risks to be borne" (2003,268). 
The standard way that the intervener will be effective overall is by being 
substantially locally externally effective, that is, by successfully tackling the 
humanitarian crisis. It follows that, in most cases, an intervener's local external 
effectiveness is a necessary condition of its legitimacy. An intervener (usually) cannot be 
legitimate if its intervention is likely to worsen the situation of those suffering the 
humanitarian crisis. 
There are, however, two potential exceptions. These are when the intervener 
could be locally externally ineffective, yet effective overall, and so still be legitimate. The 
first sort of case is where an intervener would be effective overall because of the 
contribution made by its global external effectiveness. For instance, State A may 
intervene with the purpose of tackling the humanitarian crisis in State B, but will make 
the situation worse for those in State B. It would prevent, however, an even worse 
humanitarian crisis arising in a neighbouring state, State C. Overall, State A's 
intervention would be effective and therefore legitimate according to the logic of the 
Moderate Consequentialist Approach, even though it lacks local external effectiveness. 
The second sort of case is where an intervener would be effective overall because of the 
contribution made by its internal effectiveness. For instance, State X may intervene in 
State Y to tackle the humanitarian crisis in State Y, but its intervention would worsen the 
situation for those in State Y. It would avert, however, an even worse humanitarian crisis 
arising in State X. Overall, State X's intervention would be effective - it would increase 
the overall enjoyment of basic human rights - and it would therefore be legitimate 
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according to the logic of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, even though it lacks 
local external effectiveness. 66 Although it is important to acknowledge the existence of 
these two potential exceptions, they are hypothetical. In nearly all real-world cases, an 
intervener's local external effectiveness is a necessary condition of its legitimacy. 
To summarise: an intervener's effectiveness is the primary, and a necessary, 
determinant of its legitimacy. This is because an intervener's internal effectiveness, 
global external effectiveness, and local external effectiveness are important 
considerations when deciding who should intervene. The importance of global external 
effectiveness and internal effectiveness are perhaps best seen in a negative sense. Local 
external effectiveness, by contrast, obviously is crucial. Indeed, in most cases, this is a 
necessary condition of an intervener's legitimacy. Although there are two potential 
exceptions to this, these two exceptions still support the central point: an intervener's 
effectiveness, generally speaking, is a necessary condition (and the primary determinant) 
of its legitimacy. 
It follows then that the legitimacy of an agent depends on whether, at the time the 
decision to intervene is made, it can be reasonably expected to be effective in increasing 
enjoyment of basic human rights. To have a reasonable expectation of success, an agent 
should follow a course of action that it judges is likely to be successful and, crucially, 
base that judgment on information that it has good reason to believe is accurate. An agent 
66 To be SUTe, such an intervener must still have a humanitarian intention. Its main objective must be to 
tackle the humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, if the intervener were to advance its citizens' interests in ways 
not involving the enjoyment of their basic human rights (such as by increasing their access to oil), it would 
not be legitimate. It can be legitimate on this line Of reasoning only if it improves their enjoyment of basic 
human rights, for instance by preventing a terrible humanitarian crisis. 
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of intervention cannot have a reasonable expectation of success if it acts on the basis of 
what it regards as a good course of action, yet this judgment is not supported by 
information that it has a good reason to believe is accurate. Hence, Farer asserts that 
"[t]he question for those assessing an intervention after the fact would be whether, at the 
time the decision was taken, the decision makers could reasonably have believed that 
their planned tactics, strategies and material investment were likely to achieve the 
required outcome. In law this is what we call the 'reasonable person' standard" (2005b, 
245). 
It might be objected that the use of 'reasonable' is vague and will be 
"reinterpreted according to the moral and political ideas of those who use themý' (Graham 
1987,142). However, as Gordon Graham (1987,142) responds, although there is 
flexibility in the term - so that well-informed and well-intentioned parties may disagree - 
it does not follow that there are no clear cases of reasonable (or unreasonable) 
expectation, nor does it follow that the majority of cases are disputable. 67 
Razls Service Conception of Authority 
To make a more persuasive case for the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, it will help 
to give a stronger philosophical foundation to the claim that an intervener's legitimacy is 
primarily dependent on its effectiveness. I will rely on Raz's 'service conception of 
authority' for this purpose. This account is widely recognised as the most nuanced, 
67 See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the issue of vagueness and how we should decide when 
the relevant factors of legitimacy have been met. 
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developed, and convincing of all instrumentalist accounts of legitimate authority, and 
perhaps of all accounts of legitimate authority in general. 68 
For Raz, like for the Moderate Consequential ist Approach, achieving good 
consequences is not the sole way to determine an agent's legitimacy, but the normal and 
primary way to do so. Accordingly, by providing a persuasive theoretical base, the 
following analysis of Raz will go some way to help make the case that an intervener's 
legitimacy depends, to a large extent, on its effectiveness. 
Before beginning, it is worth noting that Raz's primary concern is with the 
legitimate authority of the state. He does not directly discuss the issue of legitimacy for 
humanitarian intervention. This section therefore considers an account of legitimacy for 
humanitarian intervention that is Razian in spirit. Sometimes this may require a little 
flexibility in the application of Raz's central theory, but our interest is not in Razs work 
per se but in his consequentialist approach. 69 
Two theses lie at the heart of Raz's account of legitimacy. First, the 'dependence 
thesis' requires an institution to govern in conformity with the reasons that apply to its 
subjects. It says: 
68 See McCabe (2001) and Morris (1996). Not all regard his instrumental approach to legitimate authority as 
persuasive, however. See, in particular, Christiano (2004a), Durning (2003a), Green (1988; 1989), Moore 
(1989), Regan (1989), Shapiro (2002), and Waldron (1989). 
69 In fact, Raz does not accept that he is a consequentialist (1989,1184 n66). However, this is largely due to 
his rejection of his particular conception of consequentialism, rather than to his not being a 
consequentialist. Regan argues that "a consequentialist is someone who believes that morality, whether 
individual or political, is about promoting the occurrence in the world of whatever has intrinsic value" and 
"Raz fits this definition of a consequentialist" (1989,997). Also see Moore (1989,842). 
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all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already 
independently apply to the subject of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circuinstances covered by the directive (Raz 1986,47; emphasis in 
original). 
In other words, the institution must serve the governed. A puppet government that makes 
decisions in response to the wishes of a dominant foreign power, rather than for the 
reasons that apply to its individuals, would be illegitimate. 
Second, according to the 'normal justification thesis', the legitimacy of an 
institution depends on whether it promotes its subjects' compliance with dependent 
reasons. The normal justification thesis says: 
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely to better comply with reasons 
which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts 
the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to 
follow them, rather than trying tofollow the reasons which apply to him directly 
(Raz 1986,53; emphasis in original). 
So, to be legitimate, an institution needs to be effective at serving the governed. For Raz, 
this is the primary way in which an institution is legitimised. 
Together, the dependence thesis and the normal justification thesis provide a 
compelling view of legitimate authority. Not only do they capture our intuitions that 
authorities should serve the governed and that they should do so effectively, they explain 
why. Moreover, these two theses are mutually reinforcing. In Raz's words: 
If the normal and primary way of justifying the legitimacy of an authority is that it 
is more likely to act successfully on the reasons which apply to its subjects then it 
is hard to resist the dependence thesis. It merely claims that authorities should do 
that which they were appointed to do. Conversely, if the dependence thesis is 
accepted then the case for the normal justification thesis becomes very strong. It 
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merely states that the normal and primary justification of any authority has to 
establish that it is qualified to follow with some degree of success the principles 
which should govern the decisions of all authorities (Raz 1986,55). 
Raz's judicious account of legitimate authority is ultimately linked to his account of well- 
being. Well-being for Raz is linked to the successful pursuit of our 'goals'; it consists of 
"the (1) whole-hearted and (2) successful pursuit of (3) valuable (4) activities" (1994,3). 
By 'goals', Raz means "whatever a person cares about, be it a relationship, his career, a 
leisure activity, an interest in local history, a fascination with children, the pleasure of 
drink or of good food, etc. " (1986,305). This does not mean that the fulfilment of self- 
interest determines well-being. Raz distinguishes between well-being and self-interest, 
arguing that "self-interest is largely a biological notion7 (1986,295). Whilst people's 
well-being is, to some extent, dependent on biologically determined goals, it is also "to a 
considerable extent a function of their non-biologically determined goals" (Raz 1986, 
294). The key point then is that an individual's well-being is, in significant part, 
determined by the successful pursuit of his goals, but this does not mean the same as 
fulfilling his self-interest. 
This pursuit of goals and the achievement of well-being is reason-based: "Both when 
a person chooses a goal and when he surveys the one he has, he regards himself as 
looking for reasons for choosing one goal rather than another, and he holds himself to 
have the goals which he has for a reason" (Raz 1986,300). The primary sorts of reasons 
involved in this pursuit are 'action reasons' (Raz 1986,300). What are 'action reasons'? 
According to Raz, these are reasons "where the value (instrumental or intrinsic) is in the 
performance of an action, i. e. where there is intrinsic value in certain agents performing 
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actions of a certain kind" (1986,279) . 
70 Raz asserts that "it is clear that many of a 
person's projects and goals provide him with action reasons; many are constituted by the 
endorsement of action reasons" (1986,306). Thus, "well-being depends, at the deepest 
level, on his action reasons and his success in following thenf ' (Raz 1986,308). 
We can now see how Raz's account of legitimacy links into his account of well- 
being. A legitimate authority can be expected to increase compliance with the reasons 
which apply to its subjects - their dependent reasons. Often (but not always) these 
reasons will be action reasons, which are important to the individual since many of them 
determine his goals and therefore his well-being. A legitimate authority can be expected 
to help an individual achieve his action reasons (and also other reasons), or to put it 
another way, it can help the individual to attain his goals and therefore increase his well- 
being. Thus, the Razian approach asserts that the legitimacy of an institution primarily 
depends on its effectiveness and provides a detailed explanation why. 
Moreover, like the Moderate Consequentialist Approach (and unlike the 
Extreme Consequentialist Approach considered in the next chapter), Raz does not claim 
that effectiveness is the only factor for the legitimacy of an institution. This further adds 
to the persuasiveness of his approach. First, Raz argues that identification can help to 
establish legitimacy. He sets out two types of identification: (1) consent to the authority 
and (2) respect for its laws (Raz 1986). Raz limits the legitimating function of consent 
and respect for law, and therefore identification in general, to a role that is secondary to 
70These contrast with outcome reasons "where the value of the action is in its outcome or consequences 
(where neither the action itself nor the fact that it leads the same or other agents to perform some actions 
counts as an outcome)" (Raz 1986,279). 
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and that supports the non-nal justification thesis. In addition to primary reasons, "[t]he 
secondary reasons help to meet the burden of proof required to establish a complete 
justification, i. e. they may suffice in conjunction with the primary reasons in 
circumstances in which the primary reasons alone will not be enough to establish the 
legitimacy of an authority" (Raz 1986,55). Second, Raz waters down the role of 
consequences further with his belief that authorities must satisfy what he calls the 
'Condition of Autonomy'. 71 These are matters "on which it is more important that people 
should decide for themselves than that they should decide correctly" (Raz 1989,1180). 
This condition takes into account the intrinsic desirability of people conducting their own 
life by their own lights (Raz 1989,1180). 72 My main point here then is that Raz, like the 
Moderate Consequentialist Approach, takes consequences to be the primary, rather than 
the sole, determinant of legitimacy. 
How can this Razian account apply to humanitarian intervention? A 
humanitarian crisis massively harms the well-being of those subject to it. First, the 
grievous suffering and loss of life will harm individuals 'biologically', hurting their self- 
interest and preventing them from realising the goals that determine their well-being. 
More specifically, when there is a humanitarian crisis, an individual's action reasons (and 
other reasons) are frustrated - someone who is famished, tortured, or oppressed cannot 
successfully pursue their goals - and so will not be able to 'comply with the reasons 
which apply to him'. An intervener that can be expected to minimise this 'biological 
7 'For a recent restatement of this condition, see Raz (2003,26 1). 
72 This Condition of Autonomy has some affinity with my argument in Chapter 6 for local external 
representativeness. 
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harm' is likely to increase the well-being of those subject to its intervention. By doing so, 
the intervener will be legitimate since it will increase the number of reasons that are able 
to be fulfilled and therefore increase their subjects' compliance with the reasons which 
apply to them. Hence, an intervener that can be expected to improve the humanitarian 
crisis will be legitimate according to the normal justification thesis. 
Crucial then to an intervener's legitimacy is the effective resolution of the 
humanitarian crisis. To apply what Raz says about governmental interference to 
humanitarian intervention, agents "should act only where their intervention is likely to 
lead to greater conformity with those reasons than is likely if they do not intervene" 
(1989,1231). A legitimate intervener on the Razian account is primarily legitirriised by 
its effectiveness at remedying or improving the humanitarian crisis. Hence, an intervener 
that is likely to undertake successful humanitarian intervention will go a long way 
towards being legitimate. 
Thus far, I have applied the Razian account to help to explain the paramount 
importance of local external effectiveness. To be locally externally effective, the 
intervener has to act on the basis of (and to increase compliance with) the dependent 
reasons which apply to the individuals in the political community that is subject to its 
intervention. As previously argued, the main reasons which apply to these individuals 
involve a resolution of the humanitarian crisis. Hence, the intervener is locally externally 
legitimate if it effectively improves the humanitarian crisis. This explanation of the 
importance of local external effectiveness seems sound. But how does the Razian account 
apply to other types of effectiveness, and in particular internal effectiveness? One 
possible objection here is that the dependence thesis is incompatible with humanitarian 
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intervention. Specifically, it may appear that an agent intervening to resolve a 
humanitarian crisis cannot be internally legitimate on a Razian account when there is no 
benefit for its citizens. As discussed above, the dependence thesis requires an institution 
to act on behalf of reasons that apply to its subjects. But, the objection runs, by 
undertaking humanitarian intervention an intervener acts on reasons that apply not to its 
subjects, but to those beyond its borders - those suffering the humanitarian crisis. 
But Raz's account of reasons avoids this problem. In this context, Andrew Mason 
notes: "Raz's account allows that some of the reasons which apply to a person may derive 
from moral obligations which he is under" (2000,195). To explain further: recall here 
that, for Raz, well-being is not dependent merely on the fulfilment of self-interest, but is a 
broader notion, determined by an individual's successful achievement of his goals. So, 
the reasons that apply to individuals are not necessarily the same as their narrow self- 
interest. These reasons (such as their action reasons) are instead to do with their goals, 
which ultimately determine their well-being. Now, there are good reasons for thinking 
that the undertaking of humanitarian intervention can be deemed a valuable goal on this 
Razian framework. Most simply, protecting others from an egregious violation of their 
human rights is an intuitively valuable goal. Second, Raz (1986) endorses value 
pluralism, which means that a wide degree of goals can be valuable. Third, for Raz many 
goals are not individualistic or self-interested, but instead depend on the promotion of 
others' well-being. Indeed, Raz claims that we have certain duties of well-being, the 
fulfilment of which will in turn promote our own well-being. For instance, he asserts that 
"[o]ur duties of well-being are to provide the conditions in which people will enjoy the 
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basic capacities to take advantage of the opportunities available in their society" (Raz 
1994,18). 
It follows then that "Raz's account can allow that the state may have legitimate 
authority to engage in humanitarian intervention when it thereby enables its citizens to 
discharge their moral obligations to those beyond its borders" (Mason 2000,195). Thus, 
an intervener on Raz's service conception of authority can still be internally legitimate. 
On this Razian view, then, the state is not simply a discretionary association to promote 
its citizens' interests. Rather, as in Buchanan's (1999) account of legitimacy, it can be 
seen as an 'instrument for justice', since it requires legitimate governments to increase 
their citizens' compliance with certain duties (including fulfilling their duty to prevent 
human suffering by undertaking humanitarian intervention) in order to promote their 
well-being. Nevertheless, an intervener that undertakes reckless humanitarian 
intervention at excessive cost to its citizens would not be legitimate on the Razian 
framework since such intervention would severely harm its citizens' well-being. 
This explanation can also be extended to the importance of global external 
effectiveness on the Razian account, at least in the negative sense. If it were the case that 
some of individuals' dependent reasons are concerned with their moral obligations 
beyond the borders of their own state, including humanitarian intervention, it would seem 
that these obligations would include an obligation not to undertake intervention that is 
excessively costly to worldwide enjoyment of basic human rights. The legitimacy of an 
intervener will therefore also depend on whether it avoids reckless humanitarian 
intervention that is excessively costly to worldwide well-being. 
Thus, Raz's service conception, which holds that institutions are legitimate to 
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the extent that they promote well-being, shows why the Moderate Consequentialist 
Approach is persuasive and, in particular, why we want interveners to resolve 
humanitarian crises effectively. It asserts that an intervener that effectively improves the 
humanitarian crisis will have a positive effect on well-being and, according to the normal 
justification thesis, that intervener will be legitimate. As such, I take the Razian account 
to provide the philosophical justification for my argument for the substantial significance 
of consequences for an intervener's legitimacy. The Razian service conception therefore 
underpins the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
III. DETAILS OF THE MODERATE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
The previous two sections have outlined and defended the basics of the Moderate 
Consequentialist Approach. I argued first that the notion that consequences have a large 
role in the legitimacy of an intervener is intuitively compelling and that this helps to 
explain some of the initial attractiveness of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
Next, I distinguished between three types of effectiveness: internal effectiveness, global 
external effectiveness, and local external effectiveness. Together these help to explain 
why an intervener's effectiveness is the primary, and a necessary, condition of its 
legitimacy. I then delineated and applied Raz's service conception of authority to 
humanitarian intervention to provide some more theoretical substance to these claims of 
the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. This section will now consider some details of 
the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
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(i) What timescale? 
Let us start with whether the Moderate Consequentialist Approach should measure an 
agent's intervention - and therefore its effectiveness - by its short- or long-term expected 
success. Measuring an intervention in terms of the likely short-term success means that 
effectiveness is to do with how well the intervener can be expected to tackle the 
impending or ongoing humanitarian crisis. The long-term view, on the other hand, 
requires the intervener not only to resolve the humanitarian crisis, but also to prevent an 
immediate recurrence of it, thereby securing individuals' enjoyment of basic human 
rights. Hence, Wheeler suggests that we should regard the short- and long-term 
humanitarian outcomes as issues of rescue and protection: "the former [rescue] referring 
to the success of intervention in ending the supreme humanitarian emergency, and the 
latter [protection] being defined in terms of how far intervention addresses the underlying 
political causes that produced the human rights abuses" (2000,37). 
Overall, the long-term perspective is preferable because it includes expected 
short-term gains in its calculation of expected long-term enjoyment of basic human rights 
- it includes rescue as well as protection. The short-term perspective, conversely, 
excludes expected long-term gains - it includes only rescue. As Walzer (2002a, 5) 
argues, the short-term view, in the form of an 'in and quickly out' rule, can lead to a 
recurrence of the humanitarian crisis after the intervener has left. So, assuming that both 
short- and long-term gains in enjoyment of basic human rights are morally significant, we 
should favour the long-terrn perspective because it takes into account both types of 
increase in enjoyment of basic human rights. 
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But, as C. A. J. Coady argues: "The 'longer-tenn' cannot be too long. An 
intervention must avoid escalating into a colonial saga or even an enduring protectorate" 
(2002,30). Perhaps the easiest way to avoid this, Walzer (2002a) argues, is to limit the 
extent of the long-term objectives. Similarly, as one of the participants at the Stanley 
Foundation's Thirty-Fifth United Nations of the Next Decade Conference observed, the 
intervener could not and "should not fix 'everything' in these countries. 'You don't need 
to turn Rwanda into Pennsylvania"' (2000,39). Nor does long-term humanitarian 
intervention mean that short-terrn expected results are of lesser importance. Where 
possible, the intervention "must be tailored to suit these long-term objectives, though... 
securing an immediate cessation of hostilities will, in some cases, trump other objectives" 
(Clarke 2001,3). If a state's intervention is expected to save 50,000 lives in the short- 
term but cost 40,000 lives in the long-term, this is still a positive outcome in the long- 
term (10,000 lives have been saved). 
One difficulty commonly raised with this longer-term perspective is that it is too 
demanding because it requires many things that are not easily achieved - protection is 
often harder than rescue. Consequently, an intervener is more likely to be effective - and 
therefore, to a large degree, legitimate - in the short-term than in the long-term. But this 
is not a satisfactory reason to adopt the short-term perspective. Instead of lowering the 
moral threshold of legitimacy so that some current agents can be called effective, we 
should work towards producing such effective agents. 
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(ii) What comparison? 
A related issue here is the standard of comparison by which we should judge an 
intervener's effectiveness. One option is to treat an effective intervener as one that 
increases enjoyment of basic human rights in the long-term compared to the situation at 
the time its decision to intervene was made. Another option is to treat an effective 
intervener as one that increases enjoyment of basic human rights in the long-term 
compared to what would have been likely to happen if it had not intervened - the 
counterfactual. To illustrate the distinction, suppose that Tanzania were to intervene in 
Mozambique. On the first position, Tanzania would be expected to be effective if it were 
likely to improve enjoyment of basic human rights in the long run, compared to the 
situation at the time that President Jakaya Kikwete agrees with his ministers to intervene 
in Mozambique. On the second position, Tanzania would be expected to be effective if it 
were likely to improve enjoyment of basic human rights in the long run, compared to 
what would happen if it refrained from intervening in Mozambique. Which position 
should we prefer? 
I will use the second position for the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo provides support for the persuasiveness of treating 
effectiveness in this way. Although NATO's intervention in Kosovo originally 
exacerbated the situation and, overall, the post-intervention situation was probably worse 
than the pre-intervention situation in Kosovo, had NATO instead stood by and not 
intervened, the situation in Kosovo would have become far worse (Franck 2003,226). It 
is right to call this intervention 'effective', even though it did not improve the pre- 
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intervention situation. The justification for using the counterfactual calculation in 
determining effectiveness is that it properly accounts for the role of preventative 
humanitarian intervention, such as NATO's action in Kosovo. The problem with the first 
approach is that preventative and anticipatory humanitarian interventions would often be 
deemed ineffective. As Simon Caney notes, "it is implausible to criticize humanitarian 
intervention as 'unsuccessful' when it is more 'successful' in meeting the humanitarian 
objectives than any of the other courses of action" (2005,244). Thus, the second 
approach is preferable and we should measure all three types of effectiveness (global 
external effectiveness, local external effectiveness, and internal effectiveness) by 
comparison with the counterfactual of non-intervention. 
Note here that the counterfactual improvement need not necessarily be that large. 
Hypothetically, an intervener could be deemed effective overall even if it prevented the 
violation of only a small number of individuals' basic human rights. More generally, an 
intervener does not need to tackle completely the humanitarian crisis in order for its 
intervention to be effective. As long as its intervention makes an improvement in the 
crisis compared to what would have happened had it not intervened, this is sufficient for 
it to be deemed effective. Of course, the greater the intervener's effectiveness, the better. 
The more it increases the overall enjoyment of basic human rights, the greater its 
legitimacy. 
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IV. SELECTIVITY 
Having outlined the Moderate Consequentialist Approach in more detail, I will now argue 
that this approach can explain why selectivity is not an important factor for the legitimacy 
of an intervener. 
One of the most frequent criticisms made of humanitarian intervention is that it is 
carried out inconsistently. The criticism might be, for instance, that NATO undertook 
intervention in Kosovo but not in DR Congo (Damrosch 2000). The problem with this 
selectivity is that it "conveys the impression that 'some are more worth protecting than 
others" (ICISS 2001b, 150). If humanitarian intervention really is to be humanitarian, the 
argument continues, it has to be consistently applied whenever there is a serious 
humanitarian crisis. Mohammed Ayoob, for instance, claims that since humanitarian 
interventions "are undertaken on a selective basis and the same criteria are not applied 
uniformly and universally in every case, such interventions lose legitimacy and 
credibility in the eyes of many, if not most, members of the international system" (2002, 
86). Likewise, Edward Luttwak asks: ... what does it mean for the morality of a 
supposedly moral rule, when it is applied arbitrarily against some but not others? "' (in 
Linter 2005,284). 
Although frequently made, this objection about selectivity is problematic. The 
problem is twofold. First, some selectivity in the application of humanitarian intervention 
is desirable. On the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, an intervener should be 
reasonably expected to be effective and an intervener may be expected to be effective in 
one situation but not in another. For instance, suppose that Chad and Algeria both suffer 
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serious humanitarian crises. France has a reasonable expectation of improving the 
situation in Chad - it would be locally externally effective - without destabilising 
international order and without its intervention being extremely costly in French 
resources and lives. But suppose further that France does not have a reasonable 
expectation of improving the situation in Algeria. Given the history between these two 
countries, French intervention would face much resistance and so be unlikely to be 
locally externally effective; the intervention would also massively destabilise the 
surrounding region, and so lack global external effectiveness. What is more, the 
intervention would be likely to be bloody, with much fighting, and with an extremely 
large number of French casualties, so the intervention would lack internal effectiveness. 
In these two cases, it is certainly desirable that France should be selective in where it 
intervenes. On the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, France would be a legitimate 
intervener in Chad, but not Algeria. Hence, as Tharoor and Daws note, "selectivity is thus 
an inevitable consequence of the requirement of efficacy in interventiow' (2001,27). But, 
as Tharoor and Daws also note, this does not mean that we should overlook humanitarian 
crises in situations where intervention will not be effective. The international community 
should instead employ other tools, such as "condemnation through resolutions of human 
rights bodies and exposure in the increasingly ubiquitous mass media... shame is a 
powerful weapon in global diplomacy and should be a choice weapon of recourse" 
(Tharoor and Daws 2001,27). 
Moreover, having intervened in one country, the intervener may not have the 
resources (especially military resources) to intervene in another. For this reason, most 
interveners should be selective where they intervene. Furthermore, there are some 
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countries in which a humanitarian intervener could never be legitimate (at least in the 
foreseeable future). For instance, intervention in Russia over Chechnya or in China over 
Tibet is likely to be extremely globally externally ineffective - at worst, it might lead to 
nuclear war. Failing that, it is likely to be internally ineffective - if the U. S., for instance, 
were to intervene in either of these countries, the number of U. S. casualties and the cost 
in resources would be excessive. In addition, intervention in either China or Russia would 
be unlikely to improve the situation of the Chechens or Tibetans. Perhaps the closest we 
have come to such an intervention was the Korean War in the early 1950s. 
73 This war, 
which had the Chinese (and, to a certain extent, the USSR) on one side supporting the 
North Koreans and the Americans on the other side supporting the South Koreans, set the 
way for paralysis of the Cold War, resulted in massive American casualties, and caused 
the death of as many as 4 million Koreans, three-quarters of them civilians (Cumings 
2001,474). Indeed, even if there were a large-sized permanent force for humanitarian 
intervention in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions (as I shall propose in 
Chapter 8), intervention in the major world powers would still be unlikely to be 
SUCCCSSfUl. 74 There is, then, a strong case for a degree of selectivity in humanitarian 
intervention on the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
That said, it might be argued that selectivity is more of a problem for the 
legitimacy of interveners when they remain selective after these consequentialist 
concerns have been taken into account fully. In other words, selectivity renders an 
intervener illegitimate when the intervener would be effective in a number of cases but 
73 Note that I am not claiming that this war was an instance of humanitarian intervention. 
74 See Kinlocb-Pi chat (2004,229). 
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does not respond to them consistentl Y. 75 For instance, suppose that there are two similar 
humanitarian crises, one in Niger, the other in Mali. The U. S. has a reasonable 
expectation of successfully intervening in both states. The U. S. decides to intervene in 
Niger. The apparent, underlying reason for the U. S. 's decision is that oil has been found 
in Niger (the instability caused by the humanitarian crisis makes it extremely difficult to 
access this oil). The U. S. does not intervene in Mali, where there is no such potential oil 
supply. Is the U. S. nevertheless a legitimate intervener in Niger? Many sceptics of 
humanitarian intervention would say that it is not. The selectivity of American 
intervention undermines its legitimacy because it intervenes in Niger where it has some 
interest at stake, but not in Mali, where it has none. The underlying objection here is one 
about motives and runs as follows. The selectivity of interveners demonstrates that 
humanitarian intervention is undertaken only ever for the intervener's own interests - 
humanitarian justifications are a fagade. Ayoob, for instance, states: "Selectivity in 
humanitarian intervention seems inevitable" (2002,86) because it is "impossible to 
prevent considerations of national interest from intruding upon decisions regarding 
international intervention for ostensibly humanitarian purposes 99 (2002,85). The 
argument continues: humanitarian intervention undertaken for an intervener's own 
interest is illegitimate. Selectivity therefore demonstrates the illegitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention. This selectivity objection is essentially deontological. It suggests that 
"Wheeler takes a similar position: he asserts that it is important to distinguish "between actions that are 
selective because of considerations of selfish interests, and those that would have to be ruled out because 
the human costs of intervention would outweigh the humanitarian benefits" (2000,134). 
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selectivity is evidence of the moral inadequacy of an intervener's ulterior motives. There 
are good reasons, however, to doubt the validity of this claim. 
First, we can question the importance of motives for an intervener's legitimacy. 
76 
On the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, the most important thing for legitimacy is 
an intervener's effectiveness. In the above example, the U. S. is likely to be effective in 
Niger and it would be legitimate for this reason. When million of lives are at stake, the 
motives of an intervener seem comparatively unimportant in comparison, at least 
intrinsically. They may be, of course, instrumentally important - that is, if they affect the 
intervener's effectiveness. But, as argued in the next chapter, and as already discussed in 
Chapter 3, there is a good reason to believe that an intervener may in fact be more 
effective if it has mixed motives. 77 
Second, this selectivity objection misses its target. When considering whether the 
U. S. is a legitimate intervener in Niger, we have to consider the factors relevant to that 
particular case. So, when considering U. S. intervention in Niger, we should ask: what is 
the right way to tackle the humanitarian crisis in Niger? According to the Moderate 
Consequentialist Approach, the most important thing is that the humanitarian crisis in 
Niger is effectively tackled. For that reason, the U. S. would be a legitimate intervener. 
My point, then, is that when considering whether an intervener is legitimate in a 
76 For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 2, which challenges the concept of an intervener's motivation, 
and Chapter 3, which challenges its moral significance. 
77 One target that those who make this sort of argument may have in their sights is that the suggestion that 
humanitarian intervention is justified because it is undertaken with a humanitarian motive (e. g. Mehta 2006, 
282). 1 agree with the critics here: just as the motives of the intervener do not undermine its legitimacy, nor 
do they establish it. 
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particular case, we should concentrate on the details of that case and, specifically, on 
whether it will be effective. 78 The other cases of humanitarian intervention are important 
for the legitimacy of the intervener only to the extent that they affect (or are affected by) 
this case. As Thomas Franck argues: "The ultimate test of humanitarian intervention's 
legitimacy is whether it results in significantly more good than harm, not whether there 
has been a consistent pattern of such interventions whenever and wherever humanitarian 
crises have arisen" (2002,189). So, the seemingly obvious point that the selectivity 
objection overlooks is this: what the U. S. does or does not do in Mali should not change 
the judgment of its legitimacy in Niger, unless it will actually affect this intervention in 
Niger. 
Third, this is not to say that we should refrain from criticising the U. S. for not 
intervening in Mali. When considering the particular details of the Mali case, or when 
considering U. S. foreign policy more generally, the U. S. (and perhaps others) should be 
criticised for failing to fulfil its (their) duty to end human suffering in the Mali case. In 
general, then, selectivity is not the real issue. The real issue is the fact that states choose 
to stand by on too many occasions when they could legitimately intervene. We should not 
criticise states when they do intervene legitimately; we should criticise them when they 
do not. As ICISS asserts, "even occasionally doing the right thing is certainly preferable 
to doing nothing routinely" (2001b, 150). 
"It is important to remember here that one aspect of effectiveness is global external effectiveness. This 
means that, when concentrating on the details in particular case, we should also consider the likely effects 
of intervention on international order, stability, future humanitarian interventions, etc. 
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V. JUST CAUSE 
It is worth noting that the Moderate Consequentialist Approach limits the situations in 
which an intervener can legitimately intervene. 79 In other words, it goes some way 
towards establishing a just cause criterion for humanitarian intervention. If intervention is 
to increase the enjoyment of basic human rights, that is, if it can be reasonably expected 
to be successful, the intervener needs to be responding to a situation in which it has the 
opportunity to do enough good to outweigh the harm that its intervention will cause. As 
Eric Heinze asserts, "whether or not military force can be expected to avert more harm 
than it brings about depends crucially on how large-scale or severe the situation to be 
corrected is" (2005,173). This is because humanitarian intervention involves military 
action and so is likely to harm the basic human rights of some of those in the political 
community that is subject to the intervention. It is also likely to harm the basic human 
rights of those undertaking intervention, for instance, the intervener may suffer casualties 
and intervention may be a heavy drain on its resources. Furthermore, intervention may 
destabilise international order to a certain degree. If the infliction of these three sorts of 
harms is to be legitimate, the humanitarian crisis must be of such a magnitude that the 
good that might be secured by intervention is sufficiently large to outweigh the badness 
of those harms. In particular, the crisis will have to be such that intervention will improve 
79The ensuing discussion differs from my analysis in Chapter 2 of the circumstances in which humanitarian 
intervention occurs. In Chapter 2,1 was concerned with providing a non-natively-neutral definition of just 
cause to identify the sorts of cases that can be classified as 'humanitarian intervention'. My focus now is on 
a normative point about the sorts of cases in which an intervener can legitimately act. 
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the human rights situation sufficiently to offset the harms it will cause. 80 As Heinze 
argucs, unlcss a 
government is engaging in large-scale, systematic and gross physical abuse of its 
people, then the costs of deposing such a regime via military invasion is likely to 
only bring about severe hann that would have otherwise not occurred. Since 
interveners risk killing people, maiming them, and otherwise physically harming 
them in the conduct of intervention, then intervention must only take place to 
avert this same type and severity of hann (2005,172). 
So, the good of responding to a small number of violations of basic human rights or to a 
larger number of violations of other human rights (which are not basic) will not outweigh 
the harm caused by intervention. An intervener can be expected to be effective overall 
only in cases where a large number of violations of basic human rights are being 
frustrated. For instance, suppose that the Mauritanian government detains opposition 
politicians without trial, denies the freedom of the press, and does not follow proper 
judicial processes. However, military intervention in Mauritania would cause much more 
hardship for the Mauritanian people than their current situation. Intervention in this case 
is therefore unlikely to be effective overall because the situation, although bad, is not bad 
enough. Suppose further that genocide is currently ongoing in Guinea-Bissau. Although 
intervention in Guinea-Bissau may cause harm to some of its citizens, for instance, by 
damaging vital infrastructure with stray bombs, the situation is bad enough for the 
"There are two hypothetical exceptions, which were discussed earlier. These are when an intervener is (1) 
extremely globally externally effective or (2) extremely internally effective. In these cases, an intervener 
can respond to a less serious humanitarian crisis and still be effective, and legitimate, overall. But, even in 
these cases, the underlying logic still applies: an intervener must be responding to a situation where it is 
possible to be effective overall. 
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intervener to be effective overall. By tackling the genocide, the intervener will make a 
large enough increase in the enjoyment of basic human rights to outweigh these harms. 
Thus, the Moderate Consequential ist Approach, in taking effectiveness to be the primary 
deten-ninant of legitimacy, indicates the sort of cases in which an intervener can be 
legitimate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, which takes an 
intervener's effectiveness to be the primary determinant of its legitimacy. When deciding 
who should intervene, the Moderate Consequentialist Approach focuses primarily on the 
intervener that will be the most effective. I firstly distinguished between three types of 
effectiveness (local external effectiveness, global external effectiveness, and internal 
effectiveness) and suggested that effectiveness is a necessary condition of an intervener's 
legitimacy. I then used Raz's service conception of authority to give a stronger 
philosophical foundation to the claim that an intervener's legitimacy is primarily 
dependent on its effectiveness. Having defended this basic premise of the Moderate 
Consequential i st Approach, in the third part of the chapter I fleshed out the approach in 
greater detail, arguing that we should measure an intervener's effectiveness over the long- 
term and that we should judge effectiveness by comparison with the counterfactual. I then 
claimed that, on this Moderate Consequentialist Approach, selectivity can be justified and 
an intervener must have just cause. 
But is this the most persuasive approach to the importance of an intervener's 
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effectiveness? Would an approach that (1) gives less weight or (2) gives greater weight to 
an intervener's effectiveness be preferable to this Moderate Consequentialist Approach? 
The next chapter will consider these questions and, in doing so, will strengthen the case 
for the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
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APPROACH 
The previous chapter outlined the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. I argued that this 
approach, which takes an intervener's effectiveness to be the primary determinant of its 
legitimacy, is highly persuasive. The aim of this chapter is to show that the Moderate 
Consequential ist Approach is preferable to two alternative approaches to the significance 
of consequences for humanitarian intervention. The first I call the 'Non-Consequentialist 
Approach' and this gives no or little weight to an intervener's effectiveness. The second I 
call the 'Extreme Consequentialist Approach'. This gives exclusive weight to an 
intervener's effectiveness and no weight to the value of other factors. By showing that 
these two other approaches to the significance of consequences are mistaken, I hope to 
strengthen the case for the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
Tlie first half of the chapter concentrates on the Non-Consequentialist Approach. I 
first consider a principled Non-Consequentialist Approach which gives little or no weight 
to an intervener's effectiveness, holding instead that an intervener's legitimacy is 
determined by other factors. I then move on to assess a more pragmatic version of the 
Non-Consequentialist Approach, which rejects consequentialist. thinking on humanitarian 
intervention because of the problems of predicting whether humanitarian intervention 
will be effective. The second half of the chapter focuses on the Extreme Consequentialist 
Approach. To show that this approach is mistaken, I highlight the importance of one 
particular non-consequentialist factor for an intervener's legitimacy: the intrinsic value of 
fidelity to the principles of jus in bello. I conclude therefore that the Moderate 
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Consequential ist Approach is more persuasive than these two alternatives. 
1. THE NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
Let us begin then with the first alternative to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, 
the Non-Consequentialist Approach. This approach gives little or no weight to an 
intervener's effectiveness and holds that an intervener's legitimacy is determined instead 
by other values. There are two versions of this Non-Consequentialist Approach, one 
principled, one pragmatic. 
The Principled Non-Consequentialist Approach 
The most palatable version of the principled Non-Consequentialist Approach claims that 
an intervener's effectiveness is of little moral concern. 81 Instead of looking to see whose 
intervention will be the most effective, it uses other factors to decide who should 
intervene. What are these other factors? Two leading candidates are an intervener's 
motives and its legal status. In Chapter 3, however, I largely rejected the moral 
81 It does still bold that an intervener's effectiveness is of some moral concern, however. A stronger version 
of the principled Non-Consequentialist Approach, which holds that an intervener's effectiveness is of 
absolutely no moral concern, is highly counterintuitive. That an intervener could have no expectation of 
success, and still be a legitimate intervener, seems nonsensical. As Rawls argues: "All ethical doctrines 
worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply 
be irrational, crazy" (1999a, 26). Scheffler (1988,1) makes a similar point. 
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importance of these two factors. Three other potential factors could be plausibly used by 
this approach. These are that we should look to the intervener that (1) is responsible for 
creating the humanitarian crisis, (2) has a special relationship with those suffering the 
humanitarian crisis, or (3) has the institutionalised responsibility to intervene. Let us 
assess, in turn, whether these three potential factors are better candidates for deciding 
who should intervene than the Moderate Consequentialist Approach's suggestion that the 
most effective intervener should intervene. 82 
I start with the view that the intervener that is somehow responsible for creating 
the humanitarian crisis in the first place should intervene. It may, for instance, be a 
fort-ner colonial master whose misrule and reckless departure has led to chronic 
instability. Or it could be an international hegemon that has previously destabilised the 
region. The intuition at work here is this: those who create the mess should clear it up. 
An immediate challenge to this approach is that there are unlikely to be many 
interveners that will be both responsible for creating the humanitarian crisis and able to 
tackle it successfully. Those responsible for the crisis, if they intervene, are likely to face 
high levels of resistance amongst the local population. Another difficulty with this 
approach is that identifying the actors that are responsible for the humanitarian crisis can 
be extremely tricky. Of course, this is sometimes all too obvious, but at other times it can 
82 Note that I later argue that there are four non-consequentialist factors (fidelity to the principles of internal 
and external jus in bello and internal and local external representativeness) that should determine who 
undertakes humanitarian intervention. However, I argue that these non-consequentialist factors should be 
taken into account in addition to an intervener's effectiveness. Unlike the three potential factors considered 
in this section, I do not argue that these four non-consequentialist factors should replace the role of an 
intervener's effectiveness as the primary determinant of its legitimacy. 
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be difficult to disentangle the role that a potential intervener played in causing the 
humanitarian crisis from the roles that other, particularly domestic, actors played. 
Furthermore, it is not clear why an agent that is responsible for the crisis should 
be preferred to the most effective intervener. If one takes the prevention of human 
suffering to be a duty (as argued in Chapter 2), what matters most is that this duty is 
effectively discharged. ICISS argues that the language of responsibility and duties 
"focuses the international searchlight back on where it should be: on the duty to protect 
communities from massacre, women from systematic rape and children from starvation" 
(2001a, 17). And when the focus is on those suffering the humanitarian crisis, what is 
most important is that their suffering is ended. This trumps the importance of an 
intervener making up for its past injustices. It might be argued in response that 
intervention by the agent responsible for the crisis is required for some sort of reparation. 
But this would be an odd notion of justice: those who suffered the injustice in the first 
place - those suffering the humanitarian crisis - would end up being worse off. This is 
because intervention by the responsible agent would be less effective at tackling the 
ongoing egregious violations of human rights than the most effective intervener. 83 
The second factor, which could be used to ground the Non-Consequentialist 
Approach, is a special relationship between those suffering the humanitarian crisis and 
the intervener. 84 In this context, Kok-Chor Tan (2006,98) gives an example of a man 
drowning off a beach that has no lifeguard on duty. Out of everyone on the beach, the 
93 A further objection to this position may be made about the questionable motives of the intervener that 
caused the humanitarian crisis. However, I rejected the intrinsic and instrumental importance of an 
intervener's motives in Chapter 3. 
94 deLisle (2001,550) and Walzer (2000b) endorse this position. 
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drowning man's spouse would be identified as the appropriate agent because of her 
special relationship to him. In the case of humanitarian intervention, the special 
relationship might be historical, religious, or cultural. 
It is doubtful, however, whether special relationships exist among members of the 
international community that are sufficiently strong. It is not clear, for instance, that the 
communal affinity of the unima (the Muslim community) is sufficient to identify a 
Muslim state as the appropriate intervener when another Muslim state is suffering a 
humanitarian crisis (Hashmi 2003). Furthermore, even if there were a few special 
relationships strong enough within the international community to make a difference, in 
many other cases there would not be. This would leave us with the general problem of 
identifying which particular agent should intervene in these cases. Suppose, for instance, 
that the Darfurians do not have a strong enough special tie with anyone in the 
international community. Who in the international community should step in to save 
these individuaIS? 85 
Moreover, even if there were a strong enough special relationship, it is not clear 
that we should prefer this sort of agency condition to the most effective intervener. 
Consider again the analogy of a drowning man, but this time assume that there is an off- 
duty lifeguard among the bystanders. 86 Who should we prefer to save the drowning man, 
his wife, or the off-duty lifeguard? It is clear that the lifeguard should be identified as the 
appropriate agent because he has the greatest chance of saving the drowning man. 
"Tan cites the opposite problem where "[tlhere may be more than one potential agent with historical ties to 
those in need of protection, in which case the agency problem reappears" (2006,102). 
86 This second example is also adapted from Tan (2006,100). 
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Similarly, we should prefer the most effective intervener to an intervener that has a 
special relationship with those suffering the humanitarian crisis. If we are to focus our 
attention on where it should be - on those suffering the humanitarian crisis - what 
matters most is not this relationship, but, rather, the prevention of the torture, murder, and 
rape of innocent civilians. 
The third potential alternative is an intervener with the institutionalised 
responsibility to intervene. This is Tan's preferred option. Given that we can expect the 
recurrence of humanitarian crises, he argues, we need to put in place "institutional 
arrangements to allocate and distribute responsibilities to ensure that the duty to protect is 
effectively performed when the situation demands it" (Tan 2006,105). 
Yet the same problem arises for this factor as for the other two potential factors: it 
fails to identify any current agent of humanitarian intervention since, at present, no agent 
has the institutionalised responsibility to intervene. The UN perhaps comes closest, but it 
is still disputed whether it has a legal right to intervene, let alone the official duty to do 
SO. 
87 
The draw of institutionalising the duty to intervene is largely that this duty would, 
as Tan suggests, be effectively performed when required. As such, the best argument for 
institutionalisation in this context is instrumental - that the duty to intervene would be 
88 more successfully discharged. There may be something to this argument. And if there 
is, the Moderate Consequentialist Approach would be likely to point to the same actor - 
"See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 
"There could be a further potential benefit of institutionalising the duty to intervene. The institution could 
decide when the relevant normative factors are met, that is, when intervention would be legitimate. I 
consider this in Chapter 7. 
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the intervener that would be the most effective and that has the institutionalised duty to 
intervene - as the appropriate agent to undertake intervention. This is particularly the 
case when we include an intervener's global external effectiveness as part of its 
effectiveness overall, for this takes into account many of the apparent benefits of 
institutional ising the duty to intervene, such as the effects on international order and 
stability. 89 
However, if there is a conflict between the most effective intervener and the agent 
that has the institutionalised duty to intervene, the Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
is right to suggest that, where the agent with the institutionalised duty to intervene would 
not effectively discharge this duty, we should prefer the former. Institutionalising the 
duty to intervene does not guarantee that this duty would be performed effectively when 
necessary. Suppose we were to institutionalise the duty to intervene at the UN. As will be 
argued in Chapter 7, the UN often lacks the resources to intervene effectively. 
Accordingly, we may face situations similar to Rwanda and Srebrenica, where the UN 
891n addition, an intervener with the institutionalised duty to intervene could be the most effective 
intervener overall because it is indirectly effective, even though, on the face of it, it seems otherwise. 
Suppose that there is an institutionalised provision for humanitarian intervention that means that, in general, 
humanitarian intervention is undertaken more effectively than if such a provision did not exist. Suppose 
further that undertaking humanitarian intervention outside of this provision will weaken the provision 
irrevocably. It follows that the most effective intervener would be the one with the institutionalised duty to 
intervene, even though it may appear otherwise at first. This is because it will help to sustain the 
institutionalised provision for humanitarian intervention. By contrast, undertaking humanitarian 
intervention outside of this institutional provision will undermine this provision and therefore jeopardise 
the protection of basic human rights in the long-term, even if it may appear to be more effective in the 
short-term. 
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has a presence, but ultimately fails to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. As such, in 
some cases we may still prefer the most effective intervener to the intervener with the 
institutional ised duty to intervene. 90 
However, Tan (2006,102) raises a serious challenge to placing the responsibility 
to protect on the most effective intervener: it imposes an unreasonably heavy burden on 
the most effective intervener. To see the force of this challenge, it helps to distinguish 
between three ways that the issue of unfairness arises. First, having the most effective 
agent intervene is unfair because that agent has to do all the intervening. The duty to 
intervene falls on the same agent in a number of different cases. Other agents do not have 
the duty to intervene because their intervention would not be the most effective. The 
second and third types of unfairness differ slightly from this in that they involve the most 
effective agent covering for other agents' non-compliance with their duties - that is, in 
nonideal situations. In the second, other interveners fail to intervene and so the duty to 
intervene falls on an intervener who has already done its fair share. Suppose, for instance, 
that, States A and B would be the two most effective interveners, but are unwilling to act. 
The duty then falls on State C to intervene, because it is the third most effective 
intervener. This seems unfair on State C because it has already done its fair share: it has 
already undertaken humanitarian intervention a number of times recently. The third type 
of case in which the issue of unfairness arises is when the most effective intervener has to 
act because of the behaviour of those who caused the humanitarian crisis (e. g. the 
government of the target state persecutes a certain ethnicity). It is because of these 
individuals' non-compliance with their duty to prevent human suffering that the most 
90Mehta (2006,282) makes a similar point. 
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effective intervener has the burden of intervention. In these three ways, then, adopting the 
most effective intervener as the preferred agent can be unfair to that intervener. 
In response, there are a number of points that, to a certain extent, mitigate this 
unfairness. First, the duty to intervene is likely to fall on different agents in different 
situations, given the importance of circumstances in determining effectiveness (I consider 
this below). Furthermore, if an intervener is already intervening somewhere else, or if it 
has already intervened somewhere else very recently, then it may be unlikely to be the 
most effective intervener for a further intervention because it would be over-stretched. 
The duty to intervene will therefore fall on another agent. Second, I argue in Chapter 7 
that the most effective intervener in most cases will be NATO. NATO comprises some of 
the richest countries in the world. That the duty to intervene falls on these extremely rich 
states does not seem unduly unfair. 91 Third, although other agents do not have a duty to 
intervene, they nevertheless have a duty to prevent human suffering. In fact, other agents 
may have equally morally demanding requirements arising from the duty to prevent 
human suffering. Even though they will not be the intervener, they will have a duty to 
assist the intervener in whatever ways they can. This might include funding the 
intervention and providing equipment, and this will help to offset any apparent 
unfairness. This reply also helps to repudiate a further criticism: the most effective 
interveners have an incentive to run down their capabilities so that they no longer have 
the duty to intervene (deLisle 2001,546). If we admit that there is a duty to prevent 
human suffering, actors that fail to maintain their capacity to intervene violate their moral 
duty to do what they can to prevent human suffering. 
9'This is especially the case if one believes that rich states have acquired their wealth in unscrupulous ways. 
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Ultimately, though, to overcome these objections about fairness, it is necessary to 
revise the duty to prevent human suffering so that it is not as demanding. In this context, 
Liam Murphy proposes what he calls the 'compliance condition': 
agent-neutral moral principles should not under partial compliance require an 
agent to act such that a loss is imposed on some other person where the total 
compliance effect on that other person, taking this loss into account, would be 
worse than it would be (all other aspects of her situation remaining the same) 
under full compliance from now on (2000,82). 92 
In other words, the demands on a complying agent should not exceed what they would be 
if everyone complied with the principle that should govern their conduct (Murphy 2000, 
7). Applying this to the duty to prevent human suffering, those complying with the duty 
to prevent human suffering are not required to do more than they would have to if 
everyone complied with the duty to prevent human suffering. This principle of 
beneficence, however, is not best suited to humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian 
intervention always involves cases where someone has failed to comply with their duty to 
prevent human suffering (e. g. when governmental neglect or persecution causes a 
humanitarian crisis). Thus, humanitarian intervention requires at least one agent to do 
more (i. e. to intervene) than it would be required to do if there were full compliance with 
the duty to prevent human suffering. 
My alternative suggestion to tackle the problem of the unfairness on the most 
effective intervener is that we amend the duty to prevent human suffering so that agents 
have a duty to make a reasonable and substantial effort to prevent human suffering. The 
92Murphy's account of the compliance condition is influenced by Derek Parfit (1984,30-31), who takes a 
similar position in Reason and Persons. 
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duty to intervene will still fall on the most effective intervener. But if this agent has 
already made significant efforts to prevent human suffering in a number of ways (such as 
by undertaking a number of recent humanitarian interventions), then, for reasons of 
fairness, the duty to intervene should fall on the next most effective intervener. In 
practice, however, most agents have not done their bit to prevent human suffering - 
consider the number of humanitarian crises and amount of human suffering that currently 
go unchecked. The duty to intervene is therefore likely to continue to fall on the most 
effective intervener. 93 
In this section we have seen that the three other potential factors are an inadequate 
base to decide who should intervene, and that we should look instead primarily to an 
intervener's effectiveness (moderated to take into account faimesS). 94 The Moderate 
Consequentialist approach is therefore preferable to the principled version of the Non- 
Consequentialist Approach. But there might still be pragmatic reasons for holding that an 
intervener's effectiveness does not determine its legitimacy. 
93 In Chapter 9,1 make a further revision to the notion that the most effective intervener has the duty to 
intervene. My suggestion instead is that the most legitimate intervener (which in most cases is the most 
effective intervener) has the duty to intervene. 
94 As noted above, I later argue that there are four non-consequentialist factors that should be taken into 
account in addition to an intervener's effectiveness, although they should not replace the Tole of an 
intervener's effectiveness as the primary determinant of its legitimacy. 
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The Pragmatic Non-Consequentialist Approach 
There are a number of pragmatic arguments that might be deployed in support of the 
Non-Consequentialist Approach. The first is that an intervener's effectiveness is of minor 
significance for its legitimacy since humanitarian intervention is unlikely to be 
successful. For instance, Graham argues that intervention relies 
upon the actions now and in the future of third parties through which the 
intervening states must work - foreign diplomats, rebel forces, and governments 
installed by the power of the intervener. As the governments of the South 
Vietnam, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Uganda, and Lebanon illustrate, such third 
parties are rarely satisfactory instruments of the policies of their backers. 
Intervention, consequently ... may not have a very much 
higher chance than not 
intervening at all (19 87,143). 
Similarly, Beitz concludes, "the prospects of reform intervention in unjust states are 
normally uncertain whereas the costs in blood and treasure are certainly extreme" (1980, 
391). These views, however, provide poor reason for rejecting the importance of an 
intervener's effectiveness. It is simply not true that humanitarian intervention is never 
likely to be successful. There have been a number of cases of successful humanitarian 
intervention, such as those of India in Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda, the U. S., the 
U. K., and France in northern Iraq, Australia in East Timor, and NATO in Kosovo. 
Furthermore, even if it were true that humanitarian intervention is never likely to be 
successful, the proper conclusion would not be to reject the importance of an intervener's 
effectiveness, but to maintain that intervention should not occur. To argue otherwise 
would be to endorse the same counter-intuitive conclusions as a stronger principled 
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version of the Non-Consequentialist Approach - that an intervener can be legitimate even 
95 
though it has no expectation of success. 
A second, more pragmatic argument for holding the Non-Consequentialist 
Approach also maintains that an intervener must lack a reasonable expectation of success. 
But, unlike the first argument, it relies not upon the claim that humanitarian intervention 
cannot be successful; but on the claim that we can never know, at the time the decision is 
made to intervene, whether it will be successful. Graham argues that this is because of the 
complexity of humanitarian crises, which "makes the outcome of political actions to a 
large degree uncertain" (1987,143). Hence, this epistemological objection claims that an 
intervener's effectiveness is useless as a moral guide to its legitimacy. We cannot predict 
whether an intervener will be successful and, for that reason, (expected) effectiveness 
cannot determine legitimacy. 
This line of reasoning is also unsustainable. It is possible to make fairly accurate 
predictions of the likely success of humanitarian intervention, especially if an effort has 
been made to obtain accurate information and intelligence. We can judge, for instance, 
that a multilateral, Australian-led, large-scale, Pacific force is likely to be successful in 
the Solomon Islands but not in China. As Andrew Mason and Nicholas Wheeler argue, 
this sort of claim overstates the case: "There are many dangers attached to humanitarian 
intervention... But surely in practice there can be cases in which we know that 
humanitarian intervention has a reasonable chance of success, and the potential gains are 
such that the risk is worth taking" (1996,105). 96 
9'See my discussion above in fn. 81. 
96Similarly, Holzgrefe argues that it is true "the task of testing a claim that this or that humanitarian 
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A third, and more forceful, potential reason to endorse this pragmatic version of 
the Non-Consequentialist Approach is that an intervener's effectiveness is of little 
significance for its legitimacy because the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention is 
completely contingent upon circumstances. It is not the characteristics of the agent that 
determine the success of humanitarian intervention; it is the cause it is tackling. In this 
regard, Gerardo Munck and Chetan Kumar (1995) argue that it is the specific 
circumstances within the political community that is subject to intervention which have 
the greatest effect. So, when deciding who should intervene, the effectiveness of an 
intervener should be of no moral concern because it is entirely circumstantial. The 
particular qualities of the intervener do not determine its effectiveness and, for that 
reason, do not determine its legitimacy. It will be harder to achieve a successful outcome 
in China or Russia than in a war-tom collapsed state with deeply ingrained ethnic conflict 
and influential systems of patronage, and this, in turn, will be more difficult than 
supplying aid to a poverty stricken region with the support of all those involved. On the 
Moderate Consequentialist Approach, an intervener is likely to be effective and therefore 
legitimate in the last case, but ineffective and therefore illegitimate in the first. This 
highlights the hollowness of this approach, so the objection continues, since an agent's 
legitimacy will depend on the circumstances of intervention rather than on its structural 
qualities. We should therefore look to other values in assessing an intervener's 
intervention will (or would) affect human well-being in this or that way is fraught with methodological and 
practical difficulties" but while "these problems are formidable, they are not insurmountable. One can 
crudely measure how a humanitarian intervention will affect human well-being by comparing the number 
of people who actually died in a similar intervention in the past with the number of people who would have 
died had that intervention not occurred" (2003,50; emphasis amended). 
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legitimacy, such as its motives, representativeness, etc. This third reason for the 
pragmatic Non-Consequentialist Approach therefore provides a strong challenge to the 
Moderate Consequential ist Approach. If it were true that an intervener's effectiveness is 
wholly determined by circumstances, then the Non-Consequentialist Approach would be 
preferable to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
However, I will now argue that this claim is overblown. We can predict, to a 
certain extent, that an intervener that has certain qualities will be more likely to be 
effective than an intervener that lacks these qualities. All these qualities depend on the 
structure of the intervener, so that institutional form does play a significant role in the 
agent's expected effectiveness. As will become evident, there are two forms of quality: 
those that contribute to an agent's effectiveness directly and those that do so indirectly. 
The discussion that follows, in responding to this objection, will also further flesh 
out the Moderate Consequentialist Approach by identifying what is needed for an 
intervener to be effective. Indeed, given that I hold that an intervener's effectiveness has 
much moral significance, it is important to see what exactly is required for an intervener 
to be effective. In addition, this analysis will be vital when it comes to Chapter Ts 
assessment of who exactly should intervene. It is also needed to avoid presenting an 
account of legitimacy that is too vague and that lacks practical significance. 97 
Direct qualities of effectiveness 
The most obvious quality an intervener needs is the capability to intervene successfully. 
17 1 discuss the objection of vagueness in Chapter 7. 
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It has to have the resources necessary for it to be expected to carry out intervention 
effectively. Military resources are central; they are necessary for not only the initial 
coercive action, but also for post-war reconstruction and the opening up of a 
'humanitarian space' in which NGOs can deliver aid. To have sufficient military 
resources, an agent requires: a high number of armed, motivated, and trained - and, 
ideally, experienced - military personnel; military equipment such as tanks, boats, and 
aircraft; strategic lift capacity (in both air and sea forms) to be able to move personnel 
and equipment to wherever the humanitarian crisis is in the world; and logistical support 
to sustain this force abroad (without its resorting to looting, etc. ) (O'Hanlon 2003). 
Although some of these are not always required - Tanzania obviously did not need sea- 
and air-lift capacity for its 1979 action in Uganda - many humanitarian interventions 
require all four factors. 
If a successful and enduring solution is to be achieved, non-military resources are 
required to accompany the military ones. To put it crudely, military resources are 
important for winning the war and non-military resources are important for winning the 
peace. More specifically, political and economic resources are required for tackling the 
causes of the conflict, running any transitional authority, and reconstructing the political 
community. For instance, in addition to the military resources required to secure a stable 
environment, a successful intervener may need personnel to run the vital infrastructure 
(such as electricity, fresh water, and sewerage) in the affected political community, 
facilities for training the affected political community's civil service, and election 
monitors. Hence, Michael Bhatia notes that it "is the nonmilitary and political dimension 
that determines overall success or failure" (2003,124). 
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To use military and non-n-dlitary resources successfully, an agent of intervention 
needs to have a suitable strategy for both aspects. Agents of intervention often have a 
clear military strategy for halting the humanitarian crisis - for winning the war - but fail 
to develop a proper post-war strategy - for establishing and maintaining the peace. As a 
result, the success of their intervention has often been harmed as post-war policy is 
formed on the hoof. Perhaps the best example of this is the 2003 war on Iraq, which 
suffered from an apparent lack of such planning and was followed by severe instability. 
Furthermore, the strategy must be realistic. For decisions about whether and how to 
intervene to have a good chance of success, Alan Kuperman argues that "they must be 
informed by realistic appraisals of the prospects of humanitarian intervention rather than 
wishful thinking about the ease of saving lives with force" (2001,119). An intervener 
needs to make an accurate assessment of the situation on the ground and how it can tackle 
it with its resources, noting its own limitations. 
In addition, it is important that the intervener has an appropriate mandate and 
rules of engagement for its mission (Bhatia 2003; Coady 2002; ICISS 2001b; Terriff 
2004a). If a certain level of force is required in a particular situation during intervention, 
the commanding officers should not be impeded by unwarranted restrictions. For 
instance, an intervener may need to launch an attack on militia who are persecuting 
civilians. Too often humanitarian intervention has been approved without a suitable 
accompanying mandate and appropriate rules of engagement. Not only does this harm the 
immediate effectiveness of the operation, it creates resentment amongst the local 
population as the intervening force fails to halt attacks on civilians that, with an 
appropriate mandate, it could do easily. 
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Now, all the men, machines, and materials in the world, backed up by a suitable 
strategy and mandate, do not mean much unless the agent is prepared to use them. To be 
an intervener, an agent needs, at the very least, to have the willingness to use its resources 
to intervene. And to be an effective intervener, it also needs to be committed to using all 
the resources required for achieving a long-term successful outcome. Thus, 
"commitment... is also very much a part of effectiveness. 'Until we get the commitment 
issue right, other questions of effectiveness are not relevant'. Commitment means more 
than just mustering the political will to get involved; it also means providing adequate 
98 resources, both material and political" (The Stanley Foundation 2000,28). An agent of 
intervention lacking commitment may be willing to use only airpower or it may be 
unwilling to take casualties, which will mean that it is more likely to put civilian lives at 
risk, which is also likely to harm the prospects of success (Walzer 2002a; 2004a). 
Alternatively, the agent may be willing to conunit military resources necessary to achieve 
a short-term successful outcome, but not be willing to commit non-military resources 
necessary for long-term success. 
Kuperman argues that "[e]xperiences in the 1990s demonstrated that although 
the international community has sufficient will to intervene in many conflicts, it rarely 
has sufficient will to devote the resources necessary to intervene effectively" (2001,116). 
"Similarly, StTomseth argues that success for intervention depends Profoundly on international 
commitment to Providing adequate resources: "Often the impulse to assist suffering civilians is a mile wide 
and an inch deep - it is not accompanied by a corresponding willingness to commit forces Or provide 
resources needed to respond effectively to the atrocities and their underlying causes. Yet if insufficiently 
equipped and trained forces are deployed to carry out over-ambitious or ill-defined missions, the likelihood 
of failure is considerable" (2003,270). 
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This apparent lack of commitment leads some to claim that effective interveners require 
'mixed motives' because the only way an agent will be sufficiently committed is by 
having a self-interested reason to intervene (e. g. Seybolt 2000,6; Stein 2004,31; Walzer 
2002a, 4). There are strong and weak versions of this 'mixed motives' argument. The 
stronger version says that mixed motives are a prerequisite for effective intervention 
because they are the only way to ensure the necessary commitment, whereas the weaker 
version says that mixed motives improve the chances of effective intervention because 
they make the necessary commitment more likely. 
The epistemological and ontological difficulties of determining the motives of 
an intervener outlined in Chapter 2 mean that it is difficult to assess either of these 
claims. But setting aside these difficulties, the weaker claim, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, does have some prima facie plausibility. One does not have to be a Realist to 
admit that concerns about the national interest figure largely in states' foreign policy 
decisions. As ICISS asserts, "the budgetary cost and risk to personnel involved in any 
military action may in fact make it politically imperative for the intervening state to be 
able to claim some degree of self-interest in the intervention" (2001a, 36). It follows that 
an intervener is more likely to commit the necessary resources if it has an additional, self- 
interested reason to intervene. It also follows that an intervener is more likely to be 
willing to undertake intervention in the first place if it has mixed motives. 
This point about n-dxed motives links to an argument for an intervener's being 
local or regional. A regional intervener is more likely to be effective because its 
geographical proximity to the humanitarian crisis means that it will typically have a 
vested interest in resolving the crisis (ICISS 2001b, 210). A nearby humanitarian crisis 
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may cause border incursions, an influx of refugees, financial hardship, and political 
instability for the whole region. For instance, 
African countries pay a high price for mass human-rights abuses and killing on 
their continent -a price that European and North American countries do not pay, 
at least not directly. Flows of hundreds of thousands of refugees, cross-border 
incursions of militia groups, social and political upheaval, and damage to already 
struggling economies can hurt entire regions, as happened in West Africa, Central 
Africa and the Horn of Africa in the end of the Cold War (Gompcrt 2006,15-16). 
Indeed, it would be odd if regional interveners did not benefit from humanitarian 
intervention in their region. This element of self-interest makes commitment to the 
intervention much more likely. 99 And, as discussed above, an intervener's commitment is 
crucial for effective intervention. A more committed intervener is more likely to be 
willing to engage in more ambitious military manoeuvres that may result in casualties on 
its side and maintain their presence in the long-term during the reconstruction stage, both 
of which are necessary for success. In addition, fewer financial and military resources are 
required for regional intervention. Air- and sea-lift capabilities are rarely needed, and the 
costs involved in sustaining troops abroad are lower. However, it is important not to 
overstate the case. The link between successful intervention and regional interveners is 
not always certain since regional interveners are often ill-equipped and lack the financial 
resources to undertake humanitarian intervention (Nowrojee 2004,3). 
The final direct quality an agent needs in order to be expected to be effective is 
the ability to respond in a timely manner. This has two aspects. First, an intervener needs 
to be able to intervene when the situation is ready for intervention. In many cases, this 
"Conversely, for non-regional intervention, such as Western and UN engagements in Africa, there has been 
a notable lack of commitment necessary for effective intervention (de Waal 2000,93; Gueli 2004,133). 
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means an early intervention since prevention of the humanitarian crisis can often be the 
most effective type of humanitarian intervention, as in the case of the 2004 U. S. action in 
Haiti. Yet, the ability to undertake only early humanitarian intervention is insufficient 
because early humanitarian intervention might not be effective. It can make a 
humanitarian situation worse; other methods of diplomatic action might need to be tried 
first to avoid domestic and international resistance to the intervention, and waiting may 
secure Security Council approval. More important then, as Munck and Kumar (1995, 
180) argue, is that the intervener is able to wait until the situation is ripe for intervention. 
The second aspect of timeliness is that an intervener needs to be able to use its resources 
quickly. Kuperman rightly claims that, "once humanitarian military intervention is 
deemed necessary, time becomes of the essence as most violence can be perpetrated in a 
matter of weeks, as also demonstrated by the cases of Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timoe, 
(200 1,111). To a certain extent, this is again a question of the agent's capabilities and 
commitment, since it needs the necessary military and non-military resources for quick 
intervention. 
Indirect qualities of effectiveness 
The discussion so far has been concerned with direct qualities of effectiveness; an 
improvement in an intervener's capability, commitment, strategy, mandate, and 
timeliness can be expected to increase directly its effectiveness. However, there are other 
qualities that improve expected effectiveness, albeit indirectly. They can be indirect in 
three, closely related, senses: (1) they improve effectiveness overall despite sometimes 
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detracting from it; (2) they improve effectiveness in the long-term, rather than in the 
short-terrn; and (3) they increase the amount of perceived legitimacy, which in turn 
increases effectiveness. This last point merits explanation. For an intervener to be 
expected to be effective, those in the political community that is subject to its intervention 
need to believe that it is legitimate. 100 This makes the running of any occupation much 
smoother, since those subject to the intervention are more willing to yield to its demands 
and rules, and therefore the chances of achieving long-term peace and stability are greatly 
increased. Constant opposition amongst most of the population will make the achieving 
of a successful long-term humanitarian solution almost impossible (as can be seen in Iraq 
and Afghanistan). Yet an intervener does not need to have the support of everyone within 
the political community in which it intervenes. Political elites and certain factions within 
the population might have vested interests in continuing the crisis, perhaps because their 
power is dependent on it, or perhaps because they do well materially out of the current 
structures. Instead, it is important that there is strong grassroots support for the intervener 
amongst the affected political community. 101 
10OAnalogously, Green argues that "a belief in legitimacy tends to increase its [the state's) stability and 
effectiveness" (1988,1). 
1011t is important to note that an intervener's perceived legitimacy is different from what, in the next 
chapter, I call its 'local external representativeness'. An intervener's perceived legitimacy depends on the 
degree to which it is supported by those in the political community in which it intervenes. By contrast, its 
local external representativeness depends on the degree to which the intervener reflects, in its decision- 
making, the opinions of those in the political community in which intervenes. An intervener can be 
perceived to be legitimate but lack local external representativeness; for instance, it may enjoy support but 
fail to take into account these individuals' opinions on intervention. An agent can also be locally externally 
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There are a number of indirect qualities that affect an intervener's effectiveness 
in these three ways. Indeed, in other chapters of this thesis, I argue that certain qualities 
have an instrumental value, thereby contributing to an intervener's effectiveness. In the 
next chapter, for instance, I argue that an intervener that is internally and locally 
externally representative is more likely to be effective. Later in this chapter, I suggest the 
same for an intervener that follows the principles of jus in bello. And in Chapter 3,1 
suggested that an intervener whose intervention is legal - that has UN Security Council 
authorisation - is perhaps more likely to be globally externally effective (although I 
argued that this effect is likely to be weak). I shall not repeat the argument for the 
instrumental value of these qualities here; my main point is that the qualities of an 
intervener can affect its effectiveness both directly and indirectly. 
To summarise, an effective intervener will have, and will be committed to using, 
sufficient military and non-military resources, based on a sound strategy and suitable 
mandate, and in a timely manner. It may also have Security Council support, follow 
principles of jus in bello, and be internally and locally externally representative, which 
can affect an intervener's effectiveness indirectly. 
The role of circumstances 
From this analysis, it is clear that it is not circumstances alone that determine an 
intervener's effectiveness. We can expect an intervener that has these qualities to be 
representative, but lack perceived legitimacy; for instance, it may decide not to intervene having found out, 
after consulting with those in the target state, that its intervention would be unpopular. 
164 
Chapter 5: Altematives to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
effective and an intervener that lacks these qualities to be ineffective. Indeed, even in the 
same, or very similar, circumstances, two different interveners may achieve very different 
results. Hence, the third argument for holding the pragmatic version of the Non- 
Consequentialist Approach is mistaken. 
All that said, circumstances do, to some extent, determine an intervener's 
effectiveness. In fact, circumstances can determine whether an intervener's effectiveness 
is sufficient for its legitimacy according to the Moderate Conscquentialist Approach. Let 
me explain. The overall effectiveness of an intervener depends, firstly, on the degree to 
which it has these characteristics and, secondly, on the circumstances in which it is 
acting. Just as different interveners will achieve different results in the same 
circumstances, the same intervener will achieve different results in different 
circumstances. 
Circumstances affect an intervener's effectiveness in two ways. First, an 
intervener will have a different expectation of success in different circumstances. For 
instance, there may be more local resistance to the intervention by State A in State B than 
in State C. Hence, the probability of success varies according to the situation. Second, an 
intervener will have greater opportunity to achieve a large-scale success in some 
situations than in others. Where there is a terrible humanitarian crisis and the potential for 
great hann to a large number of individuals, such as genocide, there is more scope for an 
intervener to achieve extremely beneficial consequences by tackling the crisis and 
preventing the harm. Other less (although still) serious situations, such as the oppression 
of political opposition, present less scope for an intervener to achieve extremely 
beneficial consequences. Hence, the magnitude of the potential success varies according 
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to the circumstances. Thus, an intervener's effectiveness varies in both probability and 
magnitude according to the circumstances. It is important not to overemphasise this point, 
however. An intervener's effectiveness is not completely dependent on circumstances. 
An intervener with the characteristics outlined above is much more likely to be effective 
than one that is not. My point is rather that, in addition to whether it has these 
characteristics, circumstances also determine an intervener's effectiveness. 
Now to the crux of the matter: on the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, when 
an intervener has a high probability of achieving a success with a large magnitude, 
effectiveness may be sufficient for it to have an adequate degree of legitimacy. An 
intervener may be legitimate, for instance, simply because it is highly likely to prevent 
genocide. This is the case even if it lacks other qualities. Recall here that in Chapter 21 
proposed a scalar approach to legitimacy. On this scalar approach, a legitimate intervener 
does not need to possess all of the morally relevant qualities; it need only have enough of 
these factors in order to possess an adequate degree of legitimacy. An intervener can have 
an adequate degree of legitimacy by achieving hugely beneficial consequences. The 
likely achievement of these extremely beneficial consequences means that it is likely that 
extreme levels of human suffering will be prevented. The good achieved by this 
intervention is likely to outweigh any other moral problems which come from the 
intervener's not having other qualities. Suppose, for example, if in the beginnings of the 
genocide in Rwanda, Uganda had been willing to intervene and was highly likely to do so 
effectively. Given that this could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, the fact that 
Uganda lacked other qualities (it was undemocratic at the time and might not have 
consulted with the Rwandans) would not have undermined Uganda's general legitimacy 
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as an intervener. 
So, effectiveness can, in unusual circumstances where hugely beneficial 
consequences are more than likely, be sufficient for an adequate degree of legitimacy 
according to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. In most cases, however, 
effectiveness will not be sufficient because an intervener will not have a very high 
probability of achieving a very sizeable success. Normally, then, an intervener's 
legitimacy will also depend on the degree to which it possesses other, non- 
consequentialist qualities, such as fidelity to the principles of internal and externaIjus in 
bello and internal and local external representativeness (I establish the importance of 
these qualities below). 
Moreover, even where hugely beneficial consequences are more than likely, and 
effectiveness is sufficient for an intervener to have an adequate degree of legitimacy, the 
intervener will not be fully legitimate unless it has all the relevant qualities. Hence, 
effectiveness can, at most, be a sufficient condition for an adequate degree of legitimacy. 
In the majority of circumstances, it is not even sufficient for this. 
11. THE EXTREME CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 
Effectiveness is therefore a substantial consideration when deciding who should 
intervene. It is a necessary condition of legitimacy and even occasionally sufficient for an 
adequate degree of legitimacy. But why is effectiveness only sufficient for an adequate 
degree of legitimacy in exceptional cases? Why is it not sufficient forfull legitimacy in 
all cases? On what I call the 'Extreme Consequentialist Approach', effectiveness is not a 
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primary determinant of legitimacy. It is the only determinant. This approach therefore 
presents a different sort of challenge to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. It 
claims that the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, which holds that effectiveness is the 
primary determinant of an intervener's legitimacy, does not go far enough. 
One of the attractions of the Extreme Consequentialist Approach is its 
simplicity. It holds an intervener's legitimacy is to be entirely dependent on its 
consequences. If an agent of intervention is effective at bringing about good 
consequences, that is, the enjoyment of basic human rights, it is legitimate, but if it is 
ineffective, it is illegitimate. For instance, on this approach INTERFET (the Australian- 
led, UN Security Council-sanctioned force) was a legitimate intervener in East Timor 
solely because it was effective. Other putative criteria for Australia's legitimacy, such as 
whether it was representative or used humanitarian means, are not intrinsically important, 
but only instrumentally valuable to the extent that they improved its effectiveness. Thus, 
on the Extreme Consequentialist Approach, an intervener's effectiveness is the sole 
determinate of its legitimacy, or, to put it another way, effectiveness is both necessary 
and sufficient for legitimacy. 
However, in placing all moral weight on consequences, the Extreme 
Consequentialist Approach disregards other moral qualities, which are also significant for 
an intervener's legitimacy. The legitimacy of an intervener also depends on three other 
qualities that have intrinsic as well as instrumental value: the intervener's internal 
representativeness, its local external representativeness, and its fidelity to principles ofjus 
in bello. 
For the rest of the chapter, I will concentrate on the intrinsic value of an 
168 
Chapter 5: Altematives to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
intervener's fidelity to principles ofjus in bello. The next chapter examines the intrinsic 
value of an intervener's internal and local external representativeness. Of the three 
intrinsic values, the importance of fidelity to the principles of jus in bello provides the 
clearest demonstration of the inadequacy of the Extreme Consequentialist Approach to 
the legitimacy of an intervener. In fact, the inability of the Extreme Consequentialist 
Approach to take into account properly the importance of this value reflects two 
cornmonly-cited, and related, problems with a purely consequentialist approach: it is 
insensitive to the means by which consequences are achieved and its fails to distinguish 
between doing and allowing. By contrast, the Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
leaves room for such intrinsic values in its generally consequentialist account of 
legitimacy and so is not subject to these flaws. 
The intervener's conduct: fidelity to the principles ofjus in hello 
The conduct of the intervener during intervention is often mentioned as an important 
consideration (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996,226; Tes6n 1997). Some insist that an 
intervener must follow principles of international humanitarian law (Farer 2005a; ICISS 
2001 a; Simons 2001). Others frame this requirement in terms of Just War Theory, and, in 
particular, with reference to the principles ofJus in bello, principles ofjust conduct in war 
(Caney 2005, Heinze 2004; Lucas 2003). 
There are several principles of jus in bello that can be applied to humanitarian 
intervention. Before examining these, it is important to note that these principles provide 
restrictions on just conduct during war. These criteria are analytically distinct from the 
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criteria ofjus ad bellum, which limit when war can be justly waged., 02 These criteria are 
also analytically distinct from questions of who should intervene. This is because the 
question of who should intervene, as outlined in Chapter 2, implies a forward-looking 
account of legitimacy. By contrast, the principles ofjus in bello can affect an intervener's 
legitimacy only during intervention - the legitimacy of the intervener would increase or 
decrease according to whether it follows these rules - and this would not be helpful when 
deciding who should intervene before intervention occurs. Hence, the degree of fidelity 
to these principles would not, on the face of it, affect an intervener's legitimacy (as 
defined in this thesis). 103 But this does not mean that we should overlook the importance 
of an intervener's following these principles. I suggest that we consider whether, at the 
time that the decision to intervene is being made, we can reasonably expect an intervener 
to follow these principles. We can make this judgment by considering, firstly, the 
intervener's track record of fidelity to the principles of jus in bello in previous 
interventions and, secondly, its institutional characteristics (such as whether it is 
constituted of low-paid, ill-disciplined troops or highly-trained, specialised forces with 
much experience in dealing with civilians). I make such judgments about the current 
interveners in Chapter 7. 
There are a number of principles ofjus in bello that an intervener should follow. 
These principles limit the means that a legitimate intervener can use. For our purposes, 
the two main principles are as follows. First, a strict rule of 'non-combatant immunity' 
102 That questions of jus in bello and jus ad bellum are analytically distinct does not mean that they are 
unrelated. See McMahan's (2004) criticism of Walzer (1992). 
"'Tes6n (2005b, 29) makes a similar point about the war in Iraq. 
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maintains that all civilian casualties are impermissible. Any violent means used should 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Civilian casualties or even severe 
harm to civilians should always be avoided. Methods such as cluster bombs and 
landmines that risk civilian casualties are therefore impermissible. 104 Second, a principle 
of 'proportionality' limits the harm that a legitimate intervener can cause to combatants. 
Violent means must cause as little harm to the combatant as possible. An intervener 
should attempt to make soldiers surrender, then attempt to disarrn them (using nonlethal 
weapons), and only as a last resort kill them. An intervener should also eschew methods 
of dernotivation such as humiliation and methods which cause undue pain for the 
combatant. 
In addition, there are two further principles, which concern how a legitimate 
intervener can treat its own citizens - what I call principles of 'internaIjus in bello'. The 
third principle restricts the sort of soldiers that an intervener can use to undertake 
humanitarian intervention (i. e. not conscripts or child soldiers). 105 The fourth principle 
maintains that an intervener should not use methods that cause its own soldiers excessive 
and avoidable harm. This is not to claim that an intervener should never put its soldiers' 
lives at risk. Rather it is to insist that an intervener has a duty of care for its soldiers. It 
should, for instance, provide its soldiers with the equipment (such as flak jackets, radio 
104 McMahan (2004) has recently presented a highly compelling critique of the principle of non-combatant 
immunity, arguing that, in certain circumstances, we should target those who are responsible for unjust 
aggression instead of innocent combatants. But, as he admits, his argument falls foul of the publicity 
criterion (since, if put in place, it may lead to an increase in civilian casualties) and is best considered to be 
part of the deep morality of Just War Theory. 
105See Tes6n (2003) on the moral problems with using conscripts for humanitarian intervention. 
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systems, and working rifles) necessary to be able to undertake humanitarian intervention 
without putting their lives in needless danger. 106 
The Extreme Consequentialist Approach is unpersuasive because it cannot fully 
account for these principles of just conduct in war in its conception of legitimacy. By 
placing all moral weight on an intervener's effectiveness, it marginalises the importance 
of an intervener's expected fidelity to these principles of jus in bello. In this context, 
Heinze claims that a purely consequentialist account "has serious problems when 
employed as part of a theory of the morality of war based on human rights, because it 
suggests that aggregate human suffering is the only moral concern that need be 
addressed" (2004,549; emphasis added). He claims that if, for instance, a purely 
consequentialist principle alone were used to determine proportionality in NATO's war in 
Kosovo, NATO would have been permitted to pursue its primary end of the capitulation 
of the Milosevic regime unconditionally, regardless of civilian casualties (Heinze 2004, 
550). 
That said, there are three potential consequentialist arguments that could be made 
for the importance of an intervener being expected to follow these principles. The first is 
act consequentialist (particularly, direct act consequentialist): fidelity to the principles of 
jus in bello will directly increase an intervener's effectiveness. 107 This increase in 
effectiveness is not simply a question of local external effectiveness, but also global 
external effectiveness (and internal effectiveness). 
106 The Allied force's treatment of its soldiers in the First World War is the paradigmatic example of the 
violation of this principle. 
107 According to act consequentialism (in its direct form), an agent should try to maximise the good directly 
with each act it perfonns. 
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This act-consequentialist argument clearly fails. For it to work, an intervener's 
strict fidelity to the rules ofjus in bello would need to maximýise the good in each and 
every situation during intervention. But, on many occasions, an intervener will be more 
effective if it abandons these principles. These rules may prohibit the use of methods that 
can be highly effective in achieving strategic aims and that might be expected to decrease 
civilian casualties overall. For instance, an intervener may be more effective if it tortures 
captured soldiers in order to obtain information that will help it to achieve a swift 
resolution to the humanitarian crisis. 
The second argument is rule consequentialist. 108 The argument is this: interveners 
should follow rules ofjus in bello because these rules, when sufficiently complied with, 
maximise the good - the enjoyment of basic human rights. Although an intervener may 
be more effective in the short-term by disregarding these rules, the rules ofjus in bello 
will generally increase its effectiveness. In this context, R. B. Brandt argues that "the 
moral justification of these rules lies in the fact that their acceptance and enforcement 
will make an important contribution to long-range utility" (1972,147). 109 For instance, 
although torturing captured soldiers may increase the good in a particular instance, a rule 
against torture will generally maximise the good because such methods will give a bad 
name to humanitarian intervention and mean that future potential interveners will face 
greater resistance or be unwilling to intervene in the first place. 
Although this rule-consequentialist argument seems promising, there is an 
'O'ln short, rule consequentialism holds that agents should follow rules that maximise the good. 
10913randt goes on to offer his own account of the principles ofjus in hello. Hare (1972) also presents a rule- 
consequentialist defence of the importance of fidelity to principles ofjus in bello. 
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inherent problem with rule consequential ism: it collapses into act consequentialism. This 
objection to rule consequentialism is made by J. J. C. Smart: 
Suppose that an exception to a rule R produces the best possible consequences. 
Then this is evidence that the rule R should be modified so as to allow this 
exception. Thus we get a new form of the rule 'do R except in circumstances of 
the sort C. That is, whatever would lead the act-utilitarian to break a rule would 
lead the Kantian rule-utilitarian to modify the rule. Thus an adequate rule- 
utilitarian would be extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism (1973,10-11). 110 
This difficulty also arises with the rule consequentialist defence of the importance of an 
intervener's expected fidelity to these principles when deciding who should intervene. 
Suppose that a rule - call it RI - requires interveners to follow principles ofjus in bello. 
If complied with, this rule is generally expected to increase the enjoyment of basic human 
rights. Suppose, further, that in a particular case, an intervener can be more effective by 
abandoning one of the details of the rule RI. When intervening in a militarily strong 
target state for instance, an intervener may be more effective if it abandons the provision 
of external jus in bello against using conscripts (which would allow for a larger force). 
According to the logic of consequentialism, the appropriate response would be to modify 
the rule RI so as to take into account this exception. We then have rule R2, which says 
that interveners should follow principles of jus in bello, except when intervening in a 
militarily strong state, where they can be more effective by using conscripts. R2 is better 
"Oln Arneson's words: "for any construal of rule consequentialism according to which it appears to dictate 
conduct different from what act consequentialism would dictate, there must be an alternate candidate rule 
consequentialist code that eliminates the putative conflict with act consequentialism and must be judged 
superior from the rule consequentialist standpoint" (2005,236). Lyons (1965) makes the original statement 
of this objection. 
174 
Chapter 5: Altematives to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
at maximising overall enjoyment of basic human rights than RI because it takes into 
account this exception. Suppose, further, that in another case, one particular type of 
intervener (such as a private military company) would be more effective if it abandoned 
one of the details of R2 - such as permitting the targeting of certain non-combatants. 
Again, according to the logic of consequentialism, the most appropriate response would 
be to modify the rule R2 to take into account this second exception. We then have rule 
R3, which is better at maximising overall enjoyment of basic human rights than both R2 
and R1 because it takes into account this new exception. Such modifications will 
continue ad infinitum so that the rule of fidelity to principles of jus in bello maximises 
enjoyment of basic human rights. 
The problem then for rule consequentialism is that, by making continuous 
modifications to these rules, there will be a rule for each intervener and for each situation. 
It therefore becomes equivalent to act consequentialism. The rule-consequentialist may 
reply by arguing that we need not make these continuous amendments. However, if it 
were not to make these continuous amendments, then the rule of fidelity to principles of 
jus in bello would not be optimal - it could not be justified on the consequentialist 
grounds of maximising enjoyment of basic human rights. In short, it would be 'rule 
worship' (Smart 1973,10). Hence, rule consequentialism collapses into act 
consequentialism and with it so does this second consequentialist defence of the 
importance of an intervener's fidelity to these principles when deciding who should 
intervene. 
In Ideal Code, Real Morld, Brad Hooker presents a sophisticated version of rule 
consequentialism that tries to overcome this problem of collapse. His reformulation 
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insists that the rules of rule consequentialism need to be kept simple so that they can be 
easily internalised (Hooker 2000,96-97). Iterative amendments to the principles ofjus in 
bello would therefore not be endorsed on this sophisticated rule consequentialism. - it is 
more important to keep the rules simple. It is not clear, however, whether his theory is 
actually rule consequentialist since it ultimately appeals to intuitionism, rather than to a 
single, underlying consequentialist principle of maximising the good. Indeed, as Hooker 
(2000,188-189) himself admits, his approach does not have an overarching commitment 
to maximising the good. It does not conform therefore with the Extreme Consequentialist 
Approach. That aside, there are also difficulties with Hooker's account of rule 
consequentialism in cases of individual acceptance but general non-compliance with the 
rules, and also with his provision that internalised rules may be broken in cases of 
disaster (Arneson 2005). " 1 
The third consequentialist defence is an indirect consequentialist. argument and runs 
as follows. 112 An intervener should follow these principles because this is likely to 
"'Hooker (2005) does reply to these concerns, however. 
112 As a general theory, indirect consequentialism (specifically indirect act consequentialism) holds that, 
rather than attempting to maximise the good directly, agents should adopt decision-making procedures, 
such as dispositions, traditions, and rules of thumb, which maximise the good overall. Note that rule 
consequentialism and indirect consequentialism are distinct. The central assertion of rule consequentialism 
is what Hooker (2004) calls the rule-consequentialist 'criterion of rightness'. This judges things by whether 
they comply with rules, the acceptance of which maximises the good. By contrast, the central assertion of 
indirect consequentialism is its indirect decision-making procedure, which can be expected to maximise the 
good indirectly. Tile distinction between indirect and direct consequentialism cuts across the distinction 
between rule and act consequentialism. In other words, it is possible to have a direct and an indirect version 
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maximise its effectiveness overall, even if on particular occasions it will not. This is 
because, firstly, such an intervener will tend to face less resistance from the local 
population. Conversely, an intervener that is willing to kill civilians will quickly stop 
being legitimate in the eyes of those in the political community that is subject to its 
intervention. This will increase resistance and hostility to the intervener, and severely 
hamper its effectiveness. Hence, Walzer argues that "once we are engaged we have to 
fight justly so as not to antagonize the civilian population, whose political support is 
necessary to a military victory. In Vietnam, the relevant civilians were the Vietnamese 
themselves; we lost the war when we lost their 'hearts and minds"' (2004a, 10). 113 
A similar defence can be made of the principles of internal jus in bello. An 
intervener that uses child soldiers or conscripts is less likely to be effective, firstly, 
because an intervener that resorts to using these sorts of soldiers will lose the confidence 
of those in the political community in which it intervenes. Likewise, an intervener that 
fails to fulfil the duty of care to its soldiers will find that its intervening force quickly 
becomes dernotivated and less effective. Hence, an intervener that follows principles of 
jus in bello is more likely to be effective overall and, for this reason, fidelity to the 
principles ofjus in bello can perhaps be incorporated into the Extreme Consequentialist 
Approach to legitimacy. 
'Mis indirect consequentialist argument makes the strongest possible 
consequentialist case for the importance of an intervener's fidelity to the principles ofJus 
of rule consequentialism. and a direct and an indirect version of act consequentialism. See, further, Hooker 
(2004). 
113 To be sure, Walzer's defence ofjus in bello is not completely consequentialist. 
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in bello, when deciding who should intervene. Indeed, it provides a plausible instrumental 
justification of these principles. However, the argument is not wholly convincing. 
The first problem with it is that it leaves the justification of these principles 
contingent solely on their expected effectiveness. This is too risky a strategy. The link 
between an intervener's effectiveness and its fidelity to these principles is not strong 
enough to guarantee that following these principles will always increase effectiveness 
overall. My point here is not that this approach is unsuccessful because there will be 
instances when disobeying these principles will increase enjoyment of basic human rights 
(which was essentially my objection to the direct act-consequentialist defence of these 
principles). Rather, my point is that this approach is unsuccessful because these principles 
may not be justified overall in the future. For instance, it may be that humanitarian 
intervention becomes much more of a short-term exercise and it subsequently becomes 
far less important to win the hearts and minds of those in the political community that is 
subject to the intervention. If this were to happen, according to the Extreme 
Consequential ist Approach, there would be little reason for an intervener to follow the 
principles oQus in bello. For something as important as following the principles ofjus in 
bello, a stronger guarantee is required. 
The second, related problem with this indirect consequentialist argument is that it 
seems to miss something important by limiting the importance of an intervener's 
following these principles to their significance for its effectiveness. That is to say, there is 
something more to the importance of an intervener's expected fidelity to the principles of 
jus in bello than simply whether this improves its effectiveness. 
Consider the following standard objection to utilitarianism: 
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Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ 
transplant. The patient in Room I needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a 
liver, the patient in Room 3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6 is in 
the hospital for routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him! ), his tissue is 
compatible with the other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant 
his organs into the other five. This operation would save their lives, while killing 
the 'donor. ' There is no other way to save any of the other five patients... We 
need to add that the organ recipients will emerge healthy, the source of the organs 
will remain secret, the doctor won't be caught or punished for cutting up the 
'donor', and the doctor knows all of this to a high degree of probability (Sinnott- 
Armstrong 2006,8). 
It seems obvious that utilitarianism would sanction the transplant and, for most, this is 
rightly abhorrent. 
What this example of the transplant relies on is a distinction between doing and 
allowing. That is, there is a morally relevant distinction between what one does oneself 
and what one allows others to do. 114 In the example above, there is a significant 
difference between the doctor's harming the potential donor and his not harming the 
donor, thereby allowing the others to die. It seems right that the doctor should not 
conduct the operation because he should not do hann himself. It would be morally better 
if he allowed the other five patients to die. 
The same reasoning can be applied to an intervener's fidelity to the principles of 
jus in bello. In addition to any instrumental justification, a reason why an intervener's 
likelihood of following the principles of jus in bello is important when deciding who 
114 Scheffler frames the distinction between doing and allowing in terms of this distinction between primary 
and secondary manifestations of our agency and that "we operate with an intuitive picture according to 
which, in general, the norms of individual responsibility attach much greater weight to the primary than to 
the secondary manifestations" (2004,216). In his view, "[t]here is little doubt that some idea of this sort has 
an important role to play in ordinary moral thought"(Scheffler 2004,215). 
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should intervene is that an intervener should not itself do harm (specifically, han-n that is 
impermissible according to these principles). ' 15 It would, to a certain degree, be better if 
an intervener were to allow harm, perhaps thereby being less effective, than for it to 
target civilians, to use chemical weapons, or to rely on conscripts and child soldiers. 
Indeed, it seems more important that an intervener has a satisfactory degree of fidelity to 
the principles ofjus in bello when it is using force for humanitarian purposes than for any 
other reason. ' 16 When going to the lengths of using military force for humanitarian 
purposes, it matters intuitively that an intervener should be likely to do so in a way that is 
itself humanitarian. 
One reason why the doing and allowing distinction matters is because when one 
does the action, it is oneself that is violating the right, whereas when one allows the 
action, it is someone else that is violating the right. There is a difference between the 
government of state A violating state B's citizens' rights and the government of state A 
not intervening to stop the government of state B violating its own citizens' rights. 
I am not claiming that the difference between doing and allowing is of 
overwhelming moral significance. In fact, on an absolutist, deontological position 
according to which the difference between doing and allowing is of absolute moral 
significance, an intervener could never be legitimate because intervention almost always 
'"To be sure, some harm is permissible according to the principles of jus in bello; the concern is with 
impermissible harm, that is, harm that is suffered by civilians, disproportionate, caused by conscripts or 
child soldiers, or that is the result of a failure in an intervener's responsibility of care for its soldiers. 
"'I say satisfactory, rather than full, fidelity to principles ofjus in bello, because it would be harsh (and 
unrealistic) to judge an intervener as not obeying the principles ofjus in bello if one or two of its soldiers 
break these rules in an isolated incident. The violation of these rules has to be more systematic. 
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involves some harm that is impermissible (Tcson 2003,115). 11 7 My point is rather that 
there is, at least, some moral significance in the distinction between doing and allowing. 
When deciding who should intervene, it matters, to a certain degree, that an intervener 
will not violate innocent individuals' rights itself, even though this may ultimately allow 
more rights to be violated. Thus, who undertakes humanitarian intervention should be 
determined in part by the non-instrumcntal importance of an intervener's following 
principles ofjus in bello. 
But for the extreme consequcntialist, there is no moral importance (beyond any 
instrumental importance) to the distinction between an intervener that does harm, say by 
killing non-combatants, and an intervener that fails to prevent harm, say by failing to 
prevent another agent killing non-combatants. All harm is permissible if it improves 
effectiveness. Suppose that torturing young children of members of oppressive regimes 
would be effective overall at getting these sorts of regimes to stop human rights abuses. 
That it is interveners who do the harm is morally irrelevant. On the contrary, if a 
particular intervener were to refrain from torturing innocent family members, it would be 
illegitimate because it would be allowing harm. So, according to the Extreme 
Consequentialist Approach, whether an intervener follows the principles ofjus in bello is 
of no intrinsic value. What an intervener does itself is essentially morally equivalent to 
what it allows. But, as the discussion above demonstrates, this is highly countcrintuitivc. 
An intervener's legitimacy does seem to depend on what it does itself and, in particular, 
its expected fidelity to principles of jus in bello. For this reason, the Extreme 
117 Nagel (1972) outlines (but does not necessarily endorse) an absolutist defence of jus in bello. Atack 
(2002) gets close to this position. 
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Consequentialist Approach's reliance solely on instrumental justifications of these 
principles is unacceptable. 
Consequentialist trump 
I suggested above that a deontological position, which holds that the distinction between 
doing and allowing is of utmost significance, is unpersuasive. One reason is that, on this 
position, humanitarian intervention could never be justifiable. Another reason is that, 
according to the scalar approach to legitimacy adopted in this thesis, an intervener can be 
sufficiently legitimate, even though it does not have a satisfactory degree of fidelity to the 
principles ofjus in bello. As long as the intervener is able to make up in other ways the 
loss of legitimacy that comes from its not following closely the principles ofjus in bello, 
its overall level of legitimacy may still be sufficient for it to have an adequate degree of 
legitimacy. 
One clear way in which an intervener can make up this loss of legitimacy is if 
there is a high expectation of achieving extremely beneficial consequences, for instance 
by preventing genocide. Suppose that there is mass ethnic cleansing - genocide - in 
Benin. Tens of thousands of civilians of a certain ethnic group are being slaughtered, 
maimed, and raped every day by government troops and militias. Nigeria intervenes in 
Benin to stop this ethnic cleansing, and does so very effectively, but in doing so uses 
conscripts, a number of whom kill and sexually assault the non-combatants they are 
supposed to be helping. Although Nigeria's intervention is far from beingfully legitimate, 
the fact that it is effective at preventing genocide means that it would have an adequate 
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degree of legitimacy overall. Hence, according to the Moderate Consequentialist 
Approach, if hugely beneficial consequences are highly likely, then effectiveness may be 
sufficient for an adequate degree of legitimacy and the importance of an intervener's 
following these principles of jus in bello can be trumped by the consequences it will 
achieve. 
This is not equivalent to endorsing the Extreme Consequentialist Approach. The 
Moderate Consequential ist Approach is much more restrictive. Given the intrinsic 
importance of an intervener's following the principles of jus in bello, the intervener's 
expected effectiveness is sufficient for an adequate degree of legitimacy only in particular 
circumstances. As discussed above, these are circumstances in which the intervener has 
both a high probability of achieving a success with a particularly large magnitude - in 
short, when highly beneficial consequences are more than likely. In other cases, 
effectiveness is not sufficient for an adequate degree of legitimacy because of the non- 
instrumental significance of an intervener's following these principles. For instance, if the 
situation in Benin was less serious than ethnic cleansing and genocide - say, for example, 
that its population suffered political oppression - Nigeria would struggle to have an 
adequate degree of legitimacy if it violated principles ofjus in bello. Furthermore, even 
when an intervener has a high probability of achieving a success with a particularly large 
magnitude by halting an especially egregious violation of basic human rights, it needs to 
follow principles of jus in bello in order to be fully legitimate. In the example given 
above, in which Nigeria intervenes in Benin to halt ethnic cleansing, Nigeria would not 
be fully legitimate. It would need to use volunteer troops that have a satisfactory degree 
of fidelity to principles ofjus in bello. 
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Therefore, fidelity to principles ofjus in bello provides two sorts of constraint on 
consequentialist thinking on humanitarian intervention. First, in situations where highly 
beneficial consequences are not expected, an intervener would struggle to have an 
adequate degree of legitimacy without following the principles ofjus in bello, even if it is 
likely to be effective. Second, in situations where highly beneficial consequences are 
likely, being effective is not enough for full legitimacy. A fully legitimate intervener 
would need to have fidelity to these principles ofjust conduct. 118 
By contrast to the Extreme Consequentialist Approach, these two constraints are 
easily accommodated by the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. That is because the 
Moderate Consequential ist Approach takes effectiveness to be the primary, but not the 
only, determinant of an intervener's legitimacy. Although effectiveness therefore does 
much of the normative work, this approach still makes sufficient room for secondary 
factors, such as fidelity to the principles of jus in bello, in its overall conception of 
legitimacy. 
111. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that the Moderate Consequentialist Approach provides a 
persuasive account of the weight that we should give to an intervener's expected 
effectiveness. The first half of the chapter compared the Moderate Consequentialist 
Approach with a Non-Consequentialist Approach that rejects the importance of 
"'It also follows that Just War Theory's traditional separation of legitimate authority fromjus in bello is 
mistaken. 
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effectiveness for humanitarian intervention. Having argued that the principled rejection of 
an intervener's effectiveness is mistaken, I then considered more pragmatic reasons for 
rejecting an intervener's effectiveness. In reply to the most forceful of these, which 
suggests that an intervener's effectiveness is determined solely by circumstances, I 
argued that the qualities of an intervener will, to a large extent, determine its 
effectiveness. In particular, an intervener that has adequate resources, a suitable strategy, 
a strong enough mandate, sufficient willingness and commitment, and the ability to 
intervene in a timely manner is more likely to be effective. I did argue, however, that 
circumstances play some role in an intervener's effectiveness: when extremely beneficial 
consequences are more than likely, an intervener's effectiveness is sufficient for it to 
have an adequate degree of legitimacy. 
The second half of the chapter compared the Moderate Consequentialist Approach 
with the Extreme Consequentialist Approach, which holds that effectiveness is the sole 
determinant of an intervener's legitimacy. This approach, I claimed, is unpersuasive 
because it cannot take into account the intrinsic importance of an intervener's following 
principles ofjus it? bello. 
Thus, an intervener's effectiveness is best seen as the primary determinant of its 
legitimacy, rather as either morally irrelevant - as the Non-Consequentialist Approach 
holds - or as the sole determinant of its legitimacy - as the Extreme Consequentialist 
Approach holds. Although consequentialist thought is dominant in the legitimacy of an 
intervener, it is not the whole picture. 
In the next chapter, I make the case for the importance of two other factors for an 
intervener's legitimacy that cannot be explained solely by instrumental concerns: its 
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internal representativeness and its local external representativeness. These two factors are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of an intervener's legitimacy, but are 
nevertheless important. They will reinforce the objection I have made in this chapter 
against the Extreme Consequentialist Approach: that effectiveness is not the only factor 
determining an intervener's legitimacy. The next chapter will therefore help to establish 
further the persuasiveness of the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. 
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INTERVENTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Having defended the Moderate Consequentialist Approach against two alternatives in the 
previous chapter, in this chapter I want to argue for the moral significance of two factors, 
both pertaining to an intervener's representativeness. Both factors can be incorporated 
under the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. By making the case for these two factors, 
I will reinforce the objection made against the Extreme Consequentialist Approach in the 
previous chapter: effectiveness is not the only morally relevant factor when deciding who 
should intervene. 
The first I shall describe as an intervener's 'internal representativeness'. This 
depends on whether an intervener's decision-making on the proposed intervention 
reflects the opinions of its citizens. For instance, the internal representativeness of the 
1992 American intervention in Somalia turned on whether America represented the 
opinions of Americans. The second is what I shall describe as an intervener's 'local 
external representativeness'. This depends on whether an intervener's decision-making 
on the proposed intervention reflects the opinions of those individuals in the political 
community that is subject to its intervention. To use the same example, the local external 
representativeness of the 1992 American intervention in Somalia turned on whether 
America represented the opinions of Somalis. 
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In this chapter, I make the case for the moral importance of these two factors that 
have been neglected in the literature to a certain extent. 119 That is, I argue that an 
intervener's legitimacy depends on whether it is representative of the opinions on 
intervention, firstly, of its domestic population and, secondly, of those subject to its 
intervention. I begin by presenting three (largely complementary) arguments for the 
importance of an intervener's internal representativeness. The first is consequentialist: an 
intervener that has public support is more likely to be effective in tackling a humanitarian 
crisis. The second is the 'Resources Argument. This asserts that an intervener should be 
representative of its citizens' opinions because these citizens provide the resources for 
humanitarian intervention. The third argument emphasises the intrinsic value of 
individual self-government. I then present three arguments for the importance of an 
intervener's local external representativeness. In some measure, these mirror the 
arguments for internal representativeness. The first argument is consequentialist: a locally 
externally representative intervener is more likely to be effective. The second is the 
'Burdens Argument, which holds that an intervener should represent the opinions of 
those subject to its intervention because those individuals are likely to be burdened by its 
intervention. The third argument again asserts the value of individual self-government. 
Overall, then, I present six arguments for the significance of internal and local external 
representativeness for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. I conclude by 
dismissing the importance of a third potential factor - global external representativeness. 
119That said, these issues, especially local external representativeness, have received some treatment. Of 
those who consider these issues, Buchanan (1999; 2006,27), deLisle (2001,552), ICISS (2001 a, 36), Tes6n 
(1997,126-129; 2003,105-107), and Walzer (2000a) are the most constructive. 
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Before we proceed, however, I need to clarify what I mean by 
representativeness'. In her seminal work on the concept, Hanna Pitkin (1967) 
distinguishes between a number of meanings of representation, all based around the 
notion of re-presentation, a making present again. 120 For example, formalistic views of 
representation include the 'authorisation view', where a representative is someone who 
has been authorised to act, and the 'accountability view', where a representative is 
someone who is to be held to account (Pitkin 1967,38-55). The problem with these 
views, Pitkin (1967,58) notes, is that they cannot tell us anything about what goes on 
during representation, how a representative ought to act, and whether he has represented 
well or badly. Alternatively, the descriptive view of representation takes representation to 
be 'standing for' by virtue of a correspondence or connection between the representative 
and the represented. The focus is on the representative's characteristics, such as her class, 
ethnicity, and religion (Pitkin 1967,61-91). 
But the most useful meaning of representation, at least for our purposes, is 'acting 
for'. This view is concerned with the activity of representing, what goes on during 
representing, and the substance or content of acting for others (Pitkin 1967,113). 1 21 
Accordingly, a representative institution will act for its citizens, by delegation or 
trusteeship. It is here that we find the 'mandate-independence' controversy. Should a 
representative represent his citizens' opinions, since he is bound by mandate to do what 
they want, or should he have the independence to be able to promote his citizens' 
12OPitkin (1967) remains the best discussion of representation. Also see Birch (1971), Cohen (1968), Diggs 
(1968), Frankena (1968), and Pennock (1968). 
12 'This roughly corresponds to Birch's first usage of the term 'representative', that is, "to denote an agent or 
spokesman who acts on behalf of his principal" (1972,15). 
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interests as he sees them, and as best he can, in relation to humanitarian intervention? As 
will become apparent, I take the 'mandate' side of this controversy. That is to say, a 
representative should represent his citizens' opinions, a representative institution is one 
that reflects its subjects' opinions in its decision-making, and 'representativeness' is the 
measure of the extent to which an institution does so. 
It is also important to define what I mean by an individual's 'opinions on the 
intervention'. The most morally relevant opinion is an individual's view on whether 
humanitarian intervention should be undertaken. Other relevant opinions - but largely 
secondary in importance - are an individual's views on the specific form of intervention 
(e. g. regime change or traditional peacekeeping), on who should intervene, and on how 
long the intervention should last. Those subject to a humanitarian crisis might want 
intervention, but not want it to be carried out by a particular intervener (such as the U. S. ), 
or they might want regime change, but not long-term occupation. Furthermore, for 
reasons of practical simplicity (and perhaps of anti-patemalism), I am concerned with an 
individual's actual opinions rather than what his opinion would be if he had more 
information or if his opinion were more freely formed. Although individuals' opinions 
may be influenced in undesirable ways and contain misperceptions, I argue for their 
moral significance when they relate to humanitarian intervention. 
II. INTERNAL REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Let us begin with the case for internal representativeness. To be intemally representative, 
an intervener needs to reflect, in its decision-making, its citizens' opinions on the 
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proposed intervention. If the majority of its citizens do not want intervention, an 
internally representative government would not intervene. If its citizens want intervention 
to be undertaken in a particular way (such as regime change), then the decision-making of 
the internally representative government would reflect this. 122 
A would-be intervener can establish the opinions of its citizens - and therefore be 
internally representative - in a number of ways. For example, it could conduct opinion 
polls on a sample of the population, hold referenda on humanitarian intervention, and, 
less scientifically, consider other indicators of the public mood, such as the media, its 
interactions with the public, and public campaigns. The latter sort of measures are, of 
course, not completely accurate, given media influence, and, more generally, it can be 
tricky (but not impossible) to access reliable or genuine domestic public opinion. But an 
intervener should nevertheless attempt to garner such information, given the arguments 
that follow for the importance of internal representativeness. Note here that it is possible 
for non-democratic states to be internally representative if they accurately reflect their 
constituents' opinions. That said, democratic states are perhaps most likely - although far 
from certain - to reflect public opinion on intervention, given the democratic politician's 
desire to be elected, her sense of duty to reflect her constituents' opinions (and often 
public opinion more generally), and the likelihood of a concurrence between public 
opinion and the government's judgment. 
122 One example of an internally representative humanitarian intervention was the 1999 UN-authorised, 
AUStralian-led, intervention in East Timor. In response to images of the atrocities on their television 
Screens, the Australian public opinion was crucial to providing the impetus for the Howard government's 
intervention (Wheeler and Dunne 2001). 
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An immediate challenge might be this: why does the question of internal 
representativeness for humanitarian intervention arise? On many issues (such as health, 
education, and fiscal policy), it seems right that elected politicians should have some 
independence to use their judgment. They should primarily act in accordance with what 
they deem to be in the national (or their constituents') interest, without always having to 
reflect public opinion. In other words, the trusteeship conception of representation, 
according to which a representative can go against constituents' declared opinions and 
use their own judgment, seems appropriate in many contexts. Why should we prefer a 
delegate conception of representation according to which representatives must reflect the 
opinions of their constituents in the context of humanitarian intervention? What 
distinguishes humanitarian intervention from other governmental acts such that it requires 
politicians to reflect their citizens' opinions? 
One answer is that humanitarian intervention is a different sort of governmental 
action because it is not (usually) undertaken for its own citizens' interests. We find this 
line of reasoning in what Buchanan (1999) terms (in his discussion of the internal 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention) the 'democratic variant of the discretionary 
association view of the state'. This discretionary association view, which is based on 
Lockean thought, understands the state as: 
the creation of a hypothetical contract among those who are to be its citizens, and 
the terms of the contract they agree on are justified by showing how observance 
of these terms serves their interests. No one else's interests are represented, so 
legitimate political authority is naturally defined as authority exercised for the 
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good of the parties to the contract, the citizens of this state (Buchanan 1999,74- 
75; emphasis in original). 123 
Accordingly, the government is taken to be "the agent of the associated individuals, an 
instrument to further their interests" (Buchanan 1999,74; emphasis in original). Since an 
intervening state is primarily concerned with the interests of those suffering a 
humanitarian crisis rather than its own citizens' interests, it breaks its fiduciary obligation 
to put its citizens" interests first. NATO's action in Kosovo, for instance, was primafacie 
unjustifiable on this view since it was (at least partially) driven by concern for Kosovan 
Albanians. According to the discretionary association view, then, humanitarian 
intervention such as this is a special type of case because it is altruistic, undertaken for 
the good of those beyond the borders of the state rather than the good of those within it, 
and therefore violates the state's special obligation to its citizens. It then follows that, if a 
government wishes to undertake humanitarian intervention, it needs a special democratic 
mandate from its citizens. 
123 Note that Buchanan ultimately rejects this view, favouring instead the 'state-as-the-instrument-for- 
justice' view, based on John Rawls's account of the natural duties of justice. He argues that the most 
fundamental problem with the discretionary association view is that it implies that "there would be nothing 
morally wrong with a world in which every state adopted the Swiss model" (Buchanan 1999,79). That is to 
say, it affinns that a state has no obligations beyond the advancement of its citizens' interests. Imperialism, 
colonisation, and exploitation could be justified, regardless of the harm to those beyond the mutual 
association of the state, if these actions would advance the interests of those within the state. Even a far 
softer version of the discretionary association view, which admits that a state has some negative duties not 
to harm others, contradicts our basic moral intuitions (Buchanan 1999,80-1). For instance, it would justify 
a rich state's refusal to donate its excess food surplus to its starving neighbour. 
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This discretionary association view does have some initial appeal. But it does not 
fully explain why a humanitarian intervener should be internally representative. There is 
more to the extraordinariness of humanitarian intervention than its apparent altruism. 
Indeed, if we limit the specialness of humanitarian intervention to its apparent altruism, 
as does the discretionary association view, two problems arise. On the one hand, this 
argument for the need for humanitarian intervention to have a democratic mandate also 
applies to many other apparently altruistic governmental actions, such as aid donations 
and ethical trade negotiations. 124 On the logic of this approach, any governmental action, 
however minor, which is not in the national interest requires a democratic mandate. As 
such, the reasoning of the discretionary association view is too inclusive. On the other 
hand, on this discretionary association view, humanitarian intervention which is in the 
intervener's national interest does not need to be representative of its citizens' opinions 
on intervention because it does not violate the terms of the hypothetical contract. Indeed, 
on the logic of this approach, any governmental action, however major, which is in the 
national interest does not require public support. As such, the reasoning of the 
discretionary association view is also too exclusive. 
We therefore need a different account of what demarcates humanitarian 
intervention from other governmental actions - and that means that we should prefer a 
delegate (rather than trustee) conception of representation in this context. My suggestion 
is that what differentiates humanitarian intervention is that it involves extremely high 
moral stakes and, in particular, the use of military force to save lives. Humanitarian 
intervention (like any use of military force) has significant potential to cause high levels 
1240f course, what is in a state's national interest may be subject to much dispute. 
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of suffering and devastation to those in the target state, for instance, by killing innocent 
civilians, destroying vital infrastructure, and creating a power vacuum. Yet a 
government's decision to undertake humanitarian intervention can also have considerable 
positive benefits, such as protecting populations from genocide and ethnic cleansing. It 
follows that the consequences, either good or bad, of an agent's decision regarding if, 
when, and how to undertake humanitarian intervention will be considerable for those 
suffering the humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, the effects of an agent's decision to 
intervene reverberate around the international system, not only by affecting international 
norms (both legal and non-native) by, for instance, the setting of precedents, but also more 
materially by, for instance, creating refugee flows and destabilising surrounding regions. 
The intervener's citizens arc also affected by the decision, for (as discussed below) they 
provide the financial and human resources (which can be significant). Thus, the 
consequences, either good or bad, of an agent's decision to intervene will be highly 
significant for both the international system and the intervener's citizens. 125 
So when making a decision with such high moral stakes, it is right that a 
government should reflect its citizens' opinions in its decision-making. Other, less 
important, decisions can be left to politicians to decide for themselves, but trusteeship is 
not appropriate when the moral stakes are so high. Hence, the opinions of the intervener's 
citizens matter and a delegate view of representation is preferable in this context. I will 
use therefore 'representativeness' in this sense of representation as delegation. 
125 In fact, as Buchanan (1999,76) points out, it is far from clear that a humanitarian intervention that does 
receive a special democratic mandate would be legitimate on the discretionary association view. The 
democratic mandate would have to be unanimous (which is improbable); otherwise, humanitarian 
intervention would violate the terms of the contract for those who oppose intervention. 
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In what follows, I present three arguments for the importance of internal 
representativeness for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. These arguments 
further demonstrate that we should favour a delegate conception of representation in the 
context of humanitarian intervention. 
We could perhaps use these arguments to defend the importance of the 
representativeness (in the delegate sense) of other governmental decisions. One option 
would be to apply these three arguments to make the case for the representativeness of 
decisions that have lower moral stakes. However, the fact that these other decisions have 
lower moral stakes means that these three arguments would not be as persuasive as they 
are for humanitarian intervention. It is less important, for instance, that there is individual 
self-government on the issue of public transport than on the issue of humanitarian 
intervention. Another option, which would avoid this objection, would be to apply these 
three arguments to make the case for the representativeness of other decisions that have 
high moral stakes. Examples might include a decision to secede, the waging of war in 
self-defence, and significant constitutional changes. But it is important to note a further 
point here: the three arguments I present for the importance of an intervener's internal 
representativeness have a particular focus on humanitarian intervention and, as such, are 
not necessarily relevant to these issues. 
(i) Increased effectiveness 
Let us begin the case for the importance of internal representativeness with a 
consequentialist argument. One of the largest problems faced by humanitarian 
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intervention is insufficient commitment. This has led to critically under-resourced, and 
ultimately unsuccessful, interventions. The failure of UN member states to provide 
UNAMIR, the UN force led by Rom6o Dallaire, with the necessary resources to stop 
genocide in Rwanda is the most conspicuous example. Many of these problems arise 
because interveners are unwilling to commit the necessary financial, military, and 
diplomatic resources to potentially unpopular and controversial interventions. By 
contrast, an internally representative intervener which knows that it has public support is 
more likely to be willing to commit the resources required to be successful. It may be 
more willing, for instance, to risk casualties and so be able to undertake ambitious 
military manoeuvres, which are necessary for intervention to be successful. Consider, in 
this context, Australia's 1999 action in East Timor. Since it knew it had the support of the 
Australian public, the Australian government was prepared to accept some casualties and, 
as a result, intervened with the level of military force necessary for successful 
humanitarian intervention. ' 26 
This consequentialist argument for internal representativeness is, however, 
contingent on there being a correlation between internal representativeness and 
effectiveness. On occasion, being internally representative may not ensure that the 
intervention is successful. The time it takes to establish whether there is public support 
for intervention may mean that deployment is slowed, which in turn undermines the 
effectiveness of the operation. Alternatively, public opinion may change during the 
intervention, but if the intervener were to respond to this change (perhaps by altering its 
126 In fact, Australia successfully intervened without suffering any casualties, even though it had braced 
itself for them (Wheeler and Dunne 2001). 
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mission objectives), it would be less effective. Likewise, humanitarian intervention can 
be successful without being internally representative. This raises an important question 
for both internal and local external representativeness: would an intervener be legitimate 
if it lacked internal or local external representativeness (or both), yet was likely to be 
effective at preventing, reducing, or halting the mass violation of basic human rights? 
Both internal and local external representativeness, like the fidelity to principles 
ofjus in bello, are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions of legitimate humanitarian 
intervention. As long as the intervener is able to make up in other ways the loss of 
legitimacy that comes from not being internally or locally externally representative, its 
overall level of legitimacy may be sufficient for it to have an adequate degree of 
legitimacy. One clear way in which an intervener can make up this loss of legitimacy is if 
there is a high expectation of its achieving extremely beneficial consequences, for 
instance by preventing genocide. This reflects the dominance of consequentialist thinking 
on humanitarian intervention, as encapsulated by the Moderate Consequentialist 
Approach. Intuitively, what matters most is that the intervener is effective at preventing, 
reducing, or halting the mass violation of basic human rights. 
That is not to deny that internal and local external representativeness are 
important considerations for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. On the contrary, 
the six arguments set out in this chapter establish that these are significant considerations. 
The aim here is to make clear the strength of the arguments that follow and, in particular, 
to avoid overstating the case. Furthermore, in most cases of humanitarian intervention, 
where extremely beneficial consequences are not on the cards, an intervener would 
struggle to be legitimate if it were not internally representative and locally externally 
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representative. Moreover, even when the extremely beneficial consequences are likely, it 
remains important that the intervener should be internally and locally externally 
representative. Indeed, this would be necessary for it to befully legitimate. 
(ii) The Resources Argument 
The second reason why an intervener's internal representativeness matters is what I call 
the 'Resources Argument'. The central contention of this argument is this: since the 
intervener's citizens provide the resources for humanitarian intervention, they should 
have their opinions reflected in its decision-making on intervention. 
The underlying argument at work here is Lockean: an individual should have 
some freedom to deten-nine how his own resources (property) are used. Given that 
humanitarian intervention requires a substantial amount of resources, the intervener 
should reflect the opinions of those providing the resources for humanitarian intervention 
- its citizens. Doing so means that these individuals retain some control over their 
resources. This Lockean argument is not absolute. There are moral constraints on how an 
individual should use his resources (such as not causing excessive harm to others) and the 
importance of individual choice here might not be as significant as other moral 
considerations (such as highly beneficial consequences). Nevertheless, some degree of 
control over one's own resources is intuitively attractive. 
In theory, we could make this argument about any governmental action that uses 
its citizens' resources. However, it is more convincing for humanitarian intervention 
because of the level of resources involved. Alex de Waal estimates that the ECOWAS 
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interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cost $4 billion (de Waal 2000,81). In R2P, 
ICISS (2001a, 71) estimates that the cost of the Kosovo intervention (including post- 
intervention peacekeeping and reconstruction) was $48 billion. 127 The intervener's 
citizens - in these cases, the citizens of ECOWAS and NATO respectively - ultimately 
have to foot the bill for humanitarian intervention, perhaps through significantly 
increased taxation or greatly decreased public spending elsewhere. It is right, therefore, 
that these individuals should have some input into the decision-making on humanitarian 
intervention. The Resources Argument gains further plausibility if, in addition to 
financial resources, it includes human resources. The intervener's citizens provide the 
personnel to undertake humanitarian intervention. Some of these individuals may be 
injured and killed in combat. That provides further reason for representing the opinions of 
these individuals. 
In domestic political thought, we may question whether individuals' influence 
upon decision-making should be proportionate to the taxes they pay. This issue also 
arises for humanitarian intervention. Within a multinational operation, it is typical for 
some countries to contribute more financially and militarily than others. To use the same 
two examples, Nigeria dominated the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, providing 90% of the troops, and U. S. warplanes flew 85% of the sorties in the 
Kosovo intervention (ICISS 2001b, 219). The question then is this: should the opinions 
of those who contribute more towards intervention have greater weight? 
12701 Hanlon's (2003,34) table on the cost of UN peacekeeping is illustrative here too (if not directly 
concerned with humanitarian intervention). 
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This would not be appropriate for unilateral intervention, that is, intervention by a 
single state. Within a state, we should not give greater weight to the opinions of those 
individuals who contribute more (e. g. through taxation) to humanitarian intervention for 
two reasons. First, most states have complex economic and political structures in which 
an individual's wealth cannot be claimed to be purely the result of his own labour. For the 
Resources Argument to be plausible at the domestic level, there would need to be greater 
equality of opportunity than currently exists in most states. Greater equality of 
opportunity would mean that well-off individuals - those who contribute more financially 
towards an intervention - could claim with greater credibility that their wealth has been 
earned fairly rather than being the result of advantages that they have received from the 
system (such as private education, inheritance, etc. ). The second problem is that, given 
the population size of most states, it would be difficult to identify which particular 
individuals contribute more towards intervention. Furthermore, even if we were able to 
identify which particular individuals contribute more towards intervention, it would be 
difficult to find a method of data collection that could distinguish between those who 
contribute more towards an intervention and those who do not. 
At the multinational level, however, it does sometimes seem right to give greater 
weight to the opinions of individuals from states that provide most of the resources for 
humanitarian intervention. Although the two problems discussed above also apply to 
multilateral intervention, they are not so serious. Let me start with the first problem. The 
international system is unfair, with inherent advantages for rich states. 128 It follows that it 
is not plausible to claim that states are wholly responsible for the creation of their wealth. 
128 See Pogge (2005). 
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It also follows that, when comparing different sorts of states, such as Mozambique and 
the Netherlands, it would be mistaken to give more weight to the opinions of the 
individuals from states that contribute more to an intervention. The biases of the 
international system mean that rich states have not necessarily earned their wealth fairly 
and, consequently, the Resources Argument is less convincing in this context. 
Nonetheless, when comparing similar sorts of states, such as Britain, Australia, and 
France, Brazil and Argentina, Romania and Bulgaria, etc., it does seem right to give more 
weight to the opinions of the individuals from states that contribute more. This is because 
these states receive similar advantages and disadvantages from the international system. 
Second, although it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the contribution made by each 
member state to an intervention by a regional organisation, the UN, or a coalition of the 
willing, at other times the contributions made are well documented. Moreover, assessing 
the relative contribution of each state is far easier than at the domestic level, where it 
would be necessary to assess the relative contribution of each individual. This is because 
there exist fewer actors to assess the contributions of at the international level. 
Thus, it seems right to give greater weight to the opinions of individuals from 
those states that provide most of the resources for humanitarian intervention when, firstly, 
comparing similar sorts of states and, secondly, the contributions made by states are 
easily identifiable. To illustrate this by way of example, suppose that the African Union 
were to intervene to stop a humanitarian crisis in Kenya. Let us assume that Tanzania 
provides and funds 5,000 troops, which is almost all of the intervening force, apart from a 
contribution of ten medical staff by Zambia. No other AU member state contributes 
towards the intervention. If we were to treat each citizen's opinion as equal, regardless of 
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the Affican state from which it came, the opinions of Tanzanians would be given, firstly, 
the same weight as the opinions of Zambians, and, secondly, the same weight as the 
opinions of those from all the other AU member states. In this context, then, equality of 
opinion does not seem acceptable. For this reason, when considering multinational 
intervention, and if the two conditions outlined above are met, we should give extra 
weight to the opinions of individuals from those states that provide most of the resources 
for humanitarian intervention. But when considering unilateral intervention, we should 
treat each individual's opinion equally, rather than calibrated according to the taxes they 
pay. 
(iii) Individual self-government 
The Resources Argument is persuasive as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. It 
does not quite capture what is the main reason why an intervener's internal 
representativeness matters: individuals should have some control over their governing 
institution because it is their governing institution. More specifically, the citizens of the 
intervener should have their opinions on the intervention represented because it is their 
intervener: it is their state or their multinational organisation that is intervening. This 
sentiment was discernible in the early stages of the 2003 war in Iraq; many protesters in 
the U. K. claimed that the war was conducted 'not in our name' . 
129 Their protest was not 
about the use of resources, it was against the fact that their government was undertaking 
"91n using this example, I am not claiming that the war on Iraq was a humanitarian intervention. 
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an action which they opposed. Accordingly, I will now outline a third, more Rousseauian 
defence of the importance of an intervener's internal representativeness. 
This third argument relies on the principle of individual self-government, which 
runs as follows: a governing institution should reflect the wishes of its citizens such that it 
governs as if those individuals were in authority themselves. To be fully compatible with 
the principle of individual self-government, both the structure of government and every 
law it makes would need to match each individual's opinions on how they wish to be 
governed. Yet, in all but the smallest of societies, complete self-government is 
unachievable. This is what Thomas Christiano (1996,25) calls the 'incompatibility 
problem'. Given the inevitable conflict of opinions that arises in a society, the ability of a 
number of individuals to choose how they are governed will be frustrated. But this does 
not mean that the importance of an institution representing its citizens' opinions cannot 
be justified by the principle of individual self-government. The crucial point is that we 
are not concerned solely with achievingfull individual self-government within a society 
(which is a chimera), but with increasing the amount of individual self-government. 
Hence, we are concerned with the relative, rather than absolute, level of individual self- 
government. An intervener that represents at least the majority of its citizens' opinions on 
the humanitarian intervention is likely to have more individuals who are self-governing 
on this issue than an intervener that does not. As Robert Dahl puts it, "majority rule 
maximizes the number of persons who can exercise self-determination in collective 
decisions" (1999,138). For instance, requiring a super-majority (say of two-thirds of the 
voting population) for intervention would risk giving those who oppose intervention a 
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greater say than those that support it - and therefore decrease the overall amount of 
individual self-government on the issue of humanitarian intervention. 130 
Individual self-government here is intrinsically valuable. Put generally, an 
individual's opinions on how he wishes to be governed have independent value, that is, 
they are valuable regardless of whether those opinions, if they were realised, would 
contribute to his well-being. Again in Dahl's words: "To govem. oneself, to obey laws 
that one has chosen for oneself, to be self-deten-nining, is a desirable end" (1989,89). To 
see this, consider a (hypothetical) society whose government is hierarchical and 
unrepresentative. It never consults its citizens on how they wish to be governed - it 
makes decisions by decree - but is competent at promoting its citizens' interests. 
Although such a government would not be that morally objectionable because it would be 
promoting its citizens' interests, something morally important is still missing. That 
missing element is the value of individuals' having a voice in how they are governed and 
how their society is run. 
The intrinsic value of individual self-government has a considerable impact on the 
argument for an intervener's internal representativeness. An individual's freedom to 
choose whether there should be intervention, who should do it, how long it should last, 
and what form it should take, matters intrinsically. An intervener should be internally 
representative and respond to its citizens' opinions because those are the opinions of its 
citizens. Suppose, for example, that the Vietnamese government were considering 
130 Suppose a minority of two-fifths of the overall voting population oppose intervention, but the majority, 
three-fifths of the overall voting population, support it. The requirement of a super-majority of two-thirds 
of the voting population would mean that intervention would not occur. 
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intervening in Laos to tackle genocide. The Vietnamese people supported intervention, 
but only with UN Security Council authorisation. The views of the Vietnamese people 
matter, on the logic of this self-government argument, neither because taking account of 
those views will best serve international law and order, nor because doing so is the best 
for the Vietnamese people's enjoyment of basic human rights, but because it is their state, 
Vietnam, that is considering intervening. 
An obvious objection is that the intrinsic value of individual self-government can 
conflict with other moral factors. Consider the Vietnam example again; suppose now that 
the majority of the Vietnamese people do not want to intervene, despite the genocide in 
Laos. In that case, the intrinsic value of individual self-government conflicts with the 
responsibility to prevent genocide. Is it more important that the Vietnamese government 
should represent its citizens' opinions, and so not intervene, than that it should prevent 
genocide? If the Vietnamese government can intervene effectively to prevent genocide, it 
seems that it is not. Individual self-government, then, is not always an overriding value; 
rather, more individual self-government is by and large desirable. Occasionally, other 
moral factors (such as highly beneficial consequences) can trump the importance of 
individual self-government, but this is not to deny its intrinsic value. A large part of a 
government's legitimacy depends on how it responds to its citizens' opinions. Indeed, it 
is perhaps more important that individuals are self-governing on the issue of 
humanitarian intervention than on other issues, given that the moral stakes of 
humanitarian intervention are extremely high. 
It may help to summarise briefly the argument thus far. The first reason for the 
significance of an intervener's internal representativeness is consequentialist: an 
206 
Chapter 6: Representativeness 
internally representative intervener is more likely to be effective. The second is the 
Resources Argument, which asserts that the intervener's citizens should have their 
opinions reflected in its decision-making since they provide the resources for 
humanitarian intervention. The last reason is the value of individual self-government on 
humanitarian intervention. Together, these three reasons demonstrate that an intervener's 
internal representativeness is an important consideration for the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Ill. LOCAL EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Let us now consider the importance of local external representativeness. To be locally 
externally representative, an intervener needs to represent the opinions of those in the 
political community that is potentially subject to its humanitarian intervention. For 
instance, a locally externally representative intervener would not undertake humanitarian 
intervention if those who would be subject to it do not want intervention. Similarly, if 
those individuals do not want a particular form of intervention, the decision-making of 
the locally externally representative intervener would reflect that. 
To establish the opinions of those subject to its humanitarian intervention, a 
would-be intervener should, firstly, attempt to obtain direct access to these individuals. 
Sometimes there are obstacles to achieving this, but these are not always insurmountable. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross's People on War (2000) survey, for 
instance, comprised a series of comprehensive opinion polls and interviews on 
humanitarian intervention in a number of war-affected states. Amongst the findings was 
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that 66 percent of those surveyed wanted more intervention from the international 
community to deal with humanitarian crises, and only 17 percent wanted less (ICRC 
2000,54). 131 In addition, they were able to distinguish between combatants and civilians, 
as well as identifying those who had suffered severe burdens caused by conflict. Of 
course, such useful information will not always be accessible before the launch of a 
humanitarian intervention. Access may be denied to researchers and the situation may be 
too dangerous (the ICRC also faced these difficulties with its research). 
Where direct consultation with those suffering the humanitarian crisis is 
impossible, a locally externally representative intervener will not simply presume these 
individuals' opinions on the proposed intervention. Instead, it will use secondary sources 
or indicators of these citizens' opinions, provided, for instance, by intermediaries. The 
challenge for the intervener, if it is to be locally externally representative, is to find 
reliable agents that provide accurate information on the opinions of victims and affected 
bystanders. One way that the intervener can determine whether an agent provides 
accurate information is by examining its ethos, track record, and agenda. Another way is 
to compare the agent's account with that of the few citizens with whom direct access is 
possible (e. g. refugees). The agents that are perhaps most likely to be reliable are certain 
NGOs and what Mary Kaldor (1999,121) calls 'islands of civility' (groups that have 
political support but are not involved in the violence). 
13 'The ICRC also conducted its survey in a number of the states (such as the U. K., the U. S., and France) 
who typically play a large Tole in any force undertaking humanitarian intervention. These provided 
information on citizens' views on whether and how intervention should be undertaken by their state. 
Similar surveys could be used therefore to help ensure an intervener's internal representativeness. 
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An intervener, therefore, can be locally externally representative in a number of 
ways. Although these are not always easily achieved, in what follows I argue that an 
intervener should make a concerted effort to be locally externally representative. A 
significant part of its legitimacy depends on its doing so. This is the case even if Jacques 
deLisle is right in asserting that "most victims will not oppose intervention" (2001,552). 
It is important to establish that this is true: that those subject to the humanitarian crisis 
clearly want intervention. Indeed, much of the opposition to humanitarian intervention 
revolves around the idea that it is paternalistic, forced upon people who do not want it 
(e. g. Walzer 1980). One logical corollary of this objection is that, if intervention is to be 
justifiable, the intervener's local external representativeness is vital. As Tes6n notes, 
"leaders must make sure before intervening that they have the support of the very persons 
they want to assisf' (2003,107). 
Yet, the question remains: why exactly is it that the intervener should establish 
and represent the opinions of those in the political community that is subject to its 
intervention? The three reasons for the importance of an intervener's local external 
representativeness mirror to a certain degree the three reasons presented for internal 
representativeness. The first claims that a locally externally representative intervener is 
more likely to be effective. The second is the 'Burdens Argument', which asserts that 
those subject to the humanitarian intervention should have their opinions represented 
because intervention is likely to burden them. The third emphasises the value of 
individual self-government. 
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(i) Increased effectiveness 
I begin the defence of the moral importance of local external representativeness with a 
plainly consequential ist argument: an intervener that represents the opinions of those 
subject to its humanitarian intervention is more likely to be effective at preventing, 
reducing, or halting the mass violation of basic human rights. This is because, firstly, 
prior consultation with those who would be subject to the intervention can indicate 
whether there is widespread support for intervention in the target state. This is a key 
factor determining whether intervention will succeed (Gizeles and Kosek 2005). The 
official British peacekeeping manual thus states: 
Without the broader co-operation and consent of the majority of the local 
population and the leadership of the principal ruling authorities, be they party to 
the dispute or government agencies, success is not a reasonable or realistic 
expectation... Put simply, consent (in its broadest form) is necessary for any 
prospect of success (in Kaldor 1999,126). 
Without such prior consultation, the intervener might undertake action that is unpopular 
with the local population and, as a result, face high levels of resistance, making 
successful intervention difficult. In addition, a locally externally representative intervener 
is more likely to know whether a particular course of action or mission during the 
intervention will be successful. In this context, Chopra and Hohe (2004,291) assert that 
locals tend to have the best knowledge of the situation, including, we can sun-nise, the 
location of conflict hotspots, the terrain and weather conditions, and the underlying 
political factors. By consulting with locals, therefore, an intervener will have a greater 
awareness of this situation and, consequently, will be better placed to undertake 
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successful intervention. Moreover, since a locally externally representative intervener 
reflects, in its decision-making, the opinions of those subject to its intervention, it is more 
likely to make these individuals feel involved with the intervention. Theodora-Ismene 
Gizeles and Kristin Kosek (2005) argue that this feeling of involvement is necessary for 
effective intervention. Conversely, "a population that is largely uninvolved in 
humanitarian intervention is less likely to cooperate with the intervening parties or 
expend efforts to make the intervention successful" (Gizeles and Kosek 2005,364). 132 
(ii) The Burdens Argument 
The second argument for local external representativeness is what I call the 'Burdens 
Argument'. This asserts that an intervener should represent the opinions of those in the 
political community that is subject to its intervention because of the potential burdens 
imposed by humanitarian intervention. Those in this community might have to suffer 
civilian and military casualties, damage to vital infrastructure, increased levels of 
insecurity, and other costs associated with being in a war zone. Given that these 
individuals face these burdens, it is important that the intervener should reflect their 
opinions on the intervention. 
This Burdens Argument is similar to the Resources Argument for internal 
representativeness in that it relies on the importance of individual choice. Whereas the 
underlying principle of the Resources Argument is that an individual should have some 
choice over how his resources are used, the underlying principle of the Burdens 
132 See, further, Mersaides (2005). 
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Argument is that an individual should have some choice over the burdens he faces. The 
reason why individual choice regarding burdens matters is that those suffering burdens 
are negatively affected. More precisely, a burden of humanitarian intervention can be 
defined as a negative impact on an individual's basic human interests caused by that 
intervention. Examples of burdens therefore include injury, disruption of food supplies, 
and damage to vital infrastructure (e. g. basic medical services and running water). Hence, 
the Burdens Argument holds that those subject to the humanitarian intervention should 
have their opinions represented because intervention may have a negative impact on their 
basic human interests. 
As it stands, this Burdens Argument is both too inclusive and too exclusive. It is 
too inclusive because it suggests that the intervener should reflect the opinions of all 
those in the political community that is subject to its intervention. This includes the 
opinions of those carrying out the violations of basic human rights, which create the need 
for intervention. For example, on the logic of this argument, NATO should have 
represented the opinions of the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs before undertaking its air 
strikes in 1995, since they were essentially the targets and were burdened by this action. 
We therefore need to amend the Burdens Argument to take into account moral 
culpability. In this context, Tes6n. (1997,126) asserts that it is the victims of the 
oppression who must welcome intervention. More specifically, he argues: 
in a tyrannical regime the population can be divided into the following groups: the 
victims; the accomplices and collaborators; and the bystanders... Of these groups, 
only the first, the victims, have (arguably) a right to refuse aid. The accomplices 
and bystanders who support the regime are excluded for obvious reasons. Their 
opposition to intervention does not count. And the bystanders who oppose the 
regime cannot validly refuse foreign aid on behalf of the victims (TesOn 2003, 
107). 
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Although this typology is illuminating, it is too simplistic. I agree that the opinions of 
accomplices and collaborators should be given no weight. Any burdens of intervention 
33 
they suffer are a consequence of their own morally reprehensible behaviour. 
11 also 
agree that we should assign greatest weight to the opinions of the victims. They are not 
usually morally culpable for the humanitarian crisis, yet often face some of the largest 
burdens of intervention, such as the bombing campaigns conducted in the regions in 
which they live. Moreover, if a potential intervener treats each individual's opinions 
equally, and if the majority of others (such as the bystanders) oppose humanitarian 
intervention, the victims would be left to suffer the humanitarian crisis. For this reason, 
we should give most weight to the opinions of the victims. Yet I disagree with Tes6n's 
rejection of the importance of the bystanders' opinions. Although they are less important 
than the opinions of victims, some bystanders' opinions should be represented as well. In 
particular, we should include the opinions of those bystanders who are likely to be 
burdened by the intervention precisely because they are burdened bystanders: they are not 
(directly) responsible for the humanitarian crisis but might suffer in its resolution. Hence, 
a locally externally representative intervener will, firstly, give most weight to the 
opinions of the victims of the humanitarian crisis and, secondly, take into account the 
opinions of bystanders likely to be burdened by the intervention. 134 Of course, it is not 
133 There may be, however, an instrumental reason for taking into account the opinions of the accomplices 
and collaborators: such individuals are less likely to resist an intervener if they feel that their opinions are 
being represented. 
134 To be more specific than this would be a mistake. For instance, to specify the exact percentage of the 
support of the victims and the bystanders required for an intervener to be said to be externally 
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always easy to distinguish between victims, bystanders, collaborators, and 
accomplices. ' 35 But, although sometimes the line between the victims and the aggressors 
is blurred, on other occasions it is all too apparent who are the victims and who are the 
aggressors. 
As it stands, this Burdens Argument is also too exclusive. Some of the burdens of 
humanitarian intervention may fall on those outside the borders of the target state. An 
obvious example is the creation of a refugee flow that destabilises a neighbouring state. 
Therefore, we need to amend the Burdens Argument so that, when individuals in other 
political communities will be burdened by the intervention - when they will also be 
burdened bystanders - the intervener gives some weight to their opinions too. That said, 
in most cases, the effects on those beyond the borders of the target state would not be 
significant enough to warrant the consideration of these individuals' opinions. 
(iii) Individual self-government 
representative would require too much detail. It would not fit in with the inexactness of establishing the 
opinions of those in the political community that is subject to the intervention. That is not to claim that an 
intervener cannot obtain a fairly accurate picture of the opinions of the victims and the bystanders. On the 
contrary, it can do so if it uses the measures outlined above. Rather, my point is that this information will 
not be easily quantifiable. See Chapter 7 for further discussion. 
135 These categories could be further divided. For instance, the category of accomplices could be divided 
into those who are willing, those who are naive, and those who have little choice but to be accomplices. But 
the typology (as presented above) captures the most morally relevant distinctions. 
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Like the Resources Argument in relation to internal representativeness, the Burdens 
Argument does not provide a complete defence of the importance of an intervener's local 
external representativeness. That is, it does not encapsulate fully why an intervener 
should be locally externally representative. For a complete account, we need to turn to the 
third argument for local external representativeness, which invokes the instrumental and 
intrinsic value of individual self-government. 136 
Let us start with the instrumental argument for individual self-government in this 
context (and, by implication, for an intervener's local external representativeness). This 
instrumentalist justification relies on a form of what Albert Weale (1999) terms the 'non- 
paternalist principle'. To be specific, individuals are the best judge of what enhances their 
well-being in most cases, although there are obvious exceptions! 37 Individual self- 
government is valuable, therefore, because self-governing individuals are more likely to 
realise their well-being. It follows that an institution that is representative, in that it 
reflects its citizens' opinions in its decision-making, is more likely to promote its 
citizens' well-being. 138 It also follows that an intervener that represents the opinions of 
136 Strictly speaking, use of the term 'individual self-government' may not always be appropriate for local 
external representativeness because the intervener does not establish a government in the target state 
(unless it forms a transitional administration). Nevertheless, the underlying principle is essentially the 
same: individuals should have some degree of control over their ruling institutions. To show the mirroring 
of the argument for internal representativeness, I will continue to use the ten-n 'individual self-government. 
13'Weale phrases this in terms of 'interests', but the argument can be applied to well-being. 
13BIt may be replied that, on an objective list view of well-being, we can define the constituents of a good 
life and hence what is necessary for well-being. However, within the broad categories of the values that 
contribute to the good life (such as friendship), the details of the good life for each individual cannot be 
known a priori. The particular individual is the best judge of these details. 
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those subject to its intervention - and is therefore locally externally representative - is 
more likely to promote (or, at least, not harm) these citizens' well-being. This is because 
the intervener, by reflecting these individuals' wishes, desires, and goals in its decision- 
making, will help them to attain what they themselves identify as being required for their 
well-being. For instance, suppose an intervener responds to a humanitarian crisis in a 
society which has strong religious customs. These customs form part of what constitutes 
the good life for many individuals. By consultation, a locally externally representative 
intervener would learn that these religious customs and practices contribute to many 
individuals' well-being in this society. It would therefore have a better understanding of 
what is necessary to promote these individuals' well-being. It might follow, for example, 
that the intervener involves religious leaders in a transitional administration and avoids 
damaging religious buildings. 
I argued earlier that individual self-government matters in itself- it is intrinsically 
important that an individual should be self-governing even if his opinions, if realised, 
would not obviously promote his well-being. This intrinsic value of individual self- 
government adds to the importance of local external representativeness. A state, coalition 
of states, or multinational organisation. should not intervene to protect those who do not 
want their political community to be subject to humanitarian intervention. This is the case 
even if intervention would promote these individuals' well-being in the short-term, for 
instance, by protecting them from being victims of oppression and from violation of their 
basic human rights. 139 Moreover, it is not only individuals' opinions on whether there 
139Note that this is an argument for the intrinsic worth of individual self-government, not communal self- 
government (which is sometimes used to defend non-intervention). Some accounts of the value of 
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should be intervention that matter for the representativeness of an intervener. Although 
this tends to be the most prominent issue, it also matters that an intervener responds to 
other opinions of those subject to its intervention, including their opinions on who should 
intervene, on the form intervention should take, and on how long it should last. The 
opinions of those subject to the intervention on these issues also have intrinsic value. For 
instance, those subject to a humanitarian crisis might desire intervention, but have 
grievances against the proposed intervener. 140 Responding to such grievances might not 
directly promote the well-being of those subject to the intervention - an alternative 
intervener might not be any more effective - but it is still important to be responsive to 
these opinions as a matter of individual self-government and, ultimately, local external 
representativeness. 
IV. GLOBAL EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Having seen that an intervener's internal and local external representativeness are 
important conditions for the legitimacy of an intervener, it might be asked whether it is 
also important that an intervener represents worldwide public opinion. Should an 
communal self-government would include communities with little or no individual self-government (e. g. 
Walzer 1980). 
140 One example of this was the response by a number of Somalis to the proposal to send Kenyan, Ethiopian, 
and Djiboutian peacekeepers to Somalia in 2005. Their opposition to intervention by their neighbours 
(especially Ethiopian) was so great that a brawl erupted in the Somali parliament and Somali warlords 
claimed they would target Ethiopian peacekeepers (BBC 2005). 
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intervener take into account the opinions of everyone worldwide (minus those who are 
already considered under internal representativeness and local external 
representativeness)? In other words, is it important that an intervener is 'globally 
externally representative'? 14 1 Let us now briefly consider this question. I will examine 
whether the three types of arguments made for internal and local external 
representativeness can also be applied to global external representativeness. 
First, can an intervener's global external representativeness be instrumentally 
justified? It may be, as Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2004,171) argue, that an 
intervener that enjoys worldwide support would receive extra assistance for the 
intervention and would therefore be more effective. But this is perhaps unlikely. A 
number of interveners, especially the UN, have seemed to enjoy the general support of 
worldwide public opinion for their humanitarian intervention, but have struggled to find 
the resources necessary for effective intervention. Second, is there an argument analogous 
to the Resources Argument or the Burdens Argument that could be made in favour of 
global external representativeness? Again, this is doubtful. The Resources Argument and 
the Burdens Argument rely on the premise that individuals should have some control over 
the use of their resources and the burdens that they must face (which negatively affect 
their basic human interests) respectively. But the individuals that are included under 
global external representativeness (everyone in the world minus those included in the 
other two sorts of representativeness) are unlikely to provide any significant resources for 
141 One indicator of this, especially in democracies, might be the statements of the relevant heads of states 
and government officials, but a more accurate measure of global external representativeness would be 
opinion polls carried out in a wide variety of countries, such as those conducted during the Iraq War. 
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the intervention or face any burdens that significantly and directly affect their basic 
human interests. 11crc is no analogous argument, then, because these indi%iduals arc 
essentially international b)-st: indcrs, generally not directly affected by the intervention. 142 
Third, could an argument for the importance of individual self-government be used to 
defend the importance of an intervener's global external representativeness? Again, 
perhaps not, since the individuals in question arc not in any way governed or ruled by the 
intervener. Indi%idual sclf-goivrnment cannot be used therefore to justify the importance 
of an intervener representing these individuals' opinions. 
T"hus, %%hcthcr the intervener reflects the opinions of those individuals in the wider 
international community is not relevant to its legitimacy because these people arc not 
directly involved with the intervention. Ibc individuals in the %%idcr international 
com. munity arc t)pically unbw-dencd bystanders, whose opinions ultimately do not matter 
for the legitimacy of an intervener that is using its own citizens' resources to undertake a 
military intervention for the sake of those suffering the humanitarian crisis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The principal purpose of this chapter has been to highlight, and to make the case for, the 
moral significancc of two largely overlooked factors for the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intcrvcrition: %,. -hcthcr the intervener is representative of the opinions, firstly, of its 
citizens and, sccondly, of those in the political community in which it intervenes. '[here 
14, 
, if people of a neighbouring state were burdened by the inten-ention, for instance by the creation of a 
refugee flow. these inibviduals' opinions would be included under the Burdens Argument. 
219 
Chapter 6: Representativeness 
are three, largely complementary, reasons why the first factor, the intervener's internal 
representativeness, is important. The first is consequentialist: an internally representative 
intervener is more likely to be effective because it is more likely to commit the resources 
necessary for successful humanitarian intervention. The second is the Resources 
Argument: the intervener should take into account its citizens' opinions on the 
intervention because its citizens provide the financial and human resources for 
intervention. The third is the value of individual self-government on humanitarian 
intervention. Three parallel reasons explain the importance of the second factor, the 
intervener's local external representativeness. The first is consequentialist: a locally 
externally representative intervener is more likely to be effective. The second is the 
Burdens Argument: the intervener should take into account the opinions of those in the 
political community in which it intervenes - and, in particular, the opinions of the victims 
and the potentially burdened bystanders - because humanitarian intervention may have a 
negative impact on these individuals' basic human interests. The third is the instrumental 
and intrinsic value of individual self-government. 
Hence, internal and local external representativeness play a significant role in an 
intervener's legitimacy. For that reason, we need to pay them greater attention and, 
ultimately, to improve the extent to which current interveners are internally and locally 
externally representative. And, although it can be difficult for an intervener to obtain 
accurate information on the opinions of both its constituents and those suffering the 
humanitarian crisis, these difficulties are not insurmountable. For the reasons given in 
this chapter, an intervener should make a concerted effort to obtain and to take into 
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account such information and consequently be both internally representative and locally 
externally representative. 
It is worth noting lastly that the arguments for the value of internal and local 
external representativeness cohere with the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, which 
leaves room in its primarily consequentialist conception of legitimacy for secondary 
factors. Indeed, they reinforce the objection made in the previous chapter against the 
Extreme Conscquentialist Approach: effectiveness is not the sole moral concern when 
deciding who should intervene. 
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CONCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY 
The previous chapters have outlined the parameters of legitimacy for humanitarian 
intervention, examined various theories of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, and 
delineated the qualities that interveners need to be legitimate. The aim of this chapter is 
firstly to bring the findings of the previous chapters together to provide a complete 
conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. This conception of legitimacy, 
with its emphasis on effectiveness, provides the framework for answering the question of 
who should intervene. The second aim of this chapter is to use the conception of 
legitimacy identified to answer that question. I consider who, out of the currently existing 
agents of intervention, is the most legitimate agent and who should therefore undertake 
humanitarian intervention. I conclude that, although some agents of intervention have a 
degree of legitimacy, no currently existing agent is fully legitimate according to the 
conception of legitimacy I have identified. Further, I argue, that in light of recent 
egregious violations of human rights, the current situation is problematic because there is 
a lack of any humanitarian intervention in many cases, largely due to a lack of 
willingness to intervene. Consequently, in the next chapter, I consider a number of 
proposals for improving the mechanisms of humanitarian intervention so that it will be 
undertaken, firstly, by more legitimate agents and, secondly, on a more frequent basis. 
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1. OUTLINE OF THE COMPLETE CONCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY 
This first section will bring together the features of legitimacy identified in previous 
discussions into a complete conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. 
Before outlining that complete conception, however, it will be helpful briefly to recap the 
account of the concept of legitimacy offered in Chapter 2. 
Concept of legitimacy 
I rely to a certain extent on Buchanan's (2004) concept of legitimacy. This treats 
legitimacy as the morally justifiable use of political power. A legitimate agent will have 
certain qualities that mean it can justifiably wield political power. I take legitimacy to be 
scalar, that is, a matter of the degree. We can distinguish between an intervener 
possessing full legitimacy and an intervener possessing an adequate degree of legitimacy. 
Intervention by an intervener possessing an adequate degree of legitimacy is morally 
acceptable. However, it is desirable to have an intervener possessing a more than 
adequate degree of legitimacy and, in particular, an intervener that is fully legitimate, for 
the simple reason that such an intervener's use of power would be more morally justified. 
A number of different qualities contribute to the legitimacy of an intervener. To 
be fully legitimate, an intervener needs to have all of the relevant legitimating qualities. 
But an intervener does not have to have all of these qualities to possess an adequate 
degree of legitimacy. An intervener can also have varying degrees of these qualities, a 
high level of one quality but less of another. Any combination of qualities is acceptable, 
223 
Chapter 7: Assessing Current Interveners 
as long as they each contribute enough legitimacy so that, when added together, the 
intervener has an adequate degree of legitimacy. Each of the qualities is limited in how 
much it can contribute to legitimacy and therefore an intervener needs to possess a 
number of the qualities in order to reach an adequate degree of legitimacy. In other 
words, most of these legitimating qualities, taken singularly, are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions of legitimacy. The only exception is effectiveness, which, given its 
importance, is necessary for an intervener to be legitimate (and which also can be a 
sufficient condition when highly beneficial consequences are likely). 
In addition, there are four qualities that an intervener needs to be engaged in 
'humanitarian intervention'. That is, some qualities, outlined in Chapter 2, are implicit in 
the meaning of humanitarian intervention. These qualities are its defining conditions 
rather than its legitimating conditions. In other words, they help to define a humanitarian 
intervener, rather than what counts as a legitimate humanitarian intervener. In particular, 
it needs (i) to be engaged in military and forcible action; (ii) to be responding to a 
situation where there is impending or ongoing grievous suffering or loss of life; (iii) to be 
an external agent; and (iv) to have a humanitarian intention, that is, a predominant 
purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the ongoing or impending grievous suffering 
or loss of life. Unless it has all four qualities, an intervener cannot be said to be 
undertaking 'humanitarian intervention'. This is not to prejudge who should intervene; an 
intervener engaged in 'humanitarian intervention' might still be illegitimate. To be 
legitimate, it needs to have a number of other, moral qualities. I will now recap what 
these are. 
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Factors in an intervener's legitimacy 
The most important factor for the legitimacy of an intervener is its effectiveness. This 
reflects the intuitive plausibility of consequentialist thinking on humanitarian 
intervention. According to the Moderate Consequentialist Approach, what matters most is 
that we can expect the intervener to achieve good consequences - that it will successfully 
prevent, halt, or decrease the egregious violations of human rights. 
There are three forms of effectiveness. The first type of effectiveness is 'local 
external effectiveness', which depends on whether an intervener is likely to promote or 
harm the well-being of those in the political community that is subject to its intervention. 
In other words, to be locally externally effective, an intervener needs to be successful at 
tackling the humanitarian crisis. The second type of effectiveness is 'global external 
effectiveness'. This depends on whether an intervener promotes or harms the enjoyment 
of the basic human rights in the world as a whole, apart from the intervener's citizens and 
those subject to its intervention. The third type of effectiveness is an intervener's 'internal 
effectiveness', which depends on the consequences for the intervener's own citizens. 
Given the importance of an intervener's being effective in these three senses, it follows 
that an intervener's overall effectiveness is a necessary condition of its legitimacy. If, 
when combining its local external effectiveness, global external effectiveness, and 
internal effectiveness, an intervener is ineffective overall, it cannot be legitimate. 
If they are to be effective, interveners need to have a number of characteristics. 
These include adequate military and non-military resources, a suitable strategy to use 
these resources successfully, and an appropriate mandate. Interveners also need to have 
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the commitment to intervene successfully. Regional interveners are likely to do well in 
this regard: their geographical proximity gives them extra reason to ensure that the 
humanitarian crisis is resolved and, in addition, means that fewer resources are required. 
It is also important for an intervener to intervene in a timely manner, i. e. quickly and 
when the situation is ripe for humanitarian intervention. 
The overall effectiveness of an intervener depends, firstly, on the degree to which 
it has these characteristics and, secondly, on the circumstances in which it is acting. Both 
the probability and the magnitude of an intervener's effectiveness will vary according to 
the circumstances. When an intervener has a high probability of achieving a success with 
a large magnitude, effectiveness may be not only a necessary but also a sufficient 
condition for it to have an adequate degree of legitimacy. Consequently, effectiveness can 
be sufficient for an adequate degree of legitimacy in unusual circumstances where hugely 
beneficial consequences are more than likely. In most cases, however, effectiveness will 
not be sufficient because an intervener will not have a very high probability of achieving 
a very sizeable success. Normally, then, an intervener's legitimacy depends also on the 
degree to which it possesses other qualities. 
Moreover, even where hugely beneficial consequences are more than likely, and 
effectiveness is sufficient for an intervener to have an adequate degree of legitimacy, the 
intervener will not be fully legitimate unless it possesses all of the relevant qualities. 
Hence, at most, effectiveness can be sufficient only for an adequate degree of legitimacy 
and, in the majority of circumstances, it will not be sufficient even for this. This is 
because the legitimacy of an intervener also depends on three other qualities that have 
intrinsic as well as instrumental value. 
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The first of these intrinsically valuable qualities is fidelity to the principles ofjus 
in bello. These principles limit the means that an intervener can use to undertake 
humanitarian intervention. There are four principles of jus in bello. The first two 
principles - principles of 'extemaljus in bello' - are concerned with how the intervener 
should treat the population subject to its intervention. The first of these is a strict rule of 
non-combatant immunity, which maintains that civilian casualties are impen-nissible, and 
the second is a principle of proportionality, which limits the harm that the intervener can 
cause to combatants. The third and fourth principles - principles of 'internaljus in bello' 
- are concerned with how the intervener should treat its own citizens. The third principle 
restricts the sort of soldiers that the intervener can use (i. e. not conscripts or child 
soldiers). The fourth principle maintains that an intervener cannot use methods that cause 
its own soldiers excessive and avoidable harm. 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted two other factors that are intrinsic to (as well 
as instrumental for) an intervener's legitimacy. Both concern whether the intervener 
represents the opinions of two sets of people in its decision-making. First, it should 
represent the opinions of those individuals from whom it is collectively formed - it needs 
to be 'internally representative'. Second, it should represent the opinions of those 
individuals in the political community that is subject to its intervention (and particularly 
the victims of the humanitarian crisis) - it needs to be 'locally externally representative'. 
To establish that it is internally representative, an intervener can conduct referenda on 
humanitarian intervention, carry out opinion polls on some of the population, and, less 
scientifically, consider other indicators of the public mood. To ensure that it is locally 
externally representative, it can ascertain directly the opinions of those in the political 
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community that is subject to its intervention, or, given that this is often difficult, it can 
use indirect indicators, such as information provided by reliable intermediaries. 
Therefore, a high degree of fidelity to the principles of internal jus in bello and 
extemaljus in bello, a satisfactory degree of internal representativeness and local external 
representativeness, and a reasonable expectation of internal effectiveness, global external 
effectiveness, and local external effectiveness are all important factors for the legitimacy 
of a humanitarian intervener. 143 These exhaust the catalogue of significant factors. Other 
factors commonly cited as important have, at best, small significance for the legitimacy 
of an intervener. 
It is often assumed that interveners will be legitimate if they are legal. The current 
international law on humanitarian intervention, very briefly, is as follows. Article 2 (4) of 
the UN Charter provides a general prohibition on the use of force, to which there are two 
legal exceptions: instances of unilateral or collective self-defence, and Security Council- 
authorised intervention. The upshot is that (most) interveners require UN Security 
Council authorisation to be legal. This is essentially the same conclusion as reached by 
international legal positivists. Yet legality is at best a minor factor for the legitimacy of 
an intervener. The gap between the current international law and the demands of morality 
143 Note that an intervener that is internally and globally externally representative and has a high degree of 
expected fidelity to the principles of internal and extemaIjus in bello is more likely to be effective. This 
means that the conception of legitimacy presented is more complex than having the three types of 
effectiveness on the one band and the four other factors on the other. The four other factors (i. e., internal 
and global external representativeness and fidelity to the principles of internal and extemaIjus in bello) are 
important because of their contribution to an intervener's effectiveness, but also important because of their 
intrinsic value, independent of their contribution to effectiveness. 
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is too large: le-x lata bears little relation to lexferenda. A legal intervener is by no means 
certain to be a legitimate intervener. Indeed, being authorised by the UN Security Council 
has only a small positive impact on the legitimacy of an intervener. That legality has any 
positive impact means that it is, to some extent, desirable. But it is far from being a 
necessary or even important factor for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 
The argument that a legitimate intervener needs to have a humanitarian motive, or 
the weaker notion that a humanitarian motive will contribute to the legitimacy of an 
intervention, can be challenged. It is crucial to note the difference between a 
humanitarian intention and a humanitarian motive. An intervener with a humanitarian 
intention has the goal of preventing, reducing, or halting the humanitarian crisis. 
However, the reason for the intervener's having this humanitarian goal does not have to 
be humanitarian as well. By contrast, if an intervener is to have a humanitarian motive, 
not only must its goal be humanitarian, its reason for having that goal must be 
humanitarian too. Whilst a humanitarian intention is a necessary condition of any 
intervention being deemed 'humanitarian', a humanitarian intervention may or may not 
have a purely humanitarian motive, or may have mixed motives, and yet still be 
legitimate. 
Three other commonly cited factors do not contribute much to the legitimacy of 
an intervener. First, an intervener may be selective in its intervention and still be 
legitimate. This goes against the argument that an intervener is illegitimate in State A 
because it has not intervened in a similar situation in State B. In fact, a certain degree of 
selectivity is desirable given that legitimate humanitarian intervention is not possible in 
every single circumstance. Second, Chapter 2 argued that having a humanitarian intention 
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is not, in itself, morally significant: we need to have further information in order to judge 
the legitimacy of an agent. Third, it does not matter whether an intervener's decision- 
making reflects the opinions of those individuals in the wider international community 
because these individuals are not directly involved in the intervention. 
Summary 
Let me summarise the complete conception of legitimacy. For an intervention to qualify 
as 'humanitarian intervention', an intervener needs to have a humanitarian intention, to 
be an external agent, to be responding to a serious humanitarian crisis, and to be engaged 
in a forcible military operation. To befully legitimate, an intervener needs to be internally 
effective, globally externally effective, locally externally effective, to follow principles of 
internal jus in bello, to follow principles of external jus in bello, to be internally 
representative, and to be locally externally representative. To have an adequate degree of 
legitimacy, an intervener does not need to have all of these qualities. Whether it has an 
adequate degree of legitimacy depends on whether it possesses enough of these qualities 
cumulatively. An intervener could have an adequate degree of legitimacy, yet lack one of 
these qualities. It may, for instance, lack internal representativeness, but have an adequate 
degree of legitimacy overall because it is highly locally externally representative, follows 
closely all the principles ofjus in bello, and will be extremely locally externally effective. 
Similarly, an intervener could have an adequate degree of legitimacy yet meet some of 
these qualities only partially. For instance, there are different levels of local external 
representativeness, ranging from none to full representativeness (depending on the 
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lengths to which an intervener goes to establish the opinions of those suffering the 
humanitarian crisis). An intervener can have an adequate degree of legitimacy even 
though it is only partially locally externally representative, perhaps because it will be 
extremely effective overall. 
The only necessary condition of legitimacy is that the intervener is likely to be 
effective overall. This is because of the overwhelming significance this quality has for the 
legitimacy of an intervener. Indeed, in exceptional circumstances, where extremely 
beneficial consequences are highly likely, effectiveness can be a sufficient condition for 
the legitimacy of an intervener. 
That effectiveness can be, on occasion, sufficient for an adequate degree of 
legitimacy shows, firstly, the impact of circumstances on my conception of legitimacy for 
humanitarian intervention. Circumstances determine whether qualities, other than 
effectiveness, are required if an intervener is to possess an adequate degree of legitimacy 
and, if so, the degree to which these are required. Secondly, it reflects the dominant 
position of effectiveness among the qualities which contribute to an intervener's 
legitimacy. Thus, my conception of legitimacy is, in large part, consequentialist, as 
encapsulated by the Moderate Consequentialist Approach. This is for good reason: 
consequentialist thinking on humanitarian intervention is intuitively compelling. What 
seems to matter, above all else, is that an intervener prevents, halts, or decreases 
egregious violations of human rights. But my account is not wholly consequentialist. In 
most cases, the degree to which an intervener possesses certain intrinsic qualities - 
internal representativeness, local external representativeness, and fidelity to principles of 
jus in bello - plays a large role in its legitimacy. And even when local external 
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effectiveness is sufficient for an adequate degree of legitimacy, an intervener needs these 
non-consequentialist qualities to be fully legitimate. 
Vagueness and institutions 
It might be claimed that the conception of legitimacy I have developed is too vague. First, 
it leaves open the possibility that an intervener can possess varying amounts of the 
morally relevant qualities outlined, including very little of some, yet still have an 
adequate degree of legitimacy. Second, the qualities identified are somewhat 
indeterminate: there can be differing interpretations and judgments about whether an 
intervener possesses them. These two problems mean that it will be difficult in practice to 
determine whether an intervener is legitimate. Moreover, given this indeterminacy, agents 
may be able to claim, with some plausibility, that they possess the morally relevant 
qualities, and are therefore legitimate, even when they are not. 144 This, the argument runs, 
could increase the risk of abusive non-humanitarian intervention or illegitimate 
humanitarian intervention. 
There are a number of points to make in response. To start with, the conception of 
legitimacy identified above is not that vague. I have been careful to specify what exactly 
is required to possess the morally relevant qualities. For instance, for an intervener to be 
effective, I argued that it must be reasonably expected to make an improvement in the 
enjoyment of basic human rights in the long-term, compared to the counterfactual, of 
those suffering humanitarian crisis, of the intervener's citizens, or in the world at large. In 
144 See Bellamy (2006a) for some further problems with such indeterminacy. 
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practice, this means that the intervener must be responding to a serious humanitarian 
crisis, where the degree of violations of human rights is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively significant, and to have a number of qualities, such as the necessary 
military and non-military resources, an appropriate mandate, a suitable strategy, sufficient 
commitment, the ability to intervene in a quick and timely manner, and also be likely to 
be perceived to be legitimate. Similarly, when discussing the importance of fidelity to the 
principles ofjus in bello, I detailed what exactly is required for each of the principles and, 
in Chapter 2,1 was particularly careful to define when an agent can be said to be engaged 
in 'humanitarian intervention' and what constitutes a humanitarian intention. 
Consequently, it would be extremely difficult for a non-humanitarian, abusive, or 
illegitimate agent to claim plausibly that they are a legitimate humanitarian intervener. 
Given the varying characteristics of humanitarian crises, and the different 
considerations involved, it would be a mistake to be more determinate. We need to retain 
a degree of flexibility in the relevant normative factors so that we can apply them to the 
differing situations that will arise. The risk in being more determinate is that we may 
deny the legitimacy of an intervener in a particular case because it does not meet all the 
details of a certain factor, yet the specifics of the case - and common-sense - tell us that 
the intervener is legitimate overall (Chopra and Weiss 1992). For instance, although the 
assessment of an intervener's effectiveness might be easier if we took the establishment 
of working political institutions in the target state to be a necessary condition of effective 
humanitarian intervention, this would rule out cases where an intervener has not 
established such institutions, yet we still generally regard it as having been effective. 
Hence, Weiss asserts that, in the messy world of humanitarian intervention, "[a]nalyses 
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and not formulas are required. The task is thus to be flexible rather than to take preset 
criteria and apply them rigidly" (2005,213). 145 
One solution to the problem of indeterminate factors, favoured by many (Ayoob 
2002; Buchanan and Keohane 2004; Chopra and Weiss 1992; Pogge 2006), is to have 
institutions that formally decide whether an intervener possesses the morally relevant 
qualities. The goal here is to establish something akin to a (model) domestic legal system 
which has set processes to determine an agent's intention, as well to make judgments on 
other morally relevant concerns. It would silence much of the contestation by listening to 
competing claims and deciding in a fair and accurate manner which is correct. If put in 
place at the international level, such a system would be able to adjudicate on whether an 
intervener has the morally relevant qualities outlined and whether it would be legitimate 
overall. It would also be able to take into account the particularities of the case and rule 
accordingly, i. e., either authorise or reject the intervention. 
The development of an international adjudicating institution would, of course, be 
highly desirable. Indeed, one of the benefits of the cosmopolitan democratic institutions 
that I propose in the next chapter is that they would be able to decide in a fair manner 
whether to authorise intervention. But we must tread carefully here: not all institutions 
are appropriate for this function. As it stands, the UN Security Council is not a suitable 
candidate to act as an adjudicating institution. Central to the credibility of an adjudicating 
institution is, firstly, that its processes are fair, transparent, and procedurally just, and 
secondly, that it makes the right judgment in most cases. The Security Council fails on 
both counts. As argued in Chapter 3, the functioning of the Security Council is highly 
14'The section onTefonning international law in the next chapter has further discussion of these issues. 
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problematic. In addition, it has failed to authorise humanitarian interventions that were 
legitimate overall (e. g. Kosovo) and its permanent members have opposed a number of 
potential humanitarian interventions that might have been legitimate, had they been 
undertaken (e. g. Darfur and Rwanda). The Security Council therefore lacks just 
procedures and regularly does not make the right decisions. For these reasons, it would be 
n-dstaken to let it decide whether an intervener is legitimate, for it could not be relied 
upon to make this decision in a morally responsible way. As Chesterman argues, "it is 
misleading to suggest that the Council ever worked effectively as an objective arbiter in 
the area of peace and security - or that it was ever realistically expected to do so. The 
council was and remains an inherently political body" (2005,159). 146 
What is currently the best way then of deciding whether an agent possesses the 
morally relevant qualities and would therefore be a legitimate intervener? My suggestion 
is that, until we develop a more credible system of global governance, we should leave 
the decision on whether an intervener possesses the morally relevant qualities, and is 
therefore legitimate, to the international community. That is to say, the international 
community currently acts as an adjudicator on humanitarian intervention and should 
continue to do so. 147 The decisions that it makes are able to constrain action before it is 
146 See, further, Chesterman and von Einsiedel (2005,755-756). 
14'As already noted, the term 'international community' is ambiguous. By international community, I mean 
specifically the institutions of the UN, states (particularly the governments of states), regional, sub- 
regional, and collective security organisations, world public opinion, and global civil society (i. e. NGOs). 
For the international community to make a decision, not all these institutions have to be involved, nor do 
they all have to agree. Instead, there needs to be a general sense of agreement amongst a number of these 
institutions. 
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undertaken and the criticisms that it makes after illegitimate action has been undertaken 
have an impact on subsequent practice. 148 Of course, this system is not ideal; there are no 
formal processes for deliberation and the international community can make the wrong 
decisions. Even when it makes the right decisions, the decisions do not always constrain 
states. But we should not underplay the ability of the international community to make 
such decisions and for these decisions to carry weight. Consider, for instance, the 
widespread view in the international community, despite the claims of the U. S. and the 
U. K., that the 2003 war on Iraq was illegal and largely illegitimate. This view has 
certainly had a large impact on international relations (it is perhaps one of the main 
reasons why the U. S. has not yet attacked Iran). Hence, although the adjudicating 
function of the international community is not without its difficulties, it has greater 
transparency than the UN Security Council, and is more likely to make the right 
decisions. 149 
14'Franck's (2003) work on the jurying powers of states wben the Security Council decides not to act is 
quite informative here, but is more state-centric than the position I adopt. 
1491t might be claimed that the Security Council does have one major draw: it has a significant ability to 
constrain agents. That is, intervention opposed by the UN Security Council is much less likely to go ahead 
than intervention opposed by the international community in general. This means that the Security 
Council's decision on whether an intervener possesses the morally relevant qualities (and whether an 
intervener would be legitimate) has more bite. However, it is far from certain that the UN Security Council 
does have a significant ability to constrain agents, especially powerful ones (see Chapter 3). It seems to be 
little better than the international community in this regard. 
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11. WHICH CURRENT AGENT SHOULD INTERVENE? 
Having outlined the complete conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, I 
will now use it to examine who, out of the current possible agents of intervention, is the 
most legitimate, and who therefore should undertake humanitarian intervention. 
To do this, I will assess the track record of humanitarian interveners to see how 
they measure up to the conception of legitimacy I have developed. 150 An intervener's 
track record is only partially useful, however. An intervener may have been effective in 
the past because it has acted only in easy cases, so it might not be similarly effective in 
the future. Therefore, it is also important to consider the institutional characteristics of the 
intervener to assess whether its track record is likely to be repeated. 
Some, such as Daniele Archibugi (2005), doubt the legitimacy of all current 
agents of humanitarian intervention, and argue that only reformed or new agents could be 
legitimate. If this view is correct, then no one should intervene until we develop 
intervening agents that are more satisfactory. As will become apparent, my reading of the 
current situation is less pessimistic. As argued above, it is not necessary for an intervener 
to be fully legitimate for its intervention to be justified, although, of course, full 
legitimacy is preferable. It is necessary, however, for an intervener to have an adequate 
degree of legitimacy. Given that a large number of the humanitarian interventions 
previously undertaken have had some degree of success (and we can assume are likely to 
'"The interpretation of various case studies differs from author to author. I will rely mostly on the accounts 
presented in ICISS's (2001b) supplementary volume to R2P, which is probably one of the most reliable 
sources. 
237 
Chapter 7: Assessing Current Interveners 
continue to do so), a number of the current agents of humanitarian intervention are likely 
to possess some degree of legitimacy. Whether this is sufficient for an adequate degree of 
legitimacy largely depends on the other morally relevant factors, but, overall, we should 
expect a number of current interveners to meet the threshold required for an adequate 
degree of legitimacy. Our concern should be primarily with who, amongst these, is the 
most legitimate agent of humanitarian intervention. 
1. NATO 
Amongst currently existing interveners, NATO would probably rank as the most 
legitimate. This is because of its effectiveness, which can be seen both in its success in 
previous missions (such as in Bosnia and in Kosovo) and in its level of military 
infrastructure. In Bosnia, the 1995 NATO air campaign forced the Bosnian Serbs to agree 
to peace after three unsuccessful years of UNPROFOR intervention. In Kosovo, although 
NATO's bombing campaign at first escalated the extent of the Serbian oppression, it 
avoided the ethnic cleansing on the scale of that seen in Bosnia. The effectiveness of 
these two operations was no coincidence. NATO has tremendous military and logistical 
resources (including a well-equipped rapid reaction force, the NATO Response Force). In 
addition, when NATO does intervene, it tends to do so with the commitment to ensure, 
firstly, a rapid resolution to the humanitarian crisis and, secondly, long-term peace and 
stability. As Terry Terriff (2004a, 128) asserts, NATO's post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts in the Balkans demonstrate its desire to stabilise these regions in order to provide 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights. 
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In addition, NATO intervention is likely to be internally representative. Its 
decision-making depends on consensus; each member state must consent to the use of 
force. Every NATO member state is a democracy and, as argued in the previous chapter, 
democratic states are most likely to be responsive to their citizens' opinions on the use of 
force. It follows that NATO decision-making is likely to be responsive to the opinions of 
citizens within the Alliance. 151 It is questionable, however, whether NATO always uses 
humanitarian means. The Kosovo intervention was heavily criticised for its sole use of 
airpower and its reluctance to deploy ground troops (Chesterman 2001,220-221, 
Habermas 2000,2; Wheeler 2000,290). The bombing campaign damaged vital 
infrastructure and killed a number of civilians, far more than probably would have 
occurred if the Alliance had been willing to undertake slightly more risky operations or to 
employ ground troops. On the other hand, Stromseth (2003,249) claims that NATO 
made great efforts to conform to the law of armed conflict in the Kosovo campaign. 
Moreover, even if NATO's fidelity to the principles of jus in bello was doubtful in 
Kosovo, Terriff (2004a, 128) expects NATO to undertake any future humanitarian 
intervention as humanely as possible, with a minimum number of civilian casualties. 
Hence, NATO, if it is willing to intervene, is likely to be the most legitimate 
agent, primarily because of its effectiveness. What matters most for legitimacy is the 
intervener's likely success at halting the humanitarian crisis and NATO is, at the moment, 
the agent most likely to be successful. 
"'In this context, NATO is also likely to be consistent with the Resources Argument because the U. S., 
which contributes the most towards NATO interventions, has usually the most control in NATO's decision- 
making. 
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But when is NATO willing to act? Although NATO now has a much broader 
notion of security and has widened the geographical scope of its mandate, it remains 
essentially a collective defence organisation, and this determines its decision-making 
(Terriff 2004a). Hence, in most cases it lacks the willingness to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. This does not undermine its legitimacy when it does act (selectivity does not 
harm an intervener's legitimacy), but it does mean that we need to consider other options. 
2. States and coalitions of the willing 
If NATO decides it does not want to get involved in a humanitarian crisis, a state acting 
by itself or a coalition of the willing is probably the next best option. The track record of 
humanitarian intervention by states and coalitions of the willing is somewhat uneven, but, 
on the whole, shows that they tend to be effective. 
On the one hand, the following interventions by states and coalitions of the 
willing were probably not effective: the U. S. -led mission in Somalia to protect 
humanitarian corridors in 19921 52 ; French intervention in Rwanda in 1994, which was too 
late to stop the genocide and instead halted the advance of the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic 
152 This intervention is generally regarded as unsuccessful, largely because of the infamous Tlackhawk 
Down' incident in which a number of U. S. Rangers bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, 
but also because Somalia has since become a failed state (e. g. Gizeles and Kosek 2005,369). However, 
ICISS (2001b, 97) suggests that the mission was not without its success; the impact of the famine was 
alleviated and perhaps only 50,000-100,000 of the 1.5 million threatened by starvation actually died. 
Oakley (1993) also claims that it was successful. 
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Front -a Tutsi force), thereby allowing the unchecked exodus of the interahamwe 
murder squads to DR Congo; and the 2002 French intervention in the Ivory Coast to 
arrest growing violence, which has exacerbated the situation. 
On the other hand, the following interventions by states and coalitions of the 
willing were probably successful: India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan that brought 
an end to the Pakistani oppression of Bengalis (Wheeler 2000,55); Tanzania's 1979 
intervention in Uganda that removed the Idi Amin from power (Wheeler 2000,111); 
France's 1979 intervention in the Central Africa Republican that engineered a bloodless 
coup against the Emperor Bokassa (ICISS 2001b, 63); the creation by the U. S., the U. K., 
and France safe havens and no fly zones in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds in 199 1; the 
Australian-led 1999 intervention to protect the East Timorese from the Indonesian army 
after the Timorese had voted for independence; the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 
2000 to prevent the UN mission (UNAMSIL) from collapse; and the Australian-led 2003 
intervention in the Solomon Islands to prevent the failing state from becoming a failed 
state (McDougall 2004,214). 153 
Overall, then, the number of successful interventions by states are greater than the 
number of unsuccessful interventions. States and coalitions of the willing have quite a 
good track record of effectiveness. Can we expect this trend to continue? Much depends 
on which particular state intervenes. In particular, many mid- and large-sized Western, 
liberal democratic states have the required military and non-military resources, and are 
therefore likely to be effective. But this effectiveness is likely to be limited: a number of 
153, niS, however, was arguably more of a peacekeeping mission than humanitarian intervention because of 
the lack of a strong military involvement. 
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these states would face a high level of local resistance. For instance, Archibugi (2005, 
224) argues that, after the war on Iraq, the U. S. does not have credibility in the eyes of 
the world to carry out humanitarian intervention. Where it does intervene, it is likely to 
face extreme local opposition (which can harm the chances of a successful outcome) and 
lack local external representativeness. 154 Similarly, ex-colonial masters intervening in 
155 their former colonies may also be highly unpopular amongst the local inhabitants. 
Conversely, non-western states, which might face less resistance, are limited to 
intervention in nearby or neighbouring states at best, given their lack of resources. This 
need not be a drawback, though. As Walzer (2002a, 2) argues, the most successful 
interventions in the past 30 years have been acts of war by neighbouring states. 
But nearly all states are highly selective interveners, choosing to stand by on 
many occasions. When they do intervene, self-interested motivations often play a large 
role in their decision. As with NATO, this does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy 
of a state's humanitarian intervention. What it does mean, however, is that, on many 
occasions, no state is willing to undertake humanitarian intervention. So, again, we have 
to look for the next best option. 
3. The United Nations 
The third best option is the intervener commonly believed to possess the legal authority 
to intervene: the United Nations. The discussion that follows will consider intervention 
154 We should not read too much into this though since the Iraq effect may be only temporary. 
There may also be similar problems for a NATO force, if it comprises these nationalities. 
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by the UN itself, rather than UN-authorised humanitarian intervention. The latter option - 
UN Security Council-authorised intervention - encompasses a number of possible 
interveners, including NATO, states (or coalitions of the willing), and regional 
organisations. To provide a more detailed analysis, I consider these options one by one. 
As argued in Chapter 3, UN Security Council authorisation is mildly desirable, but is not 
morally significant and therefore does not alter the general conclusion about each 
intervener's legitimacy. 
When the UN has intervened itself, the results have been mixed at best. The 
following three interventions, for example, all had questionable effectiveness. First, in 
Bosnia as many as 230,000 people died during the UNPROFOR mission (ICISS 2001b, 
94). Second, the UN mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR, was unable to prevent the genocide 
of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and was even downgraded in the middle of the killing. 
Third, the 1999 UN intervention in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, was unable to stop the 
atrocities committed by the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) and was at the point of 
collapse until the British intervention (ICISS 2001b, 109). 
The lack of success of these missions is due largely to the way in which UN 
operations are undertaken. Rather than having a standing army of its own, readily 
available for quick deployment, the UN has to rely on ad hoc contributions of troops from 
member states. Since member states have been increasingly reluctant to connnit their 
soldiers, UN missions often do not have enough troops to fulfil their mandates (Conetta 
and Knight 1995, xiii). An example is the recent UN operation in Liberia, which, for a 
long time, had real difficulties in getting up to its full strength of 15,000 troops. Western 
states, in particular, have shown a reluctance to contribute troops, which is unfortunate 
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since their troops tend to be the best trained and to have the most equipment. 
Furthermore, the system of ad hoc troop deployment is laborious. First, it often 
takes some time for states to decide whether they will volunteer troops. If they do decide 
to commit troops, deployment can be painfully slow. For instance, after NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, it took the UN "over a year to deploy an adequate number of 
civilian police (CIVPOL), which led to the absence of police in regions and was a key 
contribution to the initial failure to establish the rule of law" (13hatia 2003,79). In 
addition to delays in deployment, it can also take the UN Security Council much time to 
authorise a UN intervention in the first place. 
When the troops do actually arrive, they frequently lack the necessary equipment. 
They also tend to lack standardised equipment and many have inadequate training 
(Kinloch-Pichat 2004,176). Hence, according to Carl Conetta and Charles Knight: "The 
UN peace operations system is today like a volunteer fire department in which all the 
firefighting assets are privately owned, and no assurance exists that volunteers will 
deploy to fires on time or with all of their necessary equipment in tow" (1995,6). In the 
field, there is frequently a lack of clear lines of command and control, so that it is not 
clear whose orders troops should be following, the orders of the UN commander or the 
orders of their national commander. Troops also have trouble integrating with other 
troops; the multinational make-up of the force means that troops speak different 
languages and have different cultures (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,176-177). 
In addition to these problems of ineffectiveness, Stephen Kinloch-Pichat (2004, 
178) argues that a lack of discipline, amoral personal behaviour, and the corruption of the 
contingents participating in UN missions have been recurrent themes in UN 
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interventions. The involvement of UN troops in child prostitution in DR Congo illustrates 
this point. The difficulty of legally sanctioning those involved in violations of human 
rights exacerbates these problems (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,186). Hence, UN troops do not 
always show adequate fidelity to the principles ofjus in bello. 
There are also doubts over the UN's internal representativeness. The problem is 
that insufficient weight is given to the opinions of those countries that contribute most 
towards UN interventions on where and how their resources should be used; these 
decisions are left instead to the UN Security Council (Keohane 2003,1137). This 
undermines the UN's internal representativeness because it goes against the claim of the 
Resources Argument, discussed in the previous chapter, which holds that those states that 
contribute more should have a greater say. 
All that said, the UN seems to have learned from some of its past mistakes. It is 
now more willing to give its troops a stronger mandate, so that they have the necessary 
rules of engagement for success. Peter Langille (2000b, 6) points to the reorganisation of 
the Department of Peacekeeping, which he suggests is symptomatic of a number of 
heartening changes within the UN Secretariat over the past few years. Other 
improvements include the strengthening of the UN Stand-By Arrangements System 
(UNSAS), under which member states make conditional commitments of troops and 
resources to UN missions, and, as part of this scheme, the creation of the Stand-By High 
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which provides the UN with some rapid reaction 
capability. 1 56 
Moreover, even in the three operations discussed above, which are often presented 
1561 consider these arrangements further in the next chapter. 
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as examples of the UN's ineffectiveness, UN intervention was partially effective and 
clearly better than no intervention at all. First, in Bosnia, the UN intervention provided 
humanitarian aid to 4.3 million victims and frustrated the war aims of Bosnian Serbs and 
Milosevic government for a greater Serbia (Gizeles and Kosek 2005,370; ICISS 2001b, 
94). Second, in Rwanda, Rom6o Dallaire was widely credited for protecting a number of 
civilians, who would have been slaughtered if it were not for his leadership. Third, the 
UN mission in Sierra Leone, even though it needed support from the British, has since 
largely stabilised the country and has helped to establish a war crimes tribunal. 
Overall, then, the UN does have a significant resources gap because of its reliance 
on ad hoc troops and this gap undermines its effectiveness. However, while the UN is not 
the most effective agent, even its interventions commonly regarded ýs ineffective have 
achieved some measure of success. And, given its recent improvements, we can probably 
expect humanitarian intervention by the UN to have some success in the future, although 
it would probably not be as effective as NATO or state intervention. 
Ultimately, whether the UN intervenes depends on the UN Security Council. The 
permanent five Council members can block humanitarian intervention whenever they 
choose. When this happens, and when NATO and states choose not to act, who should 
then intervene? 
4. Regional and sub-regional organisations 
The next best option is for a regional or a sub-regional organisation to undertake 
humanitarian intervention. In general, intervention by regional organisations has had 
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mixed results (Emmers 2004,134; Smith 2003). Regional organisations' ineffectiveness 
stems from their lack of resources. The majority of regional organisations do not possess 
the infrastructure, expertise, mandate, and money to tackle effectively a humanitarian 
crisis (Diehl 2005,2). Of course, as with state intervention, much depends on which 
particular regional or sub-regional organisation intervenes. 
The EU is by far the most capable regional organisation and is the only regional 
organisation able to intervene beyond its borders. Furthermore, the Helsinki Headline 
Goal, adopted in 1999, requires the EU to develop a 60,000-strong military force, to be 
deployable within sixty days and sustainable for at least one year in the field (Terriff 
2004b, 152). If put in place, this would certainly give the EU a large capacity to 
undertake humanitarian intervention. 157 However, this force has not yet been established. 
The EU seems instead to have scaled back these proposals to a less ambitious 
'battlegroups' concept. Their plan is to establish 13 battlegroups, each consisting of 1,500 
soldiers (plus support), rapidly deployable and sustainable in the field for up to 120 days. 
At the moment, then, despite having some capability, the EU lacks the ability to 
undertake a large-scale humanitarian intervention. The EU's operation in Macedonia was 
successful, but this operation was much more like peacekeeping than humanitarian 
intervention. More recently, in 2003 the EU intervened in Bunia (in DR Congo) in 
response to growing international concern, but deployed its force (Operation Artemis) 
only for a short space of time. 
Article 4 (h) of the Charter of the African Union allows for the AU to intervene in 
grave circumstances (war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity) in countries 
157 See Olsen (2002) and Rasmussen (2002) for further analysis of the EU's plans for a rapid reaction force. 
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that have signed up to the treaty (Gueli 2004,136). 1 58 There are also proposals for an 
African Standby Force, in the control of the AU', to be in place by 2010. But, although a 
great improvement on its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU 
suffers from massive shortfalls in funding and equipment. The AU has intervened in 
Burundi, but this was a traditional peacekeeping mission and it did not even attempt to 
protect civilians from abuse (Nowrojee 2004,4). Its mission in Darfur is closer to 
humanitarian intervention and has had a degree of success in halting genocide in the areas 
in which it has a presence. Yet the troops are too few in number to cover the whole region 
and have therefore been unable to make a significant difference. 
ECOWAS is perhaps the most notable sub-regional organisation for humanitarian 
intervention, but it too has questionable effectiveness. Although its intervention in Liberia 
in 1990 (ECOMOG) successfully pushed back the rebel advances and restored law and 
order in Monrovia, it became more like a party in the conflict and was unable to establish 
authority in the interior (ICISS 2001b). In addition, its peacekeepers committed abuses 
against a number of civilians and suspected rebels and provided anus support to factions 
opposed to Charles Taylor, thereby aiding the proliferation of rebel groups (Nowrojee 
2004,5). 159 Similarly, its 1997 intervention in Sierra Leone was able to restore the ousted 
president, but rebels remained in control in rural areas and continued to brutalise the 
civilian population and, in 1999, overran Freetown, murdering thousands before 
ECOMOG could regain control (ICISS 2001b, 107). ECOWAS has also intervened in the 
158See the next chapter for further discussion. 
"9ECOWAS redeployed in Liberia in 2003 after the country had descended into civil war again in 2000; its 
intervention calmed the situation in the capital and paved the way for the deployment of 15,000 UN troops, 
although it was not able to subdue the violence elsewhere (Nowroj ee 2004,6). 
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Ivory Coast, but its efforts stalled and it has had insufficient resources and ultimately 
necessitated French intervention (Nowrojee 2004,7). Thus, although ECOWAS has been 
willing to undertake a long-term engagement in the country concerned, which makes it 
possible to achieve long-term success (de Waal 2000,117-118), like the AU, and as the 
recent action in Ivory Coast has demonstrated, it ultimately lacks the funding and 
resources to intervene successfully. 
Other regional organisations have more limited capacity still. Some even have the 
principle of non-intervention enshrined in their constitutions. A good example is the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which explicitly rejects the notion of 
intervention to protect people against large-scale abuses of human rights and lacks the 
provision even for peacekeeping (Emmers 2004,145). 160 
At the moment, therefore, regional organisations have limited legitimacy. Most do 
not have the ability to undertake effectively a major peacekeeping or enforcement 
operation (DUPI 1999,38). This harms the prospective effectiveness, and ultimately the 
legitimacy, of any future intervention by a regional organisation. Nonetheless, regional 
and sub-regional organisations are often more willing to intervene, given their 
geographical proximity to the humanitarian crisis, which means that they have a stake in 
local stability. If they had the resources to undertake effective humanitarian intervention, 
they might be willing to intervene more frequently than other agents. Hence, "regional 
organisations are useful for what they can become, not what they are" (The Stanley 
16'Although the idea of an ASEAN peacekeeping force has been proposed by Indonesia, the Thai and 
Singaporean foreign ministers rejected the idea, the latter arguing that "we think that ASEAN is not really a 
security organization or defence organization" (Washington Post 2004,1). 
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Foundation 2004,3). 
5. Other options? 
There are essentially two non-state based options for intervention. The first is the use of 
mercenaries or private military companies (PMCs). This option should be taken 
seriously; as Weiss (2001,43) asserts, we should avoid knee-jerk rejections of private 
armies. Indeed, the possibility of using PMCs for humanitarian intervention has been 
increasingly debated recently. 161 Clients include the U. S., the U. K., and other states, 
NGOs, and even the UN, who has employed the services of PMCs, notably in Kinshasa 
in 1997 and in Somalia, where clansmen were hired as guards (Brayton 2002,321). They 
have also been heavily employed by the U. S. recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are 
essentially three roles a private company can play in peacekeeping or humanitarian 
intervention: training services, logistics and technical support, and actual fighting. I will 
concentrate on the last of these. 
Some PMCs are likely to have a degree of short-term effectiveness when engaged 
in actual fighting. For instance, in 1995, after the RUF had slaughtered, raped, and 
maimed thousands, the government of Sierra Leone employed Executive Outcomes, a 
South African PMC. Executive Outcomes successfully lifted the siege of Freetown and 
16 'The option of completely banding over peacekeeping to PMCs was debated in the higher echelons of the 
U. S. and the UN (see Singer 2003b). For further discussion of issues surrounding the use of PMCs for 
humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, see Chapter 8 and also Brayton (2002), Bures (2005), Lily 
(2000), and, particularly, Singer (2003a; 2003b). 
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destroyed the RUF's headquarters (ICISS 2001b, 105). The short-term effectiveness of 
PMCs in such operations comes from their ability to recruit some of the most capable 
troops, to scour markets for the best equipment, and to take quick and decisive actions 
(Singer 2003a, 4). As P. W. Singer asserts, these companies can "do peacekeeping faster, 
better, and cheaper" (2003a, 4). 
But the use of privatised forces for humanitarian intervention raises serious 
questions. 1 62 First, such companies fail to tackle the causes of the crisis, offering only 
short-term solutions (Singer 2003a, 7). 163 Second, and most importantly, these companies 
have extremely questionable credentials when it comes to jus in bello. In Sierra Leone, 
the government terminated the contract with Executive Outcomes after the company was 
subject to allegations of human rights abuses (ICISS 2001b, 105). In Bosnia, a U. S. -based 
company was implicated in a sex-slave scandal, but none of its employees were ever 
prosecuted, and the company later fired the whistle-blowers (Bures 2005,541-542). What 
is more, Singer argues that "many former members of the most notorious and ruthless 
units of the Soviet and apartheid regimes have found employment in the industry. These 
individuals acted without concern for human rights in the past and certainly could do so 
agaiW' (2003a, 6). These problems are exacerbated by the fact that PMCs operate outside 
the effective jurisdiction of international law. The only real form of accountability to 
which they are subject is market accountability, but even market constraints are imperfect 
and offer little incentive for PMCs to conform to principles of jus in bello, or even to 
162 This is particularly the case for forcible operafions. For other, non-forcible operations, such as training 
services and logistics and technical support, the use of PMCs might not be quite so problematic. 
"'Walzer (2004b, 1) makes a similar criticism. 
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their contracts (Singer 2003a, 4). 
The other non-state alternative is NGO intervention. Many NGOs are able to 
increase the well-being of those in the target state, partly because they are committed, 
have clear strategies, and are often perceived as legitimate by those receiving the aid and 
sometimes by the elites controlling access. However, they do not always deliver aid to 
those who need it and sometimes suffer from a lack of coordination. For instance, in the 
Great Lakes (Burundi, Uganda and the DR Congo), "[m]any, if not most, food security 
interventions failed to address the needs of people affected by crises" (Levine and 
Chastre 2004,21). There are also doubts over whether they fuel humanitarian crises 
(Weiss 2003). Moreover, the sorts of intervention that they can undertake are limited. 
Given their lack of military capability, it is questionable whether they can actually 
undertake 'humanitarian intervention' by themselves, as defined in Chapter 2. 
Ill. THE GENERAL PICTURE 
Overall, then, no current agent of humanitarian intervention is fully legitimate according 
to the conception of legitimacy outlined in this thesis. Nevertheless, a number of agents 
of intervention - NATO, certain states, the UN, and certain regional organisations - 
would probably possess an adequate amount of legitimacy. This is largely because their 
intervention would be better than no intervention whatsoever; they are likely to be, at 
least partially, locally externally effective. Of these agents, NATO would be most 
desirable because it would probably be the most effective. 
We cannot be satisfied with this situation. The problem is twofold. First, as the 
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preceding analysis demonstrates, no existing intervener is fully legitimate. This means 
that, when humanitarian intervention does occur, it will probably have some significant 
flaws. In particular, the intervener is likely to have at least one of the following failings: 
(1) it will lack internal effectiveness and so cause significant harm to its own citizens; (2) 
it will lack global external effectiveness and so cause significant harm to the international 
community; (3) it will lack local external effectiveness and therefore fail to tackle the 
humanitarian crisis effectively; (4) it will show inadequate fidelity to the principles of 
intemaljus in bello; (5) it will show inadequate fidelity to the principles of extemaIjus in 
bello; (6) it will lack internal representativeness and consequently fail to represent 
properly the opinions of those providing the resources needed to undertake the 
intervention; and (7) it will lack internal representativeness and therefore fail to take into 
account properly the opinions of those suffering the humanitarian crisis. 
Second, there are too many occasions when humanitarian intervention should be 
undertaken, but is not. Too often NATO and capable states fail to act, and Security 
Council authorisation for UN operations is too often stymied. The result is that many 
mass violations of human rights continue unabated. Thus, as Michael Hirsh (2000,4-5) 
concludes, if we stick to the present system, intervention is doomed to remain amateurish, 
late, and woefully under-resourced. 
The inadequacies of the current situation have been highlighted by the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, where there is only a very limited AU presence. The AU 
force has struggled for enough money to keep running, with its troops going unpaid for 
months at a time, and it is perpetually running short of basic supplies, such as fuel and 
food (Polgreen 2006,14). In the few places where it is deployed, it has had some success. 
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But in the vast swathes of Darfur where there is no AU presence, thejanjaweed (with the 
support of the Sudanese government) continue to terrorise and to murder the local 
population. The Security Council has passed a number of resolutions on the crisis, but 
these have been watered down at the insistence of the Chinese, who have significant oil 
interests in Sudan (Farer 2005a, 246). Although the Council did agree in principle to send 
a UN peacekeeping force, this was rejected by the Sudanese government. There has been 
little appetite to impose a force on Sudan, even though a number of states have 
condemned the mass killing and some of the most capable states (such as the U. S. ) have 
described it as 'genocide', which, under the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, makes them legally obliged to intervene. 164 
This is only ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, when the intemational 
community said "never again"(Langille 2004). These problems are not limited to Darfur. 
For instance, since 1997,3.8 million people have been killed and 2.3 million people 
displaced in the DR Congo (Annan 2005,49). Hence, as Langille (2004,2) observes, "the 
6never again' promise now echoes back as 'again' and 'again'. " 
164 Article I of this Convention states: "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed 
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to 
punish. " 
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From the discussion in the previous chapter, it is clear that we need to improve the 
mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention so that we can legitimately tackle 
egregious violations of human rights on a much more frequent basis. In short, we need to 
make sure that 'never again' means exactly that (Langille 2004,3). In the words of David 
Gompert (2006), former president of RAND Europe and Special Assistant to George 
Bush Snr., we need to develop the 'capability to protect'. This is necessary if we are to 
discharge effectively the responsibility to protect. But what can we do to ensure this? 
Using the conception of legitimacy outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter 
considers proposals for reform. 
I evaluate four sets of proposals: (I) the codification of criteria for humanitarian 
intervention in international law; (11) the increased use and regulation of private military 
companies; (III) the extension of UN standby arrangements; and (IV) the creation of a 
cosmopolitan UN force. Although most of these proposals would have some merit if put 
in place, none would completely tackle the difficulties we currently face. I therefore 
present two suggestions for reform of my own. The first is a more long-term aim: (V) the 
creation of a large-sized cosmopolitan UN force under the control of cosmopolitan 
democratic institutions. Such an intervener would be fully legitimate according to the 
complete conception of legitimacy I have outlined. The second is a more short-term goal: 
(VI) the improvement of the capacity of regional organisations to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. Although this second option might not lead to fully legitimate intervention, 
it would, firstly, ensure a greater degree of legitimacy than interveners have at the 
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moment (primarily because of its increased expected effectiveness), and secondly, enable 
humanitarian intervention to be undertaken on a more frequent basis. 
1. REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As I argued in Chapter 3, there is a gap between international law and legitimacy for 
humanitarian intervention: an intervener that is legal - one that has UN Security Council 
authorisation - is not necessarily legitimate. One option to improve the legitimacy and 
frequency of humanitarian intervention is to reform the international law on humanitarian 
intervention, so that lex lata bears more relation to le-xferenda, thereby narrowing the gap 
between legal and legitimate interveners. 
Most of the proposals for reform of international law suggest doing this by 
codifying certain criteria for humanitarian intervention in international law. These criteria 
usually constitute some form of the traditional Just War principles ofjus ad bellum (i. e. 
just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, last resort, proportionality, formal 
declaration of war, and reasonable prospects of success). But, for our purposes, the 
criteria to be codified in international law would be the same as the factors of legitimacy 
outlined in the previous chapters: internal representativeness, local external 
representativeness, fidelity to the principles of internal and external jus in bello, local 
external effectiveness, global external effectiveness, and internal effectiveness. In order 
to ensure that such a law would apply only to interveners that are engaged in 
humanitarian intervention, it would also be necessary to include the defining qualities 
(outlined in Chapter 2) that are implicit in the meaning of humanitarian intervention: an 
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intervener needs (i) to be engaged in military and forcible action; (ii) to be responding to 
a situation where there is impending or ongoing grievous suffering or loss of life; (iii) to 
be an external agent; and (iv) to have a humanitarian intention, that is, a predominant 
purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the ongoing or impending grievous suffering 
or loss of life. 
These criteria can be codified in international law in three ways. 
165 The first 
strategy is to change international law so that the interveners that are already legal 
according to the current international law - those that have UN Security Council 
autborisation - have to meet these criteria as well. If an intervener were not to meet one 
of these criteria, or if it were not to receive UN Security Council authorisation, then its 
intervention would be illegal. Given that this proposal adds extra legal restrictions to the 
status quo, I shall call this the 'Restrictive Approach'. 166 The second approach is to create 
a new legal right of humanitarian intervention which permits certain agents (such as 
states and regional organisations) to intervene legally without Security Council 
authorisation as long as they meet these criteria. This is the 'Additional Right Approach', 
for it supplements the current international law with an additional legal provision on 
humanitarian intervention. Interveners authorised by the UN Security Council would still 
be legal and would not need to meet these criteria. The third approach is both to create a 
165 The ensuing discussion builds upon categories detailed by the Danish Institute of International Affairs 
(DUPI) (1999) and Stromseth (2003). 
166 Archibugi (2005,224) endorses this position. Similarly, the British and Dutch governments have recently 
attempted to formalise criteria to govern the circumstances in which the Security Council should be 
prepared to authorise intervention (Blair 1999; Advisory Council on International Affairs and Advisory 
Committee on Issues of Public International Law 2000). 
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new legal right of humanitarian intervention and to reform current international law, so 
that all legal interveners, including those that receive the UN Security Council's 
authorisation, meet these criteria. This is the 'Comprehensive Right Approach'. Unlike 
the second approach in which Security Council-authorised interventions need to meet 
only the requirements of current international law, on this approach the Security Council- 
authorised interventions must also conform to the criteria. 
All three approaches aim to improve the legitimacy of interveners. The Restrictive 
Approach would increase the legitimacy of interveners authorised by the UN Security 
Council, but would do little to alter the legitimacy of unauthorised interveners. By 
contrast, the Additional Right Approach would improve the legitimacy of unauthorised 
interveners, but would do little to alter the legitimacy of interveners authorised by the UN 
Security Council. The third approach, the Comprehensive Right Approach, would 
improve the legitimacy of both interveners authorised by the Security Council and 
unauthorised interveners. For this reason, this would seem to be, on the face of it, the best 
approach. 
Objections 
There are various objections to reforming international law in each of these three ways. 
The first set of objections claim that a legal right of humanitarian intervention would 
allow for too niuch intervention. These objections apply to the Additional Right 
Approach and the Comprehensive Right Approach since they envisage a new legal right 
to intervene for unauthorised interveners. (The Restrictive Approach, by contrast, does 
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not propose a new legal right to intervene, but a modification of the current legal 
provisions on humanitarian intervention. ) Some of these objections are similar to those 
encountered in Chapter 3 and so do not need to be considered in detail. 
Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley argue that a legal right to undertake 
humanitarian intervention would be "an unlimited fiat for larger states to oppress their 
smaller neighbors" (1973,304). To be sure, the concern is not that such a legal right 
would lead to more cases of humanitarian intervention (as defined in Chapter 2). Rather, 
it is that, if such a rule existed, states would have more opportunity to undertake abusive 
(i. e. non-humanitarian) intervention. They would cite humanitarian justifications to 
justify abusive, imperialistic wars. Franck and Rodley (1973,284) give the example of 
Hitler's letter to Chamberlain in 1938, which claimed justification for the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia because of that country's poor treatment of ethnic Germans. 
However, it is questionable whether a new legal right of humanitarian 
intervention would provide many additional opportunities for states to undertake abusive 
interventions (Farer 2003,79). Against this largely Realist argument, codification of 
criteria for humanitarian intervention in international law would restrict the opportunity 
of abuse. Generally, Franck and Rodley's objection underestimates the constraining 
power of interriational law and international norms. A large number of states would 
probably behave as if they were constrained by these criteria. Furthermore, even if a few 
states attempted to present a mendacious humanitarian justification for an abusive war, it 
would be difficult for them to maintain, with any plausibility, to their domestic publics 
and to the international community that they meet these criteria. Such states would have 
to claim and to appear to meet all these criteria. This would be quite demanding. It would 
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not be enough that they simply claim and appear to be acting with a humanitarian 
intention (which would be all that is required if one were to create instead a new legal 
right to undertake unauthorised humanitarian intervention without codifying the 
accompanying normative criteria). As Jarat Chopra and Thomas Weiss assert, a "high 
degree of proof could be demanded from states claiming this right of intervention" (1992, 
3). 
It might be argued that a few states would disregard the opinions of their domestic 
publics and the international community, and undertake abusive intervention anyway. But 
for these states, establishing a new legal right of humanitarian intervention would not 
provide many additional opportunities to undertake abusive intervention. States that are 
determined to undertake abusive wars, regardless of the plausibility of justification, 
would be able to invoke self-defence as the justification for their force. As ICISS 
suggests, the argument that "the promotion of an international regime of humanitarian 
intervention would give interveners a legal pretext ignores one fact. Strong states which 
are - for reasons good or bad - determined to intervene in a weak state have no shortage 
of legal rationalizations for their actions" (2001b, 67). 
A more plausible objection to codifying criteria for humanitarian intervention in 
international law is that it would not tackle one of the main problems that the current 
international system faces: the lack of willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention. 
As Chesterman argues, "the problem is not the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention 
but the overwhelming prevalence of inhumanitarian noninterventiolf, (2003,54). 1 67 
Refomýiing the legal architecture of humanitarian intervention is unlikely to mean that 
167 Pogge (2006), Weiss (2005a, 235), and Wbeeler (2005,24 1) make similar points. 
260 
Chapter 8: Reform 
states would be more willing to undertake humanitarian intervention. Hence, Brown 
argues, "setting up a system of rules designed to prevent them [states] from acting seems 
a somewhat pointless activity. Instead, we ought to be thinking of ways of encouraging 
states to intervene more often" (2005,227). 
Although strictly correct, this objection misses the point of the codification of 
criteria for humanitarian intervention in international law. It should not be seen as an 
attempt to tackle the problem of reluctance to undertake humanitarian intervention. 
Instead, its aim is to tackle the other problem that besets current humanitarian 
intervention: the lack of legitimacy of those that undertake it. By insisting that interveners 
meet certain normative criteria, an intervener would (we can presume for now) be 
legitimate if its intervention were legal. The objection claims that reforming international 
law in this way would lead to better humanitarian intervention, when what is really 
needed are more cases of humanitarian intervention. In fact, both are needed: more and 
better humanitarian intervention. Codification of criteria for humanitarian intervention in 
international law could help to achieve the latter. 
That said, there is a risk that establishing criteria for humanitarian intervention in 
international law could lead to too little humanitarian intervention. Certain states may use 
the excuse of not meeting the criteria to avoid fulfilling their moral obligation to 
undertake humanitarian intervention (ICISS 2001b, 172). Further, an agent might claim 
that its intervention would not meet these criteria when in fact it would. 
The Restrictive Approach could certainly be criticised for leading to too little 
humanitarian intervention since, by limiting occasions on which the UN Security Council 
could legally authorise humanitarian intervention, it would decrease opportunities for 
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legal humanitarian intervention. The General Right Approach may also be subject to this 
criticism since it too would restrict the ability of the UN Security Council to authorise 
humanitarian intervention. But, for the Additional Right Approach, and perhaps for the 
General Right Approach, this objection might be too harsh. At the moment, states can use 
the excuse of illegality for not undertaking humanitarian intervention. They can hide 
behind the fact that they require UN Security Council authorisation for their intervention 
to be legal, and never seek that authorisation. Legal criteria that allow states and regional 
organisations to intervene, without UN Security Council authorisation, would remove the 
ability of states to use the UN Security Council as an excuse for their inaction. 
At this point, the following question might be asked: why is it problematic if the 
Restrictive Approach and the General Right Approach restrict humanitarian interveners 
that do not meet the relevant criteria? Surely, if an intervener does not satisfy these 
criteria, it would be illegitimate. But this line of reasoning is mistaken. In fact, it leads us 
to a significant problem with the codifying legal criteria for humanitarian interveners in 
international law: it requires a categorical approach to legitimacy. 
On the categorical approach, an intervener that does not meet even one factor 
would be illegal. To be legal, an intervener needs to possess all of the relevant qualities. 
But on the conception of legitimacy I outlined in the previous chapter (and in Chapter 2), 
which adopts a scalar approach to legitimacy, an intervener can be legitimate even though 
it lacks one of these qualities (depending on the other factors, the circumstances, and so 
long as it is effective). So, there is a problem with creating a new international law using 
strict criteria: it would still leave a gap between legal and legitimate interveners. Some 
legitimate interveners would be legal, but other legitimate interveners would be illegal. 
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For instance, State A might intervene effectively to stop genocide in State B, use 
humanitarian means, and be careful to conduct intervention in the manner desired by 
those suffering the humanitarian crisis, but lack internal representativeness. In that case, 
although State A would be legitimate overall, it would be illegal because it lacked 
internal representativeness. What is more, if all potential agents were to obey this 
reformed international law, a number of legitimate, but illegal, interveners would not 
intervene. This could lead to further instances of non-intervention. 168 
A further problem with codifying criteria for humanitarian intervention in 
international law is that achieving the necessary agreement among states for the 
amendment of existing treaties (such as the UN Charter) or the creation of a new treaty 
would be extremely difficult. For instance, to amend the UN Charter, there needs to be 
two-thirds majority support in the General Assembly and unanimous support among the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, both of which are unlikely to be 
achieved (Buchanan 2003,138; Stromseth 2003,259; Wheeler 2005,237). The other 
potential way of reforming international law - by the gradual evolution of customary 
international law - is notoriously unpredictable and would be unlikely to deliver these 
particular criteria. Sirnilarly, even if it were possible to achieve agreement on a new, 
treaty-based international law permitting humanitarian intervention when certain criteria 
1681t might be argued that if humanitarian intervention were more clearly outlined in international law, 
dictators would be less willing to violate their citizens' rights, so there would be less need for humanitarian 
intervention. See Caney (2005,256). Yet there is already provision for humanitarian intervention in current 
international law (i. e., when it is authorised by the Security Council). The deterrent effect that would be 
gained by allowing other interveners to intervene if they met certain criteria would probably add little to the 
deterrent effect of current international law. 
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are met, it is unlikely that states would agree to the criteria outlined above. A different list 
of criteria would further increase the discrepancy between legal and legitimate 
interveners. A different list of criteria may also be far more restrictive, including morally 
dubious clauses such as last resort, which would further decrease the number of 
humanitarian interventions. 169 As Stromseth asserts: "At worst, a document severely 
restrictive of any future humanitarian interventions will emerge" (2003,260). 
One solution would be to reject the categorical, criteria-based approach to reform 
of international law and to adopt a scalar approach instead. Interveners would be legal 
even though they failed to meet certain criteria. To be specific, they would be required to 
meet five criteria, the first four of which are necessary for their intervention to be 
humanitarian. The only necessary condition affecting an intervener's legitimacy would be 
that it is effective. The other factors affecting the legitimacy of humanitarian interveners 
would not be legal criteria; there would be no legal requirements for an intervener to be 
internally representative, locally externally representative, have fidelity to the principles 
of intemaljus in bello, or have fidelity to the principles of extemaljus in bello. 
This scalar approach is not without its difficulties, however. The danger is that 
there could still be a significant gap between legal and legitimate interveners. This gap, 
however, would be the inverse of the gap discussed before. All legitimate interveners 
would be legal, but so too would some illegitimate interveners. For instance, State A 
might be expected to make a small improvement in State B, but be internally and 
externally unrepresentative, use child soldiers to intervene, and cause a number of 
16917or criticisms of the last resort criterion of Just War Theory, see Caney (2005,249) and Walzer (2002a, 
4). 
264 
Chapter 8: Refonn 
civilian casualties. Although its intervention would be illegitimate, it would still be legal. 
We therefore face a dilemma: a criteria-based approach to codifying factors in 
international law may be too restrictive, but a scalar-based approach may be too 
permissive. This dilemma cannot be easily overcome. Perhaps the most desirable solution 
would be to adopt a criteria-based approach, but to admit that on certain occasions there 
may be mitigating circumstances that permit the overriding of a particular criterion. This 
solution gains in persuasiveness if we use the Additional Right Approach, which is the 
least restrictive of the three. Overall, then, if we use the Additional Right Approach in 
this way, the creation of a new legal right to undertake humanitarian intervention would 
be desirable. It would certainly be an improvement on the current situation, which is 
much more restrictive, given that only interveners authorised by the UN Security Council 
can intervene legally. 
But perhaps a more desirable, long-term aim would be to insist not only that there 
is a legal right to undertake intervention when certain criteria are met, but also that there 
is a legal duty to do so. (I shall leave open for now the question of on whom in particular 
this duty should fall. ) Having a legal duty to intervene would also help to tackle the 
problem of the lack of willingness to undertake intervention. All agents that can intervene 
legitimately would be not only morally, but also legally, compelled to do so when no one 
else acted. 
In reality, establishing a legal duty - or even a legal right - to undertake 
humanitarian intervention is unlikely in the near future. As already discussed, it is not 
foreseeable (in the short-term at least) that states would agree on this particular set of 
criteria. Nonetheless, we need not abandon legal reform. The law on humanitarian 
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intervention can be reformed in another way that does not involve the adoption of criteria. 
That is, we can reform regional organisations' legal structures so that they can legally 
undertake humanitarian intervention within their own regions. This reform would create 
an additional legal basis for humanitarian intervention (in the fon-n of a treaty) which 
would supplement the UN Charter's provisions on the legality of humanitarian 
intervention. ' 70 The model here could perhaps be the AU's constitution, which, recall, 
allows the AU to intervene in grave circumstances in countries that have signed up to the 
treaty (Gueli 2004,136). 171 Such reform does not require a criteria-based approach and is 
therefore not so restrictive. A regional organisation could intervene when it deems that its 
intervention would be legitimate. Consequently, this approach to reforming the 
international legal system places trust in regional organisations and the UN Security 
Council (since it would retain its ability to authorise humanitarian intervention). This 
'"Although technically the UN Charter takes precedence over other international treaties, such reform 
would not clearly be in contravention of the UN Charter. It is less clear, however, whether a regional 
organisation would be able to agree legally to undertake humanitarian intervention beyond its borders 
without having UN Security Council authorisation or the permission of the target state. This issue could 
arise for the European Union. 
"'There are some problems with the AU's arrangements for humanitarian intervention, however. First, as 
Bellamy (2006a) points out, it is not entirely clear how the AU would autborise intervention against a host 
state's consent. The AU Assembly must defer its responsibility to the AU's Peace and Security Council, but 
the Assembly meets only annually and requires a two-thirds majority which might be hard to achieve 
(Bellamy 2006a, 158). Second, it could lead to the UN Security Council deferring to the AU even though 
the AU lacks the capacity to act effectively (Bellamy 2006a, 159-160). Third, again as Bellamy (2006a, 
160) notes, it may lend credence to the notion that the Security Council ought to refrain from imposing its 
will on Africans, and thereby risk further increasing Western pretexts for standing by. 
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trust would be more justified if regional organisations and the UN Security Council were 
to adopt the reforms suggested in sections (V) and (VI). 
Yet legal solutions can be only ever part of the solution. Even if we could 
establish a legal duty to undertake legitimate humanitarian intervention, this duty would 
have little merit unless it were accompanied by the capacity to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. Reform of the legal architecture cannot be sufficient. This also applies to the 
reform of regional legal structures - we need to strengthen regional organisations' 
capabilities to intervene if the legal right or duty is to have moral significance. In short, 
legal solutions are not enough: we need practical and political ones. It is to these I now 
tum. 172 
172 Buchanan and Keohane (2004) have recently proposed the creation of a democratic coalition to authorise 
preventative war, including humanitarian intervention. This coalition would be based on agreement among 
its members, with its practice becoming part of customary international law (Buchanan and Keohane 2004, 
19). The coalition would be a second body to refer to if the Security Council opposes intervention. There 
are a number of problems with this proposal (in relation to humanitarian intervention), however. First, it 
would be likely that powerful non-democratic states, such as Russia and China, would vehemently oppose 
such a coalition. This is because it would, in effect, water down their veto - any proposed intervener that 
had its intervention blocked by a Russian or Chinese veto could still be legal if authorised by the coalition. 
Second, it is not clear what such a coalition would add to the status quo and, in particular, how it would 
better NATO or the EU undertaking or authorising intervention without UN Security Council approval, 
perhaps with the open support of other democratic states. Third, adding another level of bureaucratic 
decision-making is likely to lead to delays and innocent lives would be lost in the meantime. Last, and most 
serious, it does not tackle the problem of a lack of willingness to intervene. Creating such a coalition would 
do little to make actors keener to intervene to stop egregious violations of human rights. See Bellamy 
(2006b, 10) for further criticisms of this proposal. 
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II. REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 
One possible option for increasing capacity to undertake humanitarian intervention is to 
make use of private military companies (PMCs). (As in the previous chapter, my concern 
here is with PMCs undertaking actual fighting, rather than with their providing training, 
or logistics, or technical support. ) In the previous chapter, I argued that PMCs are 
illegitimate. This is largely because of their lack of accountability, which means that they 
are likely to violate principles of jus in bello in the field. Would PMCs be legitimate 
interveners if they were subject to more and better regulation? 
There are a number of ways of regulating PMCs. For instance, we can place limits 
on who can employ PMCs, so that only the UN Security Council can legally authorise 
their use. This would mean that the wrong people (e. g. TNCs and corrupt governments) 
could not hire their services. We could also require PMCs to have a licence to operate, 
withdrawing the licence from companies who use methods that are morally objectionable. 
The most important reform would be to bring PMCs under international law. According 
to Singer, this would "require both the extension of the International Court of Justice to 
their activities and clear contract provisos that military fin-n personnel fall under the 
jurisdiction of international tribunals" (2003a, 9). 
These reforms could reduce the chances of PMCs violating the principles oQus in 
bello. However, it would not be easy to achieve such regulation. As Stephen Brayton 
(2002,321) asserts, states have shown little interest in internationally regulating PMCs, 
which often offer them a high degree of political convenience. Furthermore, if these 
268 
Chapter 8: Reform 
regulations were put into place, it might mean that many operations would become 
unprofitable. The extra resources necessary to comply with these regulations could mean 
that PMCs no longer wished to undertake humanitarian intervention. 
This leads us to a significant problem: PMCs intervene only when, and where, it 
is profitable. In the more difficult cases, these companies arc unlikely to operate. As 
Brayton asserts: "If companies accepted the constraints of impartiality, minimum force 
and achieving a ceasefire, as under UN mandate, for instance, their effectiveness and 
economic viability would decline" (2002,324). It is therefore doubtful whether they 
would provide a reliable solution to the problem of the general lack of willingness in the 
international community to undertake humanitarian intervention. Again as Brayton 
argues, "the reality of business is that private military companies can only take on low- 
cost and high-retum assignments" (2002,324-325). 
We can also question whether PMCs have the ability, let alone the desire, to 
undertake the more difficult operations that require a large-scale employment. According 
to Damian Lily: "It is doubtful whether there is a company that exists at the moment that 
could recruit and deploy the thousands of personnel needed to patrol entire conflict areas" 
(2000,59). 
Moreover, when PMCs do actually intervene, it is uncertain whether they are 
effective. This raises serious questions over their legitimacy - the main (perhaps only) 
reason for the legitimacy of PMCs is their supposed effectiveness. The problem (which I 
alluded to in the previous chapter) is that, although PMCs can have some short-term 
effectiveness, the sustained deployment necessary for lasting success is not profitable, 
and this means that PMCs are unlikely to be effective in the long-term. The sort of 
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operations necessary for a successful long-term resolution (and post-conflict 
reconstruction), which would restore torn. social fabrics and foster cooperation among 
local parties, are not profitable. These include the setting up of local infrastructure, the 
mediation between rival political groups, the supervision of elections, and the overseeing 
of demilitarisation (Singer 2003a, 7). As a result, the humanitarian crisis may well 
reignite quickly after the PMC has left. In Angola and Sierra Leone, for example, 
Executive Outcomes and Sandline International's involvement did not address the 
fundamental issues that prompted the conflict and, as a consequence, did not secure a 
final peace (Brayton 2002,322). Indeed, the use of private force is "likely to reinforce the 
idea that power belongs only to those with the ability to afford it" (Singer 2003a, 7). 
Thus, in the short-term, where violence is necessary to tackle violence, PMCs can be 
effective. However, in the long-term, when other, non-violent measures are required, they 
are unlikely to be effective. The regulations described above would do little to alter this 
situation. 
Furthermore, PMCs have an incentive not to be effective, especially in the long- 
term. Their fortune relies on continued business. If they are too successful, if they tackle 
effectively the humanitarian crisis straightaway, their services will no longer be required. 
As a result, PMCs have good reason to prolong insecurity, so that they continue to be 
employed (Bures 2005,542). This incentive to be ineffective may be somewhat counter- 
balanced by the need to have a good reputation to be employed again. However, a PMC 
may be able to prolong the conflict without it being obvious that it is doing so and 
consequently without harming its reputation (Bures 2005,540). 
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Overall, then, even if regulated, PMCs would struggle to be legitimate 
interveners. Even if the problems of accountability and fidelity to the principles ofjus in 
bello could be remedied - something that may not be easily achieved - the effectiveness 
of PMCs is doubtful. Hence, the privatisation of humanitarian interveners is not the 
solution to the problem of the lack of legitimate humanitarian interveners. 
111. ENHANCEMENT OF UN STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS 
The third potential reform to current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention 
is for the enhancement of UN standby arrangements. These arrangements take two forms. 
First, under the United Nations Stand-By Arrangements System (UNSAS), member states 
make conditional commitments of troops and resources (such as military formations, 
specialised personnel, and equipment) to the UN. The resources which member states 
commit are on standby in their home countries until they are needed. This system 
provides the UN with a detailed knowledge of the forces and other capabilities that states 
have available in a state of readiness. In addition, leading expert on UNSAS, Peter 
Langille (2000b, 7) observes, that the system also helps with planning, training, and 
preparation and provides the UN with a variety of potential options if certain member 
states choose not to participate in an operation. Furthermore, although these arrangements 
are conditional, it may be that those that have committed to providing resources will be 
more forthcoming than would have otherwise been the case. By March 2000,88 member 
states had signed up to UNSAS, which represents 147,500 personnel (Langille 2000a, 5). 
The second form of standby arrangement is the Stand-By High Readiness Brigade 
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for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). SHIRBRIG is a Danish-led initiative, 
formed in response to the calls for such a force in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Supplement to 
an Agenda for Peace. It is based on UNSAS, but goes further than this arrangement, 
particularly in the integration of troops. More specifically, SHIRBRIG comprises 16 
states that together provide a standby rapid reaction force of 4,000-5,000 troops. This 
force is deployable within 15 to 30 days for a maximum of six months, following which 
the mission is either terminated or replaced (SHIRBRIG 2003,1). Overall, SHIRBRIG 
offers the UN relatively prompt access to a pre-established, well-trained, cohesive, 
versatile force capable of a number of peacekeeping capabilities (Langille 2000a, 2). 
A potential solution to the current problems with the agents of humanitarian 
intervention - and specifically to the problems that the UN faces - is to extend both 
forms of standby arrangement. This would involve the continued development, 
expansion, and improvement of UNSAS and the creation of more rapid response units 
like SHIRBRIG. It would also involve the extension of the mandates of these standby 
arrangements to include Chapter VII peace enforcement operations such as humanitarian 
intervention (these arrangements are currently limited to Chapter VI operations). ' 73 Such 
developments would improve the capacity of the UN to undertake humanitarian 
intervention itself. An enhanced UNSAS would mean that the UN would have a wide 
knowledge of available troops, have improved planning of humanitarian operations, and 
173 Chapter VII authorisation gives the troops much stronger rules of engagement (in essence, powers of 
enforcement) and is usually a prerequisite for a UN operation (or a Security Council-authorised operation) 
to be regarded as humanitarian intervention rather than peacekeeping. There has already been some 
indication by the members of SHIRBRIG that they would be willing to undertake Chapter VII operations 
(SHIRBRIG 2003,1). 
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be able to deploy troops more quickly. The extension of this conditional agreement may 
also mean that member states would be more willing to commit troops and resources. 
Additional SHIRBRIGs would provide the UN with rapidly deployable units readily 
available to fulfil the mandates of the UN Security Council. 
Does standby mean standing by in the face of a humanitarian crisis? 
Little can be said against any moves to enhance these standby arrangements. They would 
clearly improve the UN's ability to undertake legitimate humanitarian intervention. But 
these proposals are limited: although an improvement, they fail to resolve some of the 
fundamental problems that are inherent in the system of voluntary, ad hoc contributions 
by member states to UN missions. 
Like the current UN arrangements, these standby arrangements would face a 
shortage in a number of areas, including headquarters, communications, and sea- and air- 
lift capacity (Langille 2000b, 8). Any operation by UNSAS (although perhaps not by 
SHIRBRIG) is also likely to face problems with the integration of troops (Langille 
2000b, 11). Problems with command and control, as well as logistical issues are likely to 
persist (Conetta and Knight 1995,10). Furthermore, the deployment of UNSAS and 
SHIRBRIG depends on Security Council approval, which may not be forthcoming, and 
even if forthcoming, can be time consuming, thereby reducing rapid reaction capability 
174 (which is one of the main supposed benefits of these arrangements). 
174 Furthen-nore, Ryan (2004,75) argues that arrangements such a SHIRBRIG are highly limited since they 
have only a light combat capability and, in addition, are a 'one-shot option' - the force is not available for 
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The greatest problem with these arrangements, though, is that, like any UN 
mission dependent on the ad hoc contribution of troops, both SHIRBRIG and UNSAS 
depend on national approval. States retain the prerogative on whether or not to deploy 
troops. To be sure, this is not necessarily a bad thing, given the value of internal 
representativeness. 175 However, this requirement of national authorisation is often time 
consuming and can slow deployment (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,173). This will further 
decrease rapid reaction capability. Most significantly, the need for national approval 
means that, on many occasions, states choose not to provide troops. The participating 
members of SHIRBRIG, for instance, declined to act in Darfur (Langille 2004,2). 
Consequently, the need for national approval means that a UN rriission may lack the 
necessary number of troops or may not be undertaken at all. Hence, Langille argues: 
"With respect to UNSAS, there are few, if any, certainties" (2000b, 11). 
One potential solution would be to remove the need for national approval. Once 
states had signed up to UNSAS, SHIRBRIG, or a similar model, they would be legally 
bound to provide troops. In addition to tackling the problem of member states' lack of 
willingness to contribute troops, this would also mean that states would have to retain 
their troops in a higher state of readiness, and would therefore provide the UN with a 
stronger rapid reaction capability. Yet it is unlikely that, firstly, states would sign up to 
such an agreement and, secondly, even if they did sign up to it, would act as if bound by 
it. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is 
supposed to ensure that states will always act in response to genocide, but states have 
eight months after its use (while the troops are rested and the brigade is reconstituted). 
175 See Chapter 6. 
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been unwilling to act in a number of cases of genocide, such as in Rwanda and Darfur. 
We can envisage a similar reaction to an automated standby system. Moreover, even if 
states did agree to be bound to commit troops under such an automated standby system 
the UN missions would lack legitimacy because they would not be internally 
representative. Those providing the resources for the intervention - the citizens of the 
various member states who signed up to UNSAS, SHIRBRIG, or a similar alternative - 
would have no say in whether, where, and how these resources are used. 176 Hence, 
removing national approval of standby arrangements is neither feasible nor an especially 
desirable solution. 
Overall, then, enhancing UN standby arrangements cannot be the solution to the 
problems with the current mechanisms and agents of hwnanitarian intervention because 
such standby arrangements suffer from the same inherent weaknesses as the UN ad hoc 
national contingents (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,175). That is, with a standby system, states 
will simply stand by in the face of a humanitarian crisis on too many occasions. This 
inherent problem of UN standby forces cannot be overcome easily. Perhaps a better 
option would be to concentrate instead on developing a UN standing force. Conetta and 
Knight argue that "[i]f the goal is a truly rapid, multilateral capability to deploy for peace 
operations, there is no good substitute for a UN standing force" (1995, xiii). The next 
section will consider whether they are right. 
176 The automated provisions of the Genocide Convention contradict internal representativeness. Does this 
mean that we should abandon the Genocide Convention? In short, no, because, as argued in Chapter 5, 
when extremely beneficial consequences are at stake, such as genocide, effectiveness can be sufficient for 
legitimacy. This means that an intervener can be legitimate overall even if it lacks internal 
representativeness. 
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IV. CREATION OF A (SMALL) COSMOPOLITAN UN VOLUNTEER, STANDING 
ARMY 
There have been many proposals for a UN standing army, from Trygve Lie (the first UN 
Secretary-General) in the 1950s, Brian Urquhart (a former UN Under-Secretary-General) 
in the early 1990s, to a number of proposals more recently., 77 Although these proposals 
differ in detail, most of them share the same core ideas. Essentially, what is envisaged is a 
standing military force of around 5,000-10,000 troops to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. This force would be authorised by the UN Security Council and deployable 
within a few days. The troops would be truly cosmopolitan in character: they would be 
volunteers (rather than conscripts, although still paid); they would not have any national 
allegiance; and they would be motivated by considerations of humanity (Kinloch-Pichat, 
2004). They would also be an elite force, similar to the French Foreign Legion, and have 
a strong esprit de corps. 
The attractiveness of such a force is clear: rather than the current situation, where 
the UN has to beg, often unsuccessfully, for ad hoc contributions of troops from 
177 These include: Caney (2005), Conetta and Knight (1995), Held (1995; 1998), Langille (2004), Smith 
(1998), Tan (2006), Urquhart (2003), and Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (2005). See Kinloch-Pichat (2004) 
for a detailed history of the proposals for a UN standing army. A slightly different yet interesting proposal 
(although largely heuristic) is made by Bernard Williams (1995,3-4). He suggests the creation of an 
international rescue army of private relief agencies such as Oxfam, which would be funded by billionaire 
philanthropists, consist of idealistic soldiers, and be guided by a committee of reputable international 
figures. 
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unwilling member states in order to fulfil its mandates, there would be a readily available 
standing army to deploy quickly and effectively. This force would also overcome three of 
the central problems outlined with any standby arrangement such as UNSAS or 
SHIRBRIG (Kinloch-Pichat 2004). First, these troops would not be subject to national 
authorisation, since they would have no national allegiance. Second, the troops would be 
able to train together, and so would be much more integrated. Third, this force would 
provide a real rapid reaction capability. 
So, having seen what this force would look like, the question is this: would such a 
UN force be able to ensure legitimately that we can effectively prevent mass violations of 
human rights on a more frequent basis? I will begin this discussion with three common, 
but unpersuasive, sets of objections. 
The first objection is that the creation of such a force is unfeasible. It is claimed that 
states would not agree to a cosmopolitan UN force for a number of reasons. For instance, 
the anti-UN stance of the Bush Administration means that it would block any moves to 
establish a standing army for the UN. Similarly, former Australian foreign affairs 
minister, Gareth Evans (1993,58), argues that states in the South would also strongly 
oppose such a force, for fear it may be used against them. Thus, Marrack Goulding, a 
former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, claims that a 
cosmopolitan military force "will continue to be a bigger pill than sovereign states will 
feel able to swallow" (2004,114). 
This criticism is unconvincing. The sceptics are right to point to the current 
political difficulties of establishing such a force, but these problems are not innate to the 
international system. We should not assume that American or Southern opposition will 
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remain in perpetuity. 178 Moreover, the proposed force would be fairly small and, as such, 
its creation would not be excessively demanding. It would not take that much effort to 
achieve. Although the estimated cost of $500 million to set up and $200 million per year 
certainly raises funding issues, this expense is not so large as to be insurmountable 
(Kinloch-Pichat 2004,208; Oakley 1993,53). Further, there is a growing realisation in 
the international community that a rapid response to a humanitarian crisis before it 
escalates is highly cost effective, since it avoids the need for a much more extensive (and 
expensive) mission later on. So, the creation of a cosmopolitan UN army, as proposed, is 
certainly feasible and a realistic goal to work towards. 
A second common objection concerns not the feasibility of a cosmopolitan force, 
but its desirability. The suggestion is that a UN standing army would lead to an increase 
in supranational governance, which, it is feared, would ultimately result in a tyrannical 
world state. 179 As Langille (2000b, 16) points out, if the small cosmopolitan UN force 
proposed gains a reputation for being successful, there probably would be moves to 
extend its size and power. However, even if this were true, we would still be a very long 
way from a world state. Furthermore, although one may rightly reject a world state, 
supranational governance short of this might well be desirable. As David Held (1995b) 
and Daniele Archibugi (2004a) have demonstrated, given the current lack of democratic 
and effective control over globalising forces, there is a need to increase the amount of 
179 In fact, for most of the latter part of the 20th-century, the U. S. was the main supporter of this proposal 
(Kinloch-Pichat 2004,165). 
179As Kant argues in the First Supplement to Perpetual Peace: "The amalgamation of states under one 
superior power... would end in one universal monarchy, and laws always lose in vigor what government 
gains in extent" (1795,3). See, also, Scully (2000,2) and Zolo (1997,12 1). 
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(democratic) supranational governance. In sum, even if we admit that a cosmopolitan UN 
force sits on a slippery slope that could end in supranational governance, this is not 
necessarily a bad thing, and it would be an extremely long slide to a world state. 
A third set of objections raises doubts over the troops who would forrn the 
cosmopolitan UN force. On the one. hand, it is alleged that there would not be enough 
volunteers. However, this argument can be easily dismissed. The elite nature of the force, 
the likelihood of combat, and the desire to fight for humanitarian causes could reasonably 
be expected to draw volunteers (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,212). 180 On the other hand, it is 
claimed that, although there would be enough troops for the force, they would be, in 
effect, mercenaries (Roberts in Kinloch-Pichat 2004,215). And, as NiccolO' Machiavelli 
argues, mercenaries "are useless and dangerous... disunited, thirsty for power, 
undisciplined, and disloyal... The reason for all this is that there is no loyalty or 
inducement to keep them on the field apart from the little they are paid, and this is not 
enough to make them want to die for you" (1961,3 8). 
However, the use of the term 'mercenary' is ambiguous. If mercenaries are taken 
to be soldiers who have no national allegiance and who are paid for their services, it 
might be accurate to label the troops of a cosmopolitan UN force 'mercenaries'. Yet, on 
this understanding, it is not clear what is wrong with being a mercenary. In modem times, 
soldiers who have no national allegiance yet are paid for their services would not 
necessarily have the negative moral qualities that Machiavelli highlights. Although I 
18OAn example of this is the recent television marketing of U. K. Navy, which uses a humanitarian 
intervention-type (hypothetical) situation to recruit volunteers. Similarly, Walzer (2002a, 6) gives the 
example of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. 
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doubted the legitimacy of PMCs as humanitarian interveners in both this chapter and in 
the previous chapter, it was not for these reasons; indeed, I argued that, even if they are 
ultimately unpersuasive, we need to take seriously arguments for increasing the use of 
such companies. Moreover, as Urquhart (1993b) outlines in his proposal, the troops of a 
cosmopolitan UN force would be based on outstanding leadership, high standards of 
recruitment, training, and performance, and a dedication to the principles and objectives 
of the UN. As a result, even if they were classified as mercenaries, they would avoid the 
negative qualities associated with that term. Alternatively, if we adopt a stricter definition 
of mercenaries which includes such negative qualities, such as that found in the various 
legal classifications, Machiavelli's criticisms may be more appropriate - it may be more 
likely that mercenaries are thirsty for power, undisciplined, and disloyal., 81 Yet, it would 
not be accurate to label the troops of a cosmopolitan UN army as mercenaries, since they 
would not have the required, more specific, characteristics, such as being specially 
recruited for a particular conflict. 
Having discussed three common, but unpersuasive, objections to the legitimacy of 
the proposed cosmopolitan UN force, I want to turn now to two criticisms that are more 
telling. These will show that, although the need remains for a cosmopolitan UN force, it 
would need to be substantially different in two respects. 
The first problem with the proposed force is that it would be severely limited in 
what it could do. Given the size of the force envisaged, 5,000-10,000 troops, it would be 
too small to intervene successfully in many situations (Elliott and Cheeseman 2004,282; 
Evans 1993,58; Hillen 1994,62; Kinloch-Pichat 2004,142; Wheeler 2000,306). Most 
1 a' See Kinloch-Pichat (2004,214-217) on the various legal classifications. 
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humanitarian crises would require a much greater number of troops. For instance: 20,000 
troops were required to implement the no-fly zones in Northern Iraq in 1991 (ICISS 
2001b, 88); 30,000 American troops alone were used for the 1992 operation in Somalia 
(Oakley 1993,52); 21,000 troops were needed for the multinational force in Haiti in 1994 
(ICISS 2001b, 104); and over 50,000 NATO troops were needed to keep Kosovo 
peaceful (Goulding 2004,106). So, the problem is this: a cosmopolitan UN force of only 
5,000-10,000 troops would not be able to respond to many humanitarian crises. 
To be fair, most of its proponents would accept this criticism. They tend to see such 
a force as having three roles: first, to deploy rapidly in the early stages of a crisis, thereby 
achieving a successful resolution without needing to be replaced; second, to deploy 
rapidly with ad hoc troops replacing it after a few months; and third, to fill gaps in ad hoc 
coalitions where member states have not contributed enough troops. Hence, the role of 
the cosmopolitan UN force, as envisaged by its proponents, would not be to replace the 
role of ad hoc UN coalitions or other agents, who would still be needed, especially for 
large-scale missions (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,219). Rather, it would be to fill gaps in 
current UN capacity, especially its lack of a rapid reaction capability. 
But there would be two problems with having such a force fulfil these three roles. 
First, as discussed earlier, the existing options on humanitarian intervention are 
inadequate and offer little guarantee that effective action will be taken to halt a serious 
and large-scale humanitarian crisis, such as Darfur. The three roles outlined for the 
cosmopolitan UN force are quite limited and would seem to do little to change this 
situation. Second, this force would have difficulty perforrning even these three quite 
limited roles. To start with, if the force fulfilled one of its roles in one region in the world, 
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it would not be able to intervene elsewhere. Yet it is common for there to be more than 
one humanitarian crisis at a time that needs tackling. Hence, Wheeler states: "The UN 
Fire Brigade could not have been sent to save Rwandans, because it would already have 
been committed to firefighting in Somalia or Bosnia" (2000,304). In addition, too few of 
the proposals take into account the need for rotation (Evans 1993,58). The need for 
rotation of troops means that the force would be, as Alan Ryan (2004,75) suggests with 
regard to SHIRBRIG, a 'one-shot option': after undertaking one mission, it would not be 
available for a number of months afterwards whilst its troops regenerate. Furthermore, 
when the force is used as an initial rapid reaction force, no backup troops may be 
forthcoming from member states to replace it (Hillen 1994,61). This would confront the 
force with an unenviable dilemma of either leaving, thereby letting the humanitarian 
crisis go unresolved, or staying, thereby depriving others of access to its protection 
(although there may be some pressure on states to provide backup). Lastly, having funded 
the force, states would most likely expect it to remove some of their peacekeeping and 
humanitarian intervention burden, and therefore may be less willing to provide troops 
themselves. As a result, the gaps in UN ad hoc missions may be much larger. ' 82 The 
upshot is that a cosmopolitan UN force, as proposed, would be likely to have little utility. 
Proposals that lead to one legitimate, but limited, agent of intervention, and to much non- 
intervention, are far from the solution to the problem of who should intervene. 183 
182 Kuperman (2001,116) presents a comparable argument about proposals for extending standby 
arrangements for the UN. 
193 In section (V), I suggest a way to resolve the problem of the force's size. 
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It would not be only the size of the force proposed that would limit its utility. First, 
it would have to rely on powerful states - especially the U. S. - for lift capacity, 
communications, and logistics, which would reduce its ability to operate independently of 
the wishes of powerful states (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,210-211). Second, the force would 
be dependent on the financial contributions of member states (again, especially the U. S. ), 
who could use this dependency to control the force (Kinloch-Pichat 2004,206-211). 
Third, and perhaps most serious, it would be dependent on UN Security Council 
authorisation. This would severely restrict its use since it would be deployed only where 
the permanent members allowed it to be (Wheeler 2000,304; Walzer 2002a, 6; 2004a, 
80). To that extent, Kinloch-Pichat (2004,237) argues that the UN force would not be 
used against any of the permanent members of the Security Council (although this might 
be justified on grounds of prudence) or against any other states they wished to shield. 
Indeed, the permanent members would most likely authorise its use only where they did 
not deem their interests to be at stake. 184 So, even if the force were large enough and had 
the military, logistical, and financial resources to intervene, it would not have been 
deployed in Darfur, given China's opposition, or in Kosovo, given Russia's opposition, 
and perhaps not even in Rwanda, given the behaviour of the permanent members at that 
time. Thus, the force, as proposed, would lack the political autonomy necessary to make a 
substantial difference. 
184 A related objection here is that the authorisation of the UN force would still be reliant on the morally 
objectionable Security Council, which lacks insufficient representation and equality (Kinloch-Pichat 2004, 
235; Abbot 2005,6). Although this is an accurate, intrinsic criticism of the functioning and representation 
of the UN Security Council, my point is more instrumental: the Security Council would restrict the ability 
of the force to act. 
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Hence, Kinloch-Pichat (2004,211) argues that the idea of a UN force, which was 
designed by its proponents to relieve the dependence of the UN on powerful states for 
humanitarian intervention, brings us back to square one. Its deployment is dependent on 
the wishes of powerful states, who are likely to block humanitarian intervention on a 
number of occasions, meaning that threatened populations will be left to their fate. 
V. A LARGER COSMOPOLITAN UN FORCE AND COSMOPOLITAN 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
We should not abandon the idea of a cosmopolitan UN force, however. There are serious 
problems with the current agents of humanitarian intervention and the situation clearly 
needs improving. Moreover, a cosmopolitan UN force would, as suggested above, 
certainly have some merits, such as being an elite force and providing a rapid reaction 
capability. Indeed, such a force, if revised, could be fully legitimate according to the 
conception of legitimacy outlined in the previous chapter. For this reason, I will now 
argue that, to have substantial moral worth - to be a significant goal worth working 
towards - it is necessary to make two amendments to the existing proposals. 
As the first objection shows, a cosmopolitan UN force would need to be much 
larger to be effective. Michael O'Hanlon (2003,85) argues that 200,000 troops would be 
needed to tackle all the humanitarian crises in the world at any one time, which translates 
into 600,000 troops after taking into account the need for rotation. Given the elite nature 
of the cosmopolitan UN force, it would perhaps require 75,000 troops to be available at 
any time, with support staff and rotation taking this to 175,000 troops (although this 
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might still be a little optimistic). Such a force would be able to intervene in larger 
humanitarian crises, such as Darfur, and be able to intervene in more than one place at a 
time. It would also be able to continue its deployment without reliance on ad hoc troops 
for backup. 185 
As the second objection shows, the force would also need to have the necessary 
autonomy. For this, it would need to be provided with financial, military, and logistical 
resources, and freed from the self-interested decision-making of major states. 
Yet we should not simply place the decision on where and when to authorise the 
force in the hands of the UN Secretary-General and the Secretariat. Although this would 
reduce the influence of major states, and therefore help the force to be more autonomous, 
it would give much power to unelected officials, who could easily abuse it. It is important 
then that this force should be accountable, and, specifically, democratically accountable. 
Why is deinocratic accountability in particular valuable? 186 My reasoning here is 
similar to that of Held (1998). Democratic decision-making should be extended to 
significant decisions that are global in scope. This would include the decision to deploy a 
large-scale cosmopolitan UN force, for such a deployment would have not only 
significant global effects, it would be undertaken by a global force in the name of 
humanity. More broadly, democratic decision-making is generally valuable for intrinsic 
"'This was the sort of size of force envisaged originally under Article 43 of the UN Charter, which, 
although never implemented, was meant to provide a large number of troops readily available to the UN 
Security Council. The U. S. estimated that it would provide 300,000 troops under this Article (Urquhart 
1993a, 3). 
186 There are other forms of accountability apart from democratic accountability, such as fiscal, market, 
public relational, and hierarchical accountability. See Keohane (2003) and Grant and Keohane (2005). 
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and instrumental reasons. Intrinsically, democratic decision-making maximises individual 
self-government. Democratic control (or, more specifically, majoritarian control) over a 
certain issue maximises the number of individuals who are self-governing on this issue. 
In addition, Christiano (1996) argues that democratic decision-making is needed for 
equality, particularly the equal consideration of interests. That is, democracy is required 
for each person's interests to be given equal consideration. Instrumentally, democratic 
decision-making tends to be more likely to deliver the right results. As Richard Arneson 
argues, "what renders the democratic form of governance... morally legitimate (when it 
is) is that its operation over time produces better consequences for people than any 
feasible alternative mode of governance" (2003,122). 187 Thus, for these three reasons 
(two intrinsic, one instrumental), having democratic control over a cosmopolitan LIN 
force is morally important. 188 
A satisfactory level of democratic accountability could not come from having the 
Security Council in charge of the force. In addition to restricting the potential usefulness 
of such a force by making its deployment dependent on the self-interested decision- 
making of major states, both the functioning of the Council, which heavily favours the 
permanent five members and lacks transparency, and its composition, which includes 
187 Space precludes a more detailed discussion of these reasons here. In Chapter 6,1 present a number of 
comparable arguments, including for the importance of individual self-government, how individual 
government is maximised by majoritarianism, and the instrumental importance of representativeness. 
'"The compatibility of these three sorts of justifications is subject to much dispute. Indeed, Christiano 
(1996) rejects the argument from self-government and Arneson (2003) gives a purely instrumentalist 
defence of democracy. Nevertheless, it is not altogether clear why these different justifications should 
conflict and therefore why we should reject a plural justification of democracy. 
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three European permanent members but none from the South, are undemocratic. Even if 
the force were handed to states on a more equal basis, for instance by resolution of the 
General Assembly, there would still not be sufficient democratic accountability. This is 
because, firstly, a system based on the equality of states treats states of massively 
differing sizes (such as Luxembourg and India) as equals, and therefore gives much more 
weight to individuals from smaller states, and, secondly, because many states are 
currently undemocratic. 189 
Given the problems with the democratic credentials of the current international 
system, to achieve a satisfactory level of democratic control over the large-scale 
cosmopolitan UN force we would need to develop cosmopolitan democratic institutions 
by reforming current institutions and developing new ones. The sort of institutions that 
would fit the bill include the following: a reformed UN Security Council, with regional 
organisations replacing the current permanent members and a watering down (and 
ultimate removal) of the veto'90; an intelligence gathering and monitoring institution to 
help to decide when and where intervention would be appropriate; a larger Secretariat 
with the ability to manage deployment of the force; international legal institutions with 
greater jurisdiction and resources, including the capacity to prosecute those who comn-dt 
egregious violations of basic human rights (thereby creating the need for hurnanitarian 
intervention in the first place) and the ability to ensure that the cosmopolitan UN force 
follows principles ofjus in bello; and a global parliament formed of representatives from 
'"See, further, Buchanan (2004,317-320). 
190Paul and Nahory (2005) suggest this can be done if Japan, Brazil, India, and Gen-nany press for reform 
rather than campaigning to become permanent members (which is unlikely to be successful anyway). 
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constituencies of the same size. 191 
These institutions would be in charge of authorising, running, and monitoring the 
use of force by the cosmopolitan UN standing army. Here is how they might work. The 
intelligence gathering institution would report to the global parliament a serious 
humanitarian crisis which it believes could be tackled by the cosmopolitan UN force. The 
global parliament would meet quickly to debate deployment of the force in this case, and 
perhaps resolve that the force should undertake humanitarian intervention to remedy this 
crisis. 192 The reformed UN Security Council would retain power to block the 
intervention, but only if there were a level of consensus in the Council (since none of the 
pen-nanent members, who would be regional organisations, would have the power of 
veto). The international legal institutions would make recommendations on the legality of 
the proposed intervention to both the global parliament and the reformed Security 
'9'This institution is perhaps most ambitious, but, according to Falk and Strauss (2001), is certainly 
realisable. They argue that, like the early European Parliament, a relatively weak assembly Created by 
global civil society and business leaders (perhaps with the endorsement of a relatively small number of 
countries to start with), and initially equipped with largely advisory powers, could begin to address 
concerns about democratic deficit, while posing only a long-term threat to the realities of state power. 
Formal powers could follow as the assembly becomes the practical place for clashing interests to be 
resolved. 
192 Archibugi (2004b, 10) also believes that a world parliament is the ideal institution to deliberate on 
humanitarian intervention. He also goes on to propose the creation of a UN anny. However, his proposal, 
unlike mine, is for a standby rather than a standing army. The (main) problem with such standby 
arrangements, as argued in section IV, is that states retain the prerogative of whether or not to deploy 
troops, and this means that, on many occasions, states do not provide troops. For further criticisms of 
Archibugi's proposal, see Farer (2005b). 
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Council. In addition, they would review the intervention afterwards, making detailed 
assessments of the action and recommendations for the future. 193 
In fact, it is unlikely that a cosmopolitan UN force of this size could be realised 
without these accompanying cosmopolitan democratic institutions. Unless we create 
cosmopolitan democratic institutions to go alongside the UN standing army, states would 
be likely to oppose the force ad infinitum (Ryan 2004,66). To give the UN more power, 
states will need to have more confidence in the UN, and this can come only with 
increased democratic control. 194 Cosmopolitan democratic institutions would therefore be 
an essential and desirable accompaniment to a large-scale cosmopolitan UN force. 
But if there were such cosmopolitan democratic institutions, why would there need to 
be such a force? It may seem that such institutions would remove much of the need for 
humanitarian intervention because they could prevent conflict through measures such as 
eradication of poverty, provision of education, and den-fflitarisation. They would also be 
able to undertake a number of coercive measures short of military action, such as the 
freezing of bank accounts, international criminal prosecution, and arms embargoes. 195 
'9'To be SUTe, I am not endoTsing WOT]d government. The role of these institutions is limited to global 
issues, such as serious humanitarian crises that require humanitarian intervention. On local and national 
issues, cosmopolitan democracy requires the decentralisation of decision-making. See Archibugi (2004a) 
and Pogge (1992,65). 
194 Certain states (i. e., the U. S. ) may oppose increasing the democratic credentials of the UN because this 
would create a rival, legitimate institution. Although this might be the case, it is unlikely that other states 
would agree to increase significantly the capacity of the UN to govern without such reform. 
1951n addition, improving the prosecution powers and capabilities of international legal institutions may 
deter governments and militias from violating human rights. 
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Nevertheless, the existence of cosmopolitan democratic institutions might not mean that 
local rivalries and conflicting interests were resolved completely and instantly., 
96 
Although some of the measures available to cosmopolitan democratic institutions could 
help to defuse many such situations, others may still flare up to a full-scale humanitarian 
crisis. We need to be ready to address them if they do. As Held (1995a, 276) argues, 
cosmopolitan democratic institutions require teeth. The international community learnt 
this lesson with the League of Nations, which was severely handicapped because it 
lacked powers of coercion. 197 
Hence, there are two parts to this proposal. First, there should be a new agent to 
undertake humanitarian intervention -a large-sized cosmopolitan UN force. Second, 
existing institutions should be reformed and new international institutions should be 
created to authorise humanitarian intervention - to decide when the relevant normative 
criteria have been met and when an intervener would be legitimate. In the hands of such 
global institutions, a large cosmopolitan UN force could intervene effectively to prevent 
mass violations of human rights in challenging situations on a much more frequent basis 
and with much greater democratic control. In short, it would befully legitimate according 
to the conception of legitimacy outlined in the previous chapter. 
196 As I will argue below, these proposals are part of nonideal theory. 
197 An additional benefit of such institutions is that they would also be able to act as legitimate authorising 
institutions. That is to say, they would be able to authorise other agents' humanitarian interventions and the 
stamp of approval from these institutions would legitimise the authorised agents. Hence, even if we do not 
create a large UN force, there are still good reasons (related to humanitarian intervention) to create such 
cosmopolitan democratic institutions. 
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Tyranny of the global majority 
One frequently voiced objection to the idea of global institutions is the danger that such 
institutions would be tyrannical. A particular variant of this objection can be made 
against my two-part proposal: these institutions might authorisethe force to undertake 
abusive intervention. This situation could arise if these institutions fell into the hands of a 
single leader or corrupt elite. But the more pertinent objection is that abusive non- 
humanitarian intervention could be authorised by the global demos. In short, there would 
be a danger of the tyranny of the global majority. Individuals (through their 
representatives) in a global parliament may vote to intervene to repress vulnerable 
minorities (such as the Romany). Alternatively, the converse problem could arise: the 
global demos may not approve humanitarian intervention that is warranted. 
Both situations would be more likely to arise if the global public, when voting on such 
issues, were uninformed or misguided. In this context, Dahl (1999,24) argues that, within 
the current international system, the complexity of a number of international matters puts 
them beyond the immediate capacities of most citizens. In his words: "many citizens are 
confused, hold weak opinions, or have no opinions at all" (Dahl 1999,27). This problem, 
Dahl argues, is likely to be worse at the level of global democratic institutions. 
In response, we should take steps to ensure that these cosmopolitan democratic 
institutions would authorise humanitarian intervention in the right cases and not in the 
wrong ones. I have already indicated that the global parliament's decision to deploy the 
cosmopolitan UN force could be blocked by the reformed UN Security Council. A further 
check on the power of the global demos would be the codification of certain criteria in 
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international law to restrict when humanitarian intervention can be legally authorised. 
Legal criteria such as this, if subject to independent judicial review (by strengthened 
international legal institutions), would limit the opportunities that the global parliament 
would have to authorise abusive intervention. 198 We should also provide for the 
possibility that the global demos might choose not to authorise intervention by the 
cosmopolitan UN army when it would be legitimate. In some of these cases, regional 
organisations should step in. To be sure, these regional organisations should be reformed 
so that they are democratic and so that their intervention is subject to review by the global 
cosmopolitan democratic institutions. I consider this ftirther below. 
Ultimately, though, whether we find this tyranny of the global majority objection 
persuasive depends on whether we think that democratic decision-making is 
instrumentally justified. As suggested above, there is good reason for thinking that it is. 
Any demos may sometimes support the wrong options; Dahl is mistaken to highlight 
international issues in particular. Domestically, individuals often hold mistaken, 
misguided, and immoral views, yet democracy, on the whole, seems to be the best way of 
producing the right results. 199 The same can be said for the global demos in control of the 
UN force: although they might make the wrong decision sometimes, these occasions 
would probably be outweighed by the times they get it right. Furthermore, they would be 
more likely to perform better in this regard than any other potential arrangement which 
works with the current international system. This response points to an important feature 
'"As discussed above, codification of legal criteria on humanitarian intervention is not without its 
problems, however. Specifically, it would be difficult to achieve agreement on which particular criteria 
should be included, with the danger of either a legal proscription that is too permissive or too restrictive. 
19917or a detailed discussion of how democracy is instrumentally justified, see Weale (1999). 
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of arguments for cosmopolitan democracy: cosmopolitan democratic institutions are best 
judged not simply on their own merits (or shortcomings). They are instead better judged 
in comparison with current arrangements and other possible alternatives. Let me explain. 
In A Thcory of Juslicc, Rawls (I 999a) distinguishes between two sorts of theorising: 
ideal theory and nonideal theory. The former, ideal theory, "assumes strict compliance 
and works out the principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favourable 
circumstances" (Rawls 1999a, 216) . 
200 By contrast, nonideal theory is concerned with 
"the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice" (Rawls 1999a, 8). The 
proposals for a cosmopolitan UN force and accompanying cosmopolitan democratic 
institutions should be treated as an exercise in nonideal theory, not ideal theory. Their 
aim is to tackle a far-from-well-ordered international society where injustice is 
widespread. Indeed, any theory of the legitimacy of a humanitarian intervener will 
inevitably be an exercise in nonideal theory, given that it is concerned with grave 
circumstances (i. e. egregious violations of basic human rights). 201 
Accordingly, any nonideal theory will still have some potential drawbacks - after all, 
it is not ideal. Although potential drawbacks are undesirable, these are unavoidable given 
the degree of injustice that a nonideal theory must work with. Therefore, it would be 
mistaken to reject a nonideal theory, such as my proposal for cosmopolitan democratic 
institutions and a large-scale cosmopolitan UN force, because of the (small) possibility of 
abuse by the global denios. We should instead compare it to other nonideal theories. One 
2"The theory of justice that Rawls (1999a) develops for a domestic society is an example of an ideal 
theory. 
201 See Buchanan (2004,55-56). 
293 
Chapter 8: Reform 
leading alternative to the proposals is a statist order, but compared to the proposals 
outlined above for cosmopolitan democratic institutions, the likelihood of egregious 
abuse of power in such an order is much greater. As Caney asserts, the statist system 
"grants states untrammelled power to persecute their peoples. Unlike a multilevel system 
of cosmopolitan governance, the rights and interests of the people are entirely dependent 
on the conduct of their state" (2005,165). 
There are two responses then to the challenge that the global majority could use the 
UN force to undertake an abusive intervention against a minority. The first is that we 
could insist on a system of checks and balances to help guard against abuse. The second 
is that a permanent UN force in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions should 
not be judged absolutely, but instead judged in comparison with the alternatives - it 
would be better than an international system of states. 
VI. IMPROVED REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
A further objection to my proposal is that both aspects, the intervening force and the 
authorising institutions, are unattainable. This objection is too strong. Although these 
proposals are unlikely to be realised in the short-term, they are certainly possible. The 
existence of the EU and the UN proves that transnational institutions can be created (Held 
1998,28). There is no reason to think that, given time, global democratic institutions with 
a cosmopolitan UN force could not be created as well. 
Of course, such reforms are unlikely to happen overnight. They are best seen 
instead as mid- to long-terrn solutions to the problems with the current agents and 
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mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. As the desirability of a cosmopolitan UN force 
is increased by making the two changes suggested above (by increasing its size and by 
putting it under the control of cosmopolitan democratic institutions), the likelihood of 
achieving this goal in the short-term diminishes. Creating a small-scale cosmopolitan UN 
force, such as that proposed by Urquhart and others, is more likely to be attainable, yet its 
lack of autonomy and utility limit the desirability of this reform. It may be more fruitful, 
therefore, to concentrate our immediate efforts elsewhere. To that extent, a better short- 
term option would be to strengthen certain regional and sub-regional organisations so that 
they have a greater ability to undertake effective humanitarian intervention within their 
regions. This has more immediate political viability than a small-scale standing UN force 
(given the likely opposition to this force). It is also more desirable. Unlike a small-scale 
standing UN force, which would have limited utility (for instance, being able to tackle 
only one humanitarian crisis at a time) and which would be reliant on major states, 
regional organisations, if improved, could intervene without being subject to the whims 
of major states and could provide the capacity to tackle a number of different 
humanitarian crises in different regions across the world at the same time. 202 
As suggested in the previous chapter, regional organisations often have the 
willingness to intervene. The proximity of regional interveners means that they typically 
have a vested interest in resolving the crisis (ICISS 2001b, 210). A nearby humanitarian 
crisis may cause border incursions, an influx of refugees, financial hardship, and political 
202Kinloch-Pi chat (2004,235) also proposes improving regional organisations' capability to intervene. My 
proposal differs from his in that he proposes creating a UN standing army before pursuing regional options. 
This gets things the wrong way round: it would be far simpler and more beneficial to improve regional 
organisations' capabilites first. 
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instability for the whole region. Indeed, it would be odd if member states of regional 
organisations did not benefit from humanitarian intervention within their regions. This 
element of self-interest makes the necessary commitment - as well as the willingness to 
undertake intervention - more likely to be forthcoming. It is in regional organisations' 
interests to stay the course, thereby ensuring a successful resolution to the humanitarian 
crisis in the long-term. The problem though with regional organisations at the moment is 
that they lack the resources to undertake humanitarian intervention successfully. I 
discussed the problems of ECOWAS, the EU, and the AU in this respect in the previous 
chapter. The suggestion, then, is to utilise the potential willingness of regional 
organisations to undertake humanitarian intervention by strengthening their capabilities to 
do so. 
There arc a number of potential improvements that might be made. The most 
obvious is to develop the military resources of regional organisations. This would not 
require an enormous effort; regional organisations will rarely require extensive lift 
capacity to intervene within their own regions. Particular attention should be paid to the 
strengthening of African regional organisations, such as the AU and ECOWAS, given the 
large number of humanitarian crises on this continent and the general reluctance of other 
agents to intervene in what are regarded as African quagmires. In this context, practical 
measures of improvement include assistance with fundingý 03 and the further training of 
African troops in peacekeeping with programs such as the Global Peace Operations 
'O'The UN may now be more willing to use some of its peacekeeping budget to help fund AU interventions 
(Annan 2005,52). This is a positive development. 
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Initiative. 204 The latter would help to overcome some of the previous problems with 
African peacekeepers' abuse of civilians (Nowrojee 2004,8). In addition, Gompert 
(2006) proposes a partnership between NATO and regional organisations, particularly the 
AU. He argues that we should, firstly, expand the capabilities of AU forces so as they are 
more combat capable and, secondly, have NATO members reinforce these troops if 
escalation is necessary (Gompert 2006,14). This partnership, he argues, is both 
consistent with NATO's new aim of extending security beyond Europe and would be 
sustainable politically in the West and in Africa (Gompert 2006). 
In addition, proposals for the African Standby Force under the control of the AU 
should be put into place, and the 15,000 troops projected for this force will probably need 
to be increased, given the number of conflicts in Africa and the need for a sustained troop 
presence. Likewise, the proposals for EU battlegroups would be a positive development if 
put in place, but would still need to be increased in size and capacity (perhaps to include 
greater lift capacity and logistics) so that the EU can successfully intervene to tackle 
large-scale humanitarian crises beyond its borders. 
A further improvement would be to reform certain regional organisations' treaties 
or constitutions so that humanitarian intervention by the relevant regional organisation 
within its own borders is legally permissible. I discussed this option briefly in section (1). 
Such reform could mean that regional organisations would be able to intervene legally 
within their own regions without requiring UN Security Council authorisation. Further in 
204ThiS U. S. -initiative aims to provide 75,000 extra peacekeepers worldwide, most of them African 
(Gompert 2006,7). However, some argue that such training programs ought to be treated carefully because 
of the danger of increasing the conflict capabilities of unstable states (Bhatia 2003,143). For a reply, see 
O'Hanlon (2003,104-105). 
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the future, it would be desirable if regional organisations had not only the legal right to 
undertake humanitarian intervention within their borders, but also the legal duty to do so. 
Either solution, a legal right or a legal duty to undertake humanitarian intervention, 
places much trust in regional organisations. A potential objection here is that this trust 
would be abused by regional hegemons that would use the cover of legality to engage in 
abusive intervention. The trust in regional organisations would be more justified if 
regional organisations were reformed so that they were more democratic, both in 
composition (by the democratisation of member states) and in functioning (by increasing 
transparency and by ensuring a large role for regional parliaments). These revisions 
would mean that humanitarian intervention undertaken by regional organisations is much 
more likely to be internally representative and, ultimately, legitimate. 205 However, such 
democratic reforms would not be necessary for regional organisations to have a 
satisfactory degree of legitimacy in the short-term. Although these proposals for 
improving the authorising mechanism of regional organisations are desirable, the 
immediate aim is to improve the capacity of regional organisations to undertake 
intervention within their regions. 
We need to be careful that these proposals for strengthened regional organisations 
- and in particular African regional organisations - would not lead to the international 
community completely washing their hands of crises not in their region (Bellamy and 
Williams 2004,195; Weiss 2001,423). It is important, then, that other agents, such as 
205As with cosmopolitan democratic institutions, humanitarian crises still may occur despite regional 
organisations being more legitimate. Although such crisis may be less likely, we should still expect them to 
occur occasionally. The crisis that arose after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, in a country that has 
long and prestigious democratic history, is proof that we should not rest on our laurels. 
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states and the UN, realise that they have a moral duty to undertake humanitarian 
intervention even if there are regional mechanisms in place. In anticipation of this 
problem, it would be a good idea, firstly, to strengthen regional organisations' capability 
to intervene even further so that other agents' lack of willingness to intervene would not 
be too detrimental, and, secondly, for regional organisations to highlight that they may 
not always be able to act and that other agents still may have the responsibility to protect. 
Hence, reforn-dng regional organisations is the most constructive short-term 
solution to the problem of a lack of legitimate interveners to undertake humanitarian 
intervention. But it may be asked here, if regional organisations were democratic and 
effective, why would we require a cosmopolitan UN force with accompanying 
cosmopolitan democratic institutions? 
The first point to note is that these two options are, for the most part, 
complementary. The provisions for increasing regional organisations' ability to intervene 
effectively and democratically would be consistent with the general ethos of 
cosmopolitan democracy. And, as suggested earlier, even with a cosmopolitan UN force 
and accompanying democratic institutions, it may still be important to have regional 
organisations with a capability to undertake humanitarian intervention (for cases where 
the global denios decides against authorising intervention). 206 As Walzer argues, the 
world would not be "improved by having only one agent of international rescue. The men 
and women in the burning building are probably better served if they can appeal to more 
than a single set of firefighters" (2004a, 103). 
206 That said, regional organisations should intervene only if the global bodies have not expressly ruled that 
humanitarian intervention would be impermissible in the particular case at hand. 
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Second, beyond the issue of humanitarian intervention, there are many additional 
reasons of cosmopolitan justice for creating cosmopolitan democratic institutions, which 
could not be dealt with if we were to rely simply on strengthened regional organisations. 
Cosmopolitan democratic institutions are required if we are to tackle poverty, nuclear 
proliferation, and environmental concerns effectively and democratically (Pogge 1992, 
62-64). 
Third, whilst regional organisations reformed in this way (including 
democratically) would have a more than adequate degree of legitimacy, a cosmopolitan 
UN force could be fully legitimate according to the conception of legitimacy outlined in 
the previous chapter. Unlike reformed regional organisations, a large-scale cosmopolitan 
UN force would have much greater capacity to be locally externally representative and is 
much more likely to follow principles of jus in bello (given the strengthening of the 
global legal institutions). Most importantly, a cosmopolitan UN force would be more 
likely to be effective because it would be a highly-motivated, elite force with rapid 
reaction capability, and with significant experience of intervening in humanitarian crises. 
Thus, whilst reformed regional organisations would be a desirable short- to mid- 
term solution to the problem of who should intervene, in the long-term, to achieve fully 
legitimate humanitarian intervention, we would need the sort of democratic and effective 
intervention that can come only from a large UN force under control of cosmopolitan 
democratic institutions. Whilst this is not on the cards today, nor will it be tomorrow, or 
any time in the near future, it is in the realm of the possible. And as Urquhart argues 
(when outlining his more limited proposal): "There are plenty of arguments against such 
a force. There is one overwhelming argument for it. It is desperately needed" (2003,2). 
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Having considered various proposals for improving the mechanisms of humanitarian 
intervention in the previous chapter, and having defended two reforms in particular, I will 
conclude this thesis by considering how we can improve the international community's 
will to achieve these reforms. 
Since Chapter 7 provided a detailed summary of the arguments from the previous 
chapters, I will not recap the main arguments of the thesis here. Instead, I will compete 
the analysis of the thesis by considering how we can achieve, in the short-term, the 
strengthening of regional organisations and, in the long-term, the development of a 
cosmopolitan UN force in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions. I will also 
consider how we can increase the international community's will to undertake 
humanitarian intervention more generally, which I suggest is central to achieving such 
reforms. In particular, I offer some proposals for amending states' perceptions of their 
national interest. However, I argue that it is important not to overemphasise arguments 
concerning interests; the more salient point is that there is a duty to intervene and to 
achieve these reforms. Finally, I consider who, in particular, has these duties. 
Achieving these reforms 
We should not be too pessimistic about the chances of achieving the two main reforms 
suggested in the previous chapter. First, the fact that there have been a number of 
proposals for reform, such as the Helsinki Headline Goal and the creation of the African 
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Union Standby Force, demonstrates that there is a certain degree of will in the 
international community to reform the current mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. 
Second, the fact that there have been a number of actual reforms, such as improvements 
made to the UN, the creation of SHIRBRIG, and the development of EU battlegroups 
demonstrates that the will to reform is sometimes sufficiently strong to achieve reform. 
However, we need to increase significantly this will to reform if we are to achieve fully 
legitimate humanitarian intervention, that is, to develop a large-sized cosmopolitan UN 
army in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions. 
Central to improving the international community's will to reform the 
mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention is improving the will to undertake 
humanitarian intervention. If international actors are keener to intervene to tackle 
egregious violations of human rights, then they will be more likely to push for reforms to 
the current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention that will enable them to 
do so more effectively and, ultimately, legitimately. More generally, improving the will 
to undertake humanitarian intervention is a desirable goal. It will help to tackle one of the 
key problems in the current international system highlighted in Chapter 7: the lack of 
willingness to intervene to protect human rights. 
Conversely, one way to improve the intemational community's will to intervene 
is to improve the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention. Most of the 
reforms discussed in the previous chapter, if put in place, would help, to some extent, to 
overcome the reluctance to undertake intervention. In particular, one of the benefits of 
increasing the ability of regional organisations to undertake humanitarian intervention is 
that this would take advantage of their greater willingness to intervene, which is currently 
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limited by their lack of capacity (Hirsh 2000,6). There are, then, two interlinked 
challenges: to increase the international community's willingness to undertake 
humanitarian intervention and to increase the international community's will to reform 
current institutional arrangements so that humanitarian intervention can be undertaken 
legitimately. 
A practical way of improving the international community's will in these two 
regards, suggested by John Clarke (2001), is to highlight the successes of previous 
interventions. Commitment and willingness often depends on the support for intervention 
from the agent of intervention's home population. This support is more likely to be 
forthcoming when this population has been shown by the media and by the UN that 
previous interventions have been succesSfUl. 207 
Another way of improving the international community's will to undertake 
humanitarian intervention and to reform the current mechanisms and agents of 
intervention is to encourage a subtle adjustment in states' perceptions of their national 
interest. In this context, Kofi. Annan has called for a new, broader definition of the 
national interest in which states recognise that the collective interest is identical with their 
national interest (Abbott 2005,7). To that extent, humanitarian intervention carried out 
effectively by states (or other agents) can have massive potential benefits for that 
intervener, such as increased international status, greater standing in regional 
organisations, and the opening up of new foreign markets. More generally, most of us 
have an interest in a just global order. A more narrow understanding of the national 
interest misses such benefits. 
20'Also see Stromseth (2003,270). 
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Furthermore, Brown (2005,227) argues that we need to get away from treating 
humanitarianism as a separate category of state behaviour. This is the product of a Realist 
mindset, he argues, since it takes states to be rational egoists who act in the pursuit of 
their material interest, with anything that varies from this requiring explanation (Brown 
2005,227). The danger with this mindset is that it will be reinforcing. That is to say, it 
will lead to a lack of humanitarian intervention, with states regarding standing by in the 
face of a humanitarian crisis as the behaviour expected of them, unless there is a material 
interest clearly involved. Brown (2005,228) proposes instead that we adopt a more 
ideational notion of interests, which would remove the need for a separate category of 
humanitarian action. 
But even on narrow understandings of self-interest, such as those favoured by 
Realists, humanitarian intervention can be justified. There has been a growing realisation 
that the disruption caused by a humanitarian crisis far away can have significant domestic 
effects. For instance, failed states are increasingly being regarded as breeding grounds for 
international terrorism (Terriff 2004a; Welsh 2004,189). It is important, therefore, that 
we emphasise these links between humanitarian intervention and national interest, 
thereby tapping into a potential source of political will to undertake humanitarian 
intervention and to reform. 
The duties to intervene and to reform 
I do not want to overemphasise these arguments concerning national interest, however. 
The more salient point is that we have a duty to do what we can to prevent, to halt, and to 
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decrease substantial human suffering, such as that found in genocide and large-scale 
violations of human rights. 208 This more general duty to tackle human suffering 
translates, firstly, for certain international actors, into a more specific duty (and a right) to 
undertake humanitarian intervention. Second, this more general duty to tackle human 
suffering translates into other duties, which include the duty to reform the mechanisms of 
humanitarian intervention. Such reforrns are required if human suffering is to be 
prevented legitimately. That is to say, there is a duty to create a large-scale cosmopolitan 
UN force with accompanying democratic institutions and to enhance regional 
organisations' capabilities to intervene because these are central to ensuring that 
substantial human suffering is tackled. 
Who exactly has these duties? Tan (2006) suggests a number of potential ways of 
identifying who has the duty to intervene, some of which were discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. The most persuasive of these is that the most capable agent has the duty to act. 
This is similar to my argument at the end of Chapter 7: out of the currently existing 
agents, other things being equal, NATO should intervene because it is most likely to 
tackle successfully the humanitarian crisis. It is also similar to the general position taken 
in this thesis (especially in Chapters 4 and 5): the most legitimate intervener, which tends 
to be the most effective intervener, should intervene. It is necessary, though, to make a 
small modification to this approach. This approach is more persuasive if the most 
legitimate intervener, rather than the most effective intervener, has the duty to intervene. 
The benefit of this reformulated approach is that it gives the appropriate weight to other 
morally relevant qualities, such as internal representativeness, instead of emphasising 
20'For further discussion, see Chapter 2. 
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effectiveness alone. This change is subtle because, in most cases, the most effective 
intervener will be the most legitimate. 209 
Tan's preferred option, however, is to institutionalise the duty so that it is 
effectively carried out. Yet the institutional approach to resolving the agency problem is 
incomplete. As formulated by Tan, it requires merely that the duty to intervene be 
effectively carried out by the designated intervener. The problem with this, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, is that the designated intervener might not be the most legitimate. Suppose, 
for instance, that we were to institutionalise the duty to intervene at the UN. As argued in 
Chapter 7, the UN has an adequate degree of legitimacy and, in some cases at least, might 
be expected to carry out any future humanitarian intervention efficiently. Nevertheless, 
NATO may still be the preferred intervener given its much greater effectiveness. There is 
at least one significant argument for institutionalising the duty to intervene, however. 210 
This is that it would help to ensure that humanitarian intervention is more frequently 
undertaken. It will be harder for actors to avoid fulfilling their duty to intervene if this 
duty is assigned formally. 
My suggestion, then, is to combine these two approaches. This brings together the 
'09To give an example where it would not be, suppose Thailand has the expectation of saving 1,00 1 lives in 
a (hypothetical) humanitarian crisis in Laos, but has only adequate levels of internal and local external 
representativeness. Vietnam has the expectation of saving 1,000 lives and has extremely high levels of 
internal and local external representativeness. Although Thailand would have a reasonable degree of 
legitimacy and be the most capable intervener, intervention by Vietnam would be preferable because it 
would be the most legitimate. 
210 In addition, having an agent with the institutionalised duty to intervene may help to resolve some of the 
issues of vagueness discussed in Chapter 7. 
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reformulated version of the first approach, which says that the most legitimate intervener 
should intervene, with the second, which institutionalises this duty. We can do this either 
by first identifying the most legitimate intervener, and then giving it the legal duty to 
intervene, or by ensuring that the organisation that has the legal duty to intervene is the 
most legitimate, for instance, by providing it with the resources necessary for effective 
intervention. On this combined approach, the agent that would be the most legitimate 
humanitarian intervener would have the institutionalised duty to intervene, and having 
this institutionalised duty to intervene should mean that in general it undertakes 
intervention when necessary. 
One way I have already suggested of implementing this combined approach is to 
increase regional organisations' capacity to undertake humanitarian intervention within 
their own regions, so that they are the most legitimate interveners, and to institutionalise 
this by refori-ning regional organisations' constitutions so they have the legal duty to 
intervene. But we should go further than this. It should not be merely the most legitimate 
intervener that has the institutionalised duty to intervene, but the intervener that isfully 
legitimate according to the conception outlined in Chapter 7. We will achieve this goal if 
we act on the proposals for a large-sized cosmopolitan UN force in the hands of 
cosmopolitan democratic institutions. 
Until we achieve this combined approach, we should adopt the reformulated 
version of the first approach. This is preferable to the second approach because the 
second approach might assign the institutionalised duty to intervene to agents that are not 
the most legitimate, such as the UN (at the moment) or a small-scale standing UN army 
(as discussed in section (IV) of the previous chapter). Instead, on the amended first 
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approach, the most legitimate agent has the duty to intervene. 211 
Other agents do not have the duty to intervene. They do have, however, a duty to 
prevent human suffering, which means that they should work towards improving the 
capacity to undertake legitimate humanitarian intervention by helping achieve the 
reforms outlined in the previous chapter. As Tan argues, "all members are obliged to do 
what is necessary to establish and support the cooperative arrangement required to carry 
out the duty to protect" (2006,104; emphasis in original). To prevent human suffering 
legitiniately andfrequctilly, we need to create a cosmopolitan UN force and place it in the 
hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions. Again as Tan argues, the duty to intervene 
64can generate the duty to create a global humanitarian defence force if the creation of this 
force is required to ensure that the response to humanitarian emergencies is acceptably 
efficient" (2006,105). 
Hence, in this thesis, I have considered who should undertake humanitarian 
intervention. I have argued that we should look to the intervener that will be the most 
legitimate, which in most cases will be the intervener that will be the most effective. 
However, the currently existing agents of humanitarian intervention are inadequate. We 
therefore need to reform the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention, by, in 
21 'If the most legitimate intervener does not intervene, the duty to intervene would fall upon the next most 
legitimate intervener (states), and so on. This can only go so far, however. For any agent to have the duty to 
intervene, it is also necessary that they have an adequate degree of legitimacy. Otherwise, it would not have 
the right to intervene - no intervention would be better than intervention by an illegitimate intervener. This 
also fits in with our intuition that an intervener cannot have a duty to intervene if intervention will be 
excessively costly for it. Such an intervener would not be internally effective, so could not legitimately 
intervene in the first place; as Tan (2006) argues, it would not have the right to intervene. 
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the short-term, improving regional organisations' abilities to intervene and, in the long- 
term, developing a cosmopolitan UN force and cosmopolitan democratic institutions. 
Although only the most legitimate intervener has the duty to intervene, it falls on 
all of us in the international community to accept that we have the duty to reform the 
current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention in these two ways. These 
reforms are vital if states are to fulfil legitimately the responsibility to protect endangered 
populations that they agreed to at the 2005 UN World Summit. More broadly, these 
reforins are essential if we are to fulfil our duty to prevent human suffering. As I have 
argued, it is not merely in our interests to secure these reforms. It is our duty. 
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